After the introduction of that bill by me in June 1965, the Minnesota Law Review devoted that issue of December 1965 to a symposium on this issue. I wrote an article explaining my bill. The symposium included feature articles by noted law scholars in America discussing the proposal and the issues.

Since then other law reviews have discussed it, and there is a book by Mr. Stephen Shafer called "The Victim and His Criminal," which approaches this from a sociological standpoint.

I went to the University of Ohio at Athens, Ohio, and spoke on this subject. Mr. Shafer was working on the book, was invited out there, had several chapters discussing this entire subject of victim compensation. He approached it from a sociological point of view rather than legal.

At the congressional level, not only were those bills introduced by me in the 89th, 90th and the present session of the 91st Congress but there had been a number of bills in the House which would create a Federal Violent Crime Compensation Commission to consider claims, examine evidence, and provide up to, but not in excess of, $25,000 compensation for individuals injured by criminal violence. These bills are applicable to those areas in which the Federal Government exercises general police power-the District of Columiba, and the special maritime and territorial jurisdictions of the United States.

This bill I have introduced is taken out of those other bills. It has only one portion of the jurisdiction included in the more general bills, and applies only to the District of Columbia. We think it is pertinent, since the distinguished chairman has had leadership in so many fields in the efforts to improve the quality of rights in the District that this be presented as a part of the measures now being heard, Mr. Chairman. This, of course, is less extensive in its application than the bills that I have been introducing for three different Congresses. It is a local measure, applying to the District of Columbia.

But my other bills, I have hoped to have improved in the definement of each section. I think each bill that was introduced was somewhat better than the one before, and I am hopeful that this bill, likewise, is better than the first one.

Noting the Law Review articles, we have studied the other bills of other States. This, of course, we do not offer as a model, a perfect bill, Mr. Chairman. This whole field is new, certainly in English-speaking jurisdictions of modern times, beginning with the New Zealand law of 1963. It is in the state of development. This bill doubtless can be improved. We offer it as a basic groundwork to study only.

There is a great need of this type of legislation in the District. Rape increased by 50 percent in the first 6 months of this year. The FBI recently released a report of serious assault jumping 37.3 percent over the prior year for the same period, with the national increase for violent crime 13 percent, and Washington was much higher. That is for cities of 500,000 or over. In the District there was a 42-percent increase for murder and nonnegligent manslaugher. Robbery went up 46 percent in the District in the first 6 months of this year over the first 6 months of last year. We could go on and on with the necessity for this.

We followed the spirit of the New Zealand law in establishing a quasi-judicial administrative commission to adjudicate the compensation claim. This is a compensation commission; not a court to try innocence or guilt of the accused.

This three-man tribunal would be appointed for staggered terms of 8-years; each commissioner would be a member of the bar of a Federal court or of the highest court of the State. The Commission members would not be permitted to engage in any other business, vocation or employment.

Mr. Chairman, I do not believe it is necessary to detail each particular item in the bill, other than the basic groundwork, but the principal office would be in the District with the power for the commissioners to go other places to get evidence if it is needed.

The hearing would be conducted more like a regulatory agency than like a court, to give that liberality for obtaining evidence that would not be dependent upon the guilt of the accused. For example, if an insane man murdered somebody, there would be a defense in the criminal case, but that would not deny this injured person the right to compensation, the Government having failed in its duty to protect him.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Yarborough, do you have a Good Samaritan provision in this bill?

Senator YARBOROUGH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is that?
What does it provide?

Senator YARBOROUGH. There is a Good Samaritan provision. It provides that the person who comes to the aid of a person may be compensated. We did not have that in the earlier bills. Let me turn to the page.

The CHAIRMAN. I think, in your testimony, you said they do this in Great Britain. Under the British program, I think you said the application for ex-gratia payments of compensation can be made to such a person who suffered personal injury as the direct result of a crime or while helping the police, arresting an offender, or preventing or trying to prevent a crime from being committed.

