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scarcely interest or be intelligible to any but readers of that work, I do not give the long passage to which the following refers. S. C.)
But why, if there are many Ichheiten, should not No. 1 I act on No. 2. I? If I act on itself, it is acted on, therefore actible on by an I. But to assert that it can be acted on by this and no other incomprehensiblydetermined-in-its-comprehensible-determinateness-I, is to assert, and no more. In short, the "Attributes of the Absolute Synthesis, the I am in inal I AM, are falsely transferred to the I AM in that God is.
Aye, replies Schelling, this would be secundum principium essendi · hut I speak only secundum principium sciendi.
True, I rejoin, but you assert that the two principles are one; p. 18, 1. 17-18. What is this but to admit that the I itself, even in its absolute synthesis, supposes an already perfected Intelligence, as the ground of the possibility of its existing as it does exist? And what is Schelling's Begräuztheit überhaupt but the allgemeinerte abstraction from the bestimmten Begräuztheiten-a mere ens logicum, like motion, form, color, &c.? S. T. C.
Note written in Schelling's Syst. des Transsc. Id., p. 121, above the section headed-Problem: to explain how the I beholds itself as perspective. Transl.
I more and more see the arbitrariness and inconveniences of using the same term, Anschauen, for the productive and the contemplative Acts of the Intelligential Will, which Schelling calls das Ich. If this were true, the I could never become self-conscious: for the same impossibility for the same reason will recur in the second act-and so in fact it is. We can no more pass without a saltus from mere Sensation to Perception, than from marble to Sensation.
Whether it is better to assume Sensation as a minimum of Perception, or to take them as originally diverse, and to contend that in all Sensation a minor grade of Perception is comprised, deserves consideration. S. T. C.
Transsc. Id., pp. 259–60. "Since, then, Intelligence beholds the evolution of the Universe, so far as it falls within its view (Anschauung), in an organization, it must consequently behold the same as identical with itself."
* The two things taken together, that the defined Limitation cannot be defined through the Limitation in general, and yet that it arises at the same time with this, and through one Act, makes that it is the Incomprehensible and Inexplicable of Philosophy. Transl.
†This Intuition (Anschauen) is an Activity, but the I cannot at once behold, and behold itself as beholding (anschauen, und sich anschauen, als anschauend). Ib., p. 121. Transl.
Whether from acquired habit or no, I do not, and seem to myself never to have, regarded my body as identical with myself, my brain any more than my nails or hair, or my eyes than a pair of spectacles. S. T. C.
A few other notes of Mr. C. on Schelling have become partly illegible, or are too much interwoven with the text to be given here. S. C.
On a treatise in the Jahrbücher der Medicin als Wissenschaft, entitled Grundsätze zu einer künftigen Seelenlehre, Ground-positions for a future Doctrine of the Soul,-Mr. Coleridge writes thus:
Never, surely, was work written so utterly unsatisfactory for both head and heart. What we are, or are to be; what the I is, is not evenspoken of. But we are gravely told, in the last paragraph, that, if we act virtuously, the soul will remember a something of which we, while there was a We, had been likewise conscious: while our brother Nothings, who had not been virtuous, would be forgotten by this Soul!!— though how this unconscious Soul can be said to forget what, according to this hypothesis, she never knew anything at all about, I cannot even conjecture. And what is the basis of the whole system-mere Ipse dixits, grounded on the mere assumptions of the scheme of dead mechanical emanation. S. T. C.
At the end of Schelling's Denkmal der Schrift von den göttlichen Dingen, &c., des Hern Friedr. Heinr. Jacobi, Mr. Coleridge has written:
Spite of all the superior airs of the Natur-Philosophen, I confess that, in the perusal of Kant, I breathe the free air of Good Sense and Logical Understanding, with the light of Reason shining in it and through it; while in the Physics of Schelling I am amused with happy conjectures, and in his Theology I am bewildered by positions, which, in their first sense, are transcendental (über fliegend), in their literal sense scandalous. S. T. C.
In the blank page at the beginning, Mr. Coleridge, after speaking of Schelling's great genius and intellectual vigor, objects to his "exaltation of the Understanding over the Reason." "What understanding?" he says. "That of which Jacobi had spoken? No such thing! but an Understanding enlightened;-in other words, the whole Man spiritually regenerated. There is doubtless much true and acute observation on the indefiniteness, the golden mists of Jacobi's scheme; but it is so steeped in gall as to repel one from it. And then the Fancy is unlithesome and wooden, jointed in the wilful open-eyed dream-and the wit, the would-be smile, sardonic throughout. Dry humor with a vengeance." S. T. C.
On a margin of Schelling's Philosophie und Religion, in which the
author contends with a work of Eschenmeyer's, the aim of which is to reintegrate Philosophy with Faith, at p. 7 Mr. C. writes:
Whatever St. Paul (the Apostle to and through the Understanding) may have done, yet Christ and John use the word Faith not as Eschenmeyer, &c., but as a total energy of the moral and intellectual being, destitute of all antithesis. S. T. C.
On p. 5 Mr. Coleridge writes:
Here we have strikingly exemplified the ill effects of ambiguous (i. e. double-meaning) words even on highest minds. The whole dispute between Schelling and Eschenmeyer arises out of this, that what Eschenmeyer asserts of Faith (the fealty of the partial faculty, even of Reason itself, as merely speculative, to the focal energy, i. e. Reason + Will + Understanding Spirit) Schelling understands of Belief, i. e. the substitution of the Will + Imagination + Sensibility for the Reason. S. T. C. Philosophy and Religion, pp. 21-2.
