sans, in both Houses. He knew that Congress would not authorize war, or any warlike demonstration, either in anticipation of Mr. Slidell's return home from his bootless mission, or upon, or because of his return. He could not then, or at any time before the first blow was struck, have made a case, upon which Congress would have declared war. We believe he knew this perfectly well; and he sent an army to the Rio Grande, with the deliberate and full purpose that thus a case should be made, as with the sword of Brennus, which should admit of no alternative but war-unless, indeed, Mexico should be found to be frightened from her propriety by his military demonstration, and abjectly submit without striking a blow; for we believe the administration was weak enough to dream of the possibility of a bloodless achievement on this score! But so much, at least, the President was evidently resolved on; if the Mexicans will fight when their fields and peaceful firesides are invaded-if they will fight when we point a battery directly on the public square of one of their chief cities-why, let them fight; if it comes to that, they must lose, and we shall win.

And how was it that the President was so prompt and so resolved to take extreme measures against Mexico? He was not a soldier; was not bred in camps; had never" set a squadron in the field;" had not shown himself "sudden and quick in quarrel," or "sought the bubble, reputation, in the cannon's mouth." What did he want of a war in Mexico? Well, it was not, we suppose, so much the war that he wanted, but he wanted Mexican territory-a rich province or two, cut out of her dominion, with which to illustrate the first term of his Presidency; and as his first essay-the mission of Mr. Slidell-had been met in a temper to promise little for his plans of territorial aggrandizement through that mode, he resolved to try the other tack. We acquit him entirely of the sagacity to foresee to what a terrible war, how obstinate, protracted and oppressive, he was committing the country. We do him the justice to believe that he fancied that a demonstration of war, or at most a handsome "brush" with Mexico, just to make her "feel our strength -as Mr. Slidell had advised-would be enough for his purpose; enough to make Mexico treat with him on his own terms, and dispose her to relax a little the firmness of her

grasp on some of those broad acres of hers, which seemed, in his eyes, so desirable a possession for the United States, especially if he might have the credit of making the acquisition. Still, he could not know to what lengths and straits the country might be driven in the war which he undertook to provoke, and he was willing to run all the risks and awful hazards of such an enterprise.

That it was territory-the vehement desire to extend the dominion of the Republic, as a measure deemed of all others most grateful to the Roman ambition of our people-which moved Mr. Polk to adopt his extraordinary line of policy towards Mexico, and finally to challenge her to the combat, has never been matter of doubt with us, and must now be apparent to every one who has taken the trouble to look into the whole history of this business. To take and hold New Mexico and Upper California, was a principal object distinctly avowed and earnestly insisted on, in the earliest instructions given to the military and naval commanders, sent out on their errands of conquest to these countries. These instructions included the command of the President forthwith to set up civil governments in the conquered countries! Proceeding from one audacious step to another, he actually sent out a military colony from the city of New York, under the name of a regiment of volunteers, for permanent settlement in California. And upon the success of these military enterprises, the President ventured, in his last annual Message to Congress, to congratulate the country on "the vast extension of our territorial limits."

Who could believe, in the face of facts like these, the President would venture to repeat, in the same message, the stale declaration, that the "war had not been waged with any view to conquest!" But it was sufficiently characteristic of the whole of that extraordinary document, that he should assert nevertheless, in the very same paragraph, that the war, since it had been begun, had been carried into the enemy's country, and should be prosecuted, to secure there "ample indemnity" for the expenses of the war, as well as for our pecuniary claims on Mexico. This, of itself, was a sufficient avowal that, in the convenient name of indemnity for the expenses of the war-a war demonstrably begun by the President himself-the contest had been and should be waged expressly with a view to the per

manent conquest of Mexican territory, and the dismemberment of that empire by the sword. But this avowal has been recently repeated, in a still more explicit form. The President has asked and obtained of Congress three millions of dollars, to enable him to bring the war to a conclusion by a treaty of peace. How this money was proposed to be used, and with what object, was disclosed in the Senate by the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, on introducing the Bill. We had already taken military possession of New Mexico and Upper California, and the chairman declared that, in making peace," he supposed no Senator would think we ought to get less” than these two provinces. And this grand object of the war was expected to be secured, as nearly as could be understood from the oracular explanations of the chairman, while some chief-probably Santa Anna-and some faction along with him, should be in the possession of temporary power in Mexico, by making a judicious application and advance of these monies "to pay the expenses of their army, and other expenses," and thus to purchase of them a peace, with a cession of these territories to the United States! In other words, the money was to be used, not to buy the territories, for which it was manifestly inadequate-but to buy the men who were to make peace with us, and cede us the territories, or leave them to become ours by the law of uti possidetis! Of course, it was only in strict accordance with the designs of the President in the conduct of this war, as thus at last openly avowed, that his party in the Senate rejected an amendment to the Three Million Bill, proposed by Mr. Berrien of Georgia, which declared, by way of proviso, "that the war with Mexico ought not to be prosecuted by this government with any view to the dismemberment of that republic, or to the acquisition by conquest of any portion of her territory." We have now given the readers of this Journal an account of Mr. Slidell's mission to Mexico, according to our understanding of it, with the causes of its failure, and the fearful alternative of war to which the President so promptly turned, in the face of all constitutional impediments, and with objects so utterly reprehensible. They will judge of the whole matter for themselves. It is for the American people to say, how they like this being driven or dragged into a war, under such circumstances, and for such objects. We believe that the administra

tion, or the country, one or the other, is preparing for a day of terrible retribution.