Senator YARBOROUGH. Mr. Chairman, I ask permission to file my prepared statement with a detailed explanation of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, your prepared statement will be placed in the record in its entirety.

(The prepared statement submitted by Senator Yarborough reads in full as follows:)

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RALPH W. YARBOROUGH, A UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM TEXAS

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to appear on behalf of S. 2936, the District of Columbia Criminal Injuries Compensation Act which I introduced on September 19, 1969, and which is now pending before this committee. Briefly, the bill would create a three-man commission appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, empowered to hear applications from victims of crimes of violence for compensation under 14 categories of offenses occurring in the District of Columbia. The provisions of the bill will be explained in more detail in the course of my remarks.

The idea of compensating victims of crime is not new. It dates back many hundreds of years. The historical background of the idea was ably presented by NBC News Analyst Chet Huntley in his perspective on one of my early bills dealing with victim compensation as follows:

"The concept of compensating the victims of crime is not new. It is almost as old as law itself. The penal codes of ancient Babylon, Israel, Greece and Rome all required the criminal to compensate the victim with a sum of money or property. Compensable offenses ranged from robbery and burglary to libel, slander and murder. Compensation for crime reached its zenith in Anglo-Saxon England. The seventh century documents from

the Kentish laws of King Ethelbert include a list of payments for a variety of crimes. The amount of compensation to be paid in each case was carefully graded. A murderer might have to pay 100 shillings to the victim's dependents, but restitution was limited to 20 shillings if the assailant succeeded only in smashing his victim's shinbone."

While compensation policies of earlier periods are indeed interesting, those precedents seem irrelevant to a consideration of present day legislation except as a footnote of academic interest. Legislation must be considered as a justifiable expression of the relationships between state and citizen. Compensation plans of early history would be of doubtful value in assessing a modern plan for compensation.

Excluding compensation plans of antiquity, the legal history of today's compensation plans would appear to begin with the work of the celebrated English social reformer and magistrate Margery Fry who, at first, as her “Arms of the Law," published in 1951 indicates, had primarily been interested in compensation for victims being paid by the offenders themselves, on the assumption that, although "compensation cannnot undo the wrong. . . it will often assuage the injury, and it has a real educative value for the offender whether adult or child." A few years later Miss Fry expressed a different view in a widely discussed article printed in The Observer in 1957. Miss Fry proposed the establishment of a limited system of governmental compensation for victims of criminal violence. It was her thought that the state must assume the obligation of ameliorating deprivation suffered by its members as part of enlightened social policy. “In our modern system of collective responsibility for sickness and injury," stated Miss Fry, "we have evolved a machinery for assuring compensation which could well be extended to injuries criminally caused, affording equal benefits to the man who falls from a ladder at work and the man whose enemy pushes the ladder from under him at home." Miss Fry drew an analogy to the industrial insurance program in concluding that "the logical way of providing for criminally inflicted injuries would be to tax adult citizens.. to cover a risk to which each is exposed." Miss Fry felt that "the state which forbids our going armed in self-defense cannot disown all responsibility for its occasional failure to protect." This demand for compensation from state sources by Miss Fry is credited with stimulating interest in the subject which ultimately led to the inauguration of the present programs of victim compensation by New Zealand and England. New Zealand, in 1963, enacted the first comprehensive statute in modern times for the payment of compensation by the State for personal injuries suffered as a result of crimes of violence. This legislation, the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act of 1963, came into force on January 1, 1964, thereby nosing out the new non-statutory scheme of Great Britain by a few months. The British scheme was outlined in a White Paper, "Compensation for Victims of Crimes of Violence" which was announced in both Houses of Parliament on June 24, 1964, and came into operation on August 1, 1964. The precedents established by these two countries in adopting compensation legislation have been followed by the Australian State of New South Wales, the Canadian Provinces of Saskatchewan and Newfoundland, and in the United States by 5 states beginning with California in 1965 and followed by New York in 1966, Hawaii and Massachusetts in 1967 and Maryland in 1968.

