contended, was the only sound view in which war could be contemplated, and he differed entirely from those who considered the subject in any other manner. If war were the issue, it should be a war worthy of this great country; and there was no war in which the country could be engaged at the present moment, and under the existing circumstances of Europe, unless she put forth all her power, all her strength, all her energies, and determined to succeed or to perish in the contest. The determination of government, which he conceived was in unison with the general sense of the country, was for neutrality; and for what neutrality? The House would give him leave to say, for a strict and honest neutrality. Any other would be unworthy of the nation. The promise of actual and efficient support to Spain, this country was not prepared to give; and the case ministers had to consider was this, whether they should withdraw from the question altogether, and treat it with perfect indifference? Indifference they could never feel towards the affairs of Spain; and he earnestly hoped and trusted that she would come triumphantly out of this struggle. But he should not speak truly, if he did not say, that he was perfectly convinced, the first result of her success and pacification must be the adoption of those alterations in her system which they had recommended. But whether Spain or France were successful, he must ever feel a perfect conviction, in considering the extent of misery which might be occasioned by the contest; that if Spain had given way in a slight degree on the one part, and the army of observation had been withdrawn on the other, any unpleasant feeling would have been swallowed up and lost sight of in the immensity of the benefit which would have been produced; they would not then have had to deplore that state of warfare, the risk of which was incalculably great, and the issue of which it was impossible to fore see. Mr Brougham, who alone undertook to reply, began with declaring, That he was one of those who could not see the propriety