A very recent proceeding on the part of the administration furnishes a very apt commentary on the wisdom and dignity of its policy towards Mexico, and to which it so obstinately adhered, in the matter of Mr. Slidell's mission. The two countries then, though not at war, were in a state of hostility rather than a state of peace. To restore friendly relations, Mexico insisted that we must send her a commissioner, specially invested with powers to treat of the causes which had interrupted these relations; but the President refused to send a commissioner, or any other than a minister plenipotentiary, to reside near that government. And upon this he proceeded to actual war. But now it would seem'at last discovered, after we have had the calamities and horrors of a war upon us for near a twelvemonth, that it may be quite a proper thing, as soon as we can find a door of admission open to us, to send a commissioner, one or more, with special powers, to treat with Mexico for peace and for the restoration of friendly relations between the two countries. It is understood that the administration applied to the Finance Committee of the Senate, near the close of the late session of Congress, to procure an appropriation of 50,000 dollars for this object, and expressly on the ground that though Mexico might be willing to treat with us, yet a diplomatic mission in the ordinary form might not be acceptable to her. If just this easy concession had been made to Mexico fifteen months ago, this war might have been avoided! How it is to be ended, now we are in it, is another question. In our honest conviction, we can have peace with Mexico only by abandoning, and disavowing, in the most explicit manner, every desire, and purpose, and plan of conquest. The administration must give up the policy it has so long cherished of dismembering that empire for the sake of aggrandizing our own. It must return to some sense, or some show, of honesty and fair dealing, before Mexico will ever treat with us for peace. Of this we have no doubt. Till this is done, our battles and military enterprises will give us brilliant achievements and barren victories-nothing else; while our intrigues with whatever Mexican chief, or faction, backed by a corruption fund of three millions of dollars, will bring us nothing but national disgrace and dishonor.

D. D. B.

1847.]

It is proposed in this article to offer some remarks on that project of the "American Peace Society," which is indicated by its title. The writer is sufficiently sensible of the disfavor with which the project is likely to be regarded: "Utopian, chimerical, impracticable," are the terms doubtless which many will apply to it; and yet, if there is a Law of Nations, is it extravagant to ask, why there may not be a Court of Nations?

The world is slowly arriving at the conviction that there must be some other method than war by which reasonable beings may settle their disputes. Indeed, what mode that is, of adjusting the fair and equitable claims of nations, which obtains the solution of difficulties by violence-which brings in the sword to cut the Gordian knot-which marshals armies, not arguments, to decide every question, let common sense judge. Clearly, it is not, in any intelligible sense, a method of settling disputes. It does not even put an end to them. All the questions after the war are just where they were before the war; and are ready at any moment to be revived. All the difference is, that after the war, power may dictate, and weakness must submit. There is no pretence of right in the case; nor is there now any pretence of an appeal to heaven, as there was formerly in the martial encounter of single champions. It is a trial of strength, and nothing else. It is the strongest cause which is best, and not the good cause which is strongest, before this grim and bloody tribunal of martial justice. Be it admitted, however, that war, in a sense utterly degrading to both parties, helps to a decision-that nations are willing to negotiate when they can fight no longer-that lost battles and exhausted finances, have a marvellous effect in clearing up the truth and right of things to the vision of kings and ministers, of governments and diplomatic agents. Still, if this method will not much longer do--if enlightened nations cannot bear it if the worn and torn sinews of national strength and prosperity,-nay, and the worn and torn sinews of human heart and flesh, cannot and will not forever bear it, then some other method is to be devised.

Now let the reader consider, whether besides the martial trial, there is any

VOL. V.-NO. IV.

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conceiveable method of settling disputes but one. If force is to be laid aside, reason must take its place; this is the only alternative. If reason has any thing to do with the decision, it must take the form of a judgment. If there is a judgment, there must be a reference of the cause to it. If there is a reference of the cause, there must be a hearing of it-there must be an arbitration. there is an arbitration, there must be arbitrators; or, to vary the statement, if there is a hearing of the cause, there must be an auditor, or umpire.

If

We have not yet, it is true, arrived at the point proposed. That requires another step, and it does not follow, to be sure, that if there must be arbitrators or an umpire, either must form a permanent Court, for the trial of causes between nations as parties. That is to say, it it does not follow as a matter of argument; and the question is, whether it will not follow as a matter of easy transition, and as a matter of expediency. Meanwhile, we think it important to secure the position which we have thus taken, and to show that the progress of civilization and of civil liberty tends directly, if not inevitably, to this point.

Before we go farther then, let us see whether the ground to which we have arrived is strong-whether it is strong enough to bear up any practical principles: or is only of sufficient firmness to sustain a useless theory. The position may seem to be very clear, but it needs probably to be insisted on. What we say is, that the only alternative to the employment of force is arbitration.

Now is there any thing-let it be asked to test the practical value of this conclusion-is there any thing in the affairs of nations that must preclude them from being submitted, like other affairs, to the arbitration of disinterested persons.

Nations have resorted to this method of decision. They are doing so more frequently, as civilization advances. They can already do this without dishonor: and this I consider to be the most material point of all-the point of honor. Nations have frequently fought for this. They have often fought unwillingly, as individuals have :-fought only because there was no other way to sav