The University of Minnesota Law Review of December 1965 devoted a large part of one issue to a symposium on the concept of victim compensation. I was a contributor to this symposium with an article about $2155, my bill of the 89th Congress, to set up a commission to compensate victims of crimes committed in federally-administered areas. There is also a book by Stephen Schafer entitled The Victim and His Criminal which is a very thorough treatment of the entire subject of victim compensation.

At the Congressional level, pertinent bills have been introduced in the 89th, the 90th and the present 91st session of the Congress. The first such proposal was S. 2155 of the 89th Congress which I introduced on June 17, 1965, prior to the time any jurisdiction in the United States enacted such a law. Similar bills have been introduced in the House of Representatives subsequent to the introduction of S. 2155 by me in the 89th Congress. These several compensation bills would create a Federal Violent Crimes Compensation Commission which would consider claims, examine evidence, and provide up to $25,000 compensation for individuals injured by criminal violence. These bills are applicable to those areas in which the federal government exercises general police power-the District of Columbia and the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

The bill now under consideration, S. 2936, is less extensive in its application. It is a local measure restricted in application to the District of Columbia. My prior proposals as refined from time to time have, of course, served as a model for this proposed legislation, and I have theretofore stated that the provisions of my prior proposals are based on the best aspects of the plans now in operation in New Zealand and Great Britain.

There is indeed a very great need for this type of legislation in the District of Columbia. Crime statistics for the first 6 months of this year just released by the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting Service disclose that the violent crimes of murder, rape, robbery and assault jumped 37.3 percent in the District of Columbia over the same period for the prior year. This was almost 3 times the national rate of increase. The national increase for violent crime was 13 percent and the rate for cities with 500,000 to 1 million population (Washington had 763,956 in the 1960 census) was 21 percent. During the same period there were increases in the District for the offenses of murder and non-negligent manslaughter from 88 to 125 or an increase of 42 percent; the offense of rape increased from 100 to 150, which was an increase of 50 percent; robberies climbed from 3491 to 5098, or 46 percent; and cases of aggravated assault rose from 1489 to 1725, or 15.9 percent.

Commenting now upon the major provisions of S. 2936, as I stated earlier, its application is restricted to the District of Columbia. This spirit of the New Zealand statute is followed in establishing a quasi-judicial administrative commission to adjudicate compensation claims.

The bill would create a District of Columbia Violent Crimes Compensation Commission which would be a three-man tribunal appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for 8-year staggered terms The chairman, who would be a member of the bar of a federal court or of the highest court of a state for at least 8 years, would be designated by the President. Commission members would not be permitted to engage in any other business, vocation or employment. The chairman and one other member would constitute a quorum; and if opinion should be divided when only one other member is present, the opinion of the chairman would prevail. However, the Commission, or any member thereof, or its duly authorized representative, may hold such hearings, sit and act at such times and places, and take such testimony as the Commission or such member may deem advisable.

Each member would be eligible for reappointment; and grounds for removal, by the President, are stated to be inefficiency, neglect of duty or malfeasance in office. The Commission may appoint necessary officers, attorneys and employees to carry out its function.

The principal office of the Commission would be in the District of Columbia. but Commission powers could be exercised by an authorized representative in any place.

Injury or death resulting from 14 offenses which possibly may be grouped under the headings of homicide, assaults, and sexual offenses of violences, occurring in the District of Columbia would be compensable.

It is the Commission's function and duty to examine the evidence presented to it both to determine what level of compensation should be granted and whether, in fact, the person making the claim is truly an innocent victim.

The Commission may order the payment of compensation to 3 categories of persons: (1) to or on behalf of the injured person; or (2) in the case of the personal injury of the victim, where the compensation is for pecuniary loss suffered or expenses incurred by any person responsible for the maintenance of the victim, to that person; or (3) in the case of the death of the victim. to or for the benefit of the dependents of the deceased victim, or any one or more of such dependents.