If I do not deceive myself, the truth, which Schelling here toils in and after, like the moon in the scud and cloudage of a breezy November night, is more intelligibly and adequately presented in my scheme or Tetraxy.
1. Absolute Prothesis.
WILL absolutely and essentially causative of Reality. Therefore 2. Absolute Thesis
of its own reality. Mens-Pater. But the absolute Will self-realized is still absolutely creative of Reality. It has all Reality in itself; but it must likewise have all Reality in another. That is, all eternal relations are included in all Reality, and here there can be no difference but of relation, but this must be a real relation.
3. Absolute Antithesis.
But the absolute of Mens is Idea, absoluta adæquata, Deus Filius.
But where Alterity exists without difference of Attribute, the Father beholdeth himself in the only-begotten Son, and the Son acknowledgeth the Father in himself, an Act of absolute Unity is given, proceeding from the Father into the Son, from the Son into the Father-spxpnois, processio intercircularis.
4. Absolute Synthesis, Love, Deus Spiritus.
From the beginning I avoid the false opposition of Real and Ideal, which embarrasses Schelling. Idea with me is contradistinguished only from conception, notion, construction, impression, sensation. S. T. C.
The Jahrbücher der Medicin als Wissenschaft and the Zeitschrift der Spekulative Physik, edited by Schelling, contain writings by a disciple of his, Dr. Steffens. On pp. 21-2 of a review by Steffens of the later
natural-philosophical writings of the Editor in the latter, Mr. Coleridge
The clear-headed, perspicuous Steffens, whom I love and honor with heart and head, could not but feel the obscurity and limping of Schelling's theory of warmth, or the ground-work at least of the promised theory, as given in his Einleitung: and nothing but his reverential sense of Schelling's genius would, I am persuaded, have influenced him to adopt so implicitly his great master's dynamico-atomistic assumption of Simple Actions. As to Warmth, far more beautiful is Steffens's own doctrine, who regards it as the Indifference between Light and Gravity. And yet there must be a lower form of Light and Warmth, in which they stand in antagonism. Why not thus? Let the highest product of Light (n. b. not as the universal Antithesis to Gravity, including the power of sound, &c., but), as Lux phenomenon, or Light commonly so called, be the outward pole or correspondent Excitant of Organization. A lower will be a chemical, or chemico-mechanical stuff, embodying the chemical powers of contraction, as Oxygen,-while the Warmth will appear as the dilation in Hydrogen, the substance or magnetic product with which the one is combined and made latent being the metal y, the stuff representative of-Magnetism, and the other the metal x, the stuff representative of Magnetism, not improbably Nitrogen itself. The
order would be thus:
fi.e. When it acts on a Fluid,-for a Fluid is that which has no Jistinguishable parts: the oxygen acts, therefore, on the whole as at all and one. But, for the same reason, when it acts on a Solid—(=rectius, Rigid), it exerts the same fixive power by causing a retraction of each particle in upon itself, as it were, and thus produces the phenomenon of pulverization or multëity, and the quality of positive hardness. The power exerted is the same in both, and differenced only by the subjects.
Hydrogen. Fluidum fluidissimum aëreum quidem propter levitatem
ejus relativam, hand vero aer. An Air.
Jahrbücher der Med., Dritt. Band, zweyt Heft. Ueber die Vegetation, von H. Steffens. P. 197.
Thou askest how we presume to say anything about vegetation, with
out having spoken on the nature of light. Hast thou seen it, or is it not seeing itself? Steff. Transl.
There is a quackery in passages like these, very unpleasant to my feelings. This peráßaois sis hddo yévos without notice! Du frägst:What do I ask-or concerning what? Light as an object—that somewhat, in the absence of which vegetables blanch, &c. And Steffens answers me as if we had been conversing of subjective Light—and asks me, is it not the same as light? Is not its esse in the videre? I see a herring, I see milk,--I slice the fresh herring lengthways, and suspend the slips in a clear phial of milk,-all this is seeing. But in an hour or two I see the phial shining, I see a luminous apparition, and, if I darken the room, I can see other things by it within the sphere of a foot. Now, it is this we were talking of: and what sense is there in saying, Ist es nicht das Sehen selbst? S. T. C.
At the end of some remarks on a treatise by Franz Baader Ueber Starres und Fliessendes, immediately following that of Steffens on Vegetation, Mr. Coleridge says:
The word matter, maleria, in, is among the most obscure and unfixed in the whole nomenclature of metaphysics, and I am afraid that the knot must be cut, i. e. a fixed meaning must be arbitrarily imposed on the word, as I have done in defining.
Matter as mere videri (opposed to) spirit as quod agit et non apparet, the synthesis being body. At all events, I would have preferred the terms Quantity and Quality, thus:
Materia+Spiritus=Corpus. Ergo Materia est in corpore: spiritus agit per Corpus. Matter and Spirit are Body: then Spirit (2) re-emerges in moments, as a property or function of Body, but in omni tempore and as the whole per totalitatem immanentem—it is Quality-Spiritus potentialis. Again, Materia ens in corpore=Quantity. S. T. C.
Note A. a., p. 162.
It has been thought that this epigram was suggested by one in a book called Terra-Filius, or The Secret History of the University of Oxford, London, 1726. I give the older epigram, though I think its paternal relationship to the later one by no means clear on internal evidence, and know not that my father ever saw the volume which contains it. Upon some verses of Father William.
"Thy verses are immortal, O! my friend,
For he who reads them, reads them to no end.”
No. xxvi., vol. i., p. 142.
Note A. b., p. 188.
Prefixed to the works of Cowley is an Account of his Life and Writ