The absence of a criminal intent is not an essential factor for determining the entitlement to compensation. A person shall be deemed to have intended an act or omission notwithstanding that by reason of age, insanity, drunkenness, or otherwise he was legally incapable of forming a criminal intent. The Commission may, however, consider any circumstances it determines relevant, including the behavior of the victim which contributes directly or indirectly to his injury or death, unless such injury or death resulted from the victim's lawful attempt to prevent the commission of a crime or to apprehend an offender. The Commission must find that the act or omission complained of did occur, and that injury or death resulted therefrom.

The authority of the Commission to award compensation is not dependent on the prosecution or conviction of the accused or any other legal action for the offense giving rise to the injury. The Commission may, however, upon application of the Attorney General or the person or persons alleged to have caused the injury or death, suspend proceedings until such application is withdrawn or until a prosecution for an offense arising out of the act or omission is no longer pending or imminent. The Commission may suspend proceedings in the interest of justice of a civil action arising from such act or omission is pending or imminent.

Payment of compensation may be ordered for: (a) expenses actually and reasonably incurred as a result of the injury or death of the victim; (b) loss of earning power; (c) pecuniary loss to the dependents of the deceased victim; (d) pain and suffering of the victim; and (e) other pecuniary loss resulting from the personal injury or death of the victim which the Commission determines to be reasonable.

Application for compensation must be made within 2 years of injury or death and compensation shall not be awarded in an amount in excess of $25,000.

Compensation will not be awarded in 2 situations: if the victim was at the time of the injury or death living with the offender as his wife or her husband or in situation when the Commission at its discretion feels unjust enrichment to or on behalf of the offender would result.

Any order for the payment of compensation may be made on such terms as the Commission deems appropriate, and any payments received by the victim from the offender shall be deducted from any payments awarded by the Commission, but only to the extent that the sum of such payments and any award under this legislation are in excess of the total compensable injuries suffered by the victim as determined by the Commission.

The Commission may at any time vary any order for the payment of compensation in such manner as it thinks fit, whether as to terms of the order or by increasing or decreasing the amount of the award or otherwise.

The Commission may institute an action against a person convicted of an offense giving rise to an award for compensation for recovery of the whole or any part of such compensation. In order for the payment of compensation shall not affect the right of any person to recover damages from any other person by a civil action for the injury or death.

In the matter of attorney's fees, generally, the Commission may allow whatever fee is justified under the circumstances.

Orders and decisions of the Commission are reviewable on appeal, except that no trial de novo of the facts determined by the Commission shall be allowed. Injury is defined to include actual bodily harm, pregnancy and mental or nervous shock. While the inclusion of mental or nervous shock may be subject to criticism as being likely to give rise to undeserving claims which would be difficult to reject, injury resulting from mental or nervous shock is quite generally recognized as a proper ground for action.

The term "victim" means the direct and immediate victim of the offense-a person who is injured or killed by any act or omission of any other person which is within the description of any of the offense specified in the bill.

The heart of the proposal is found in Section 301 which deals with the award of payments of compensation. Where any person is injured or killed by any act or omission of any other person which is within the description of any offenses in the bill, the Commission may make an order for the payment of compensation to or for the benefit of the injured person responsible for the victim's maintenance. In the case of the death of the victim, the payments are to be to or for the benefit of his dependents or closest relative. The Commission has wide discretion in making awards, subject of course to the $25,000 limitation.

The Commission's right to consider behavior of the victim which contributed directly or indirectly to his injury or death should provide insurance against unmeritorious claims.

It is not intended that any victim should receive double benefits or be better off by reason of the crime than he would otherwise have been, and therefore, in assessing the compensation to be paid, the Commission is required to deduct any payment received by the victim or by any of his dependents from the offender or from any person on behalf of the offender, or from the United States (except those received under this bill), a state or any of its subdivisions, for personal injury or death compensable under this legislation, but only to the extent that the sum of such payment and any award under this legislation are in excess of the total compensable injuries suffered by the victim as determined by the Commission. While the bill also provides for the recovery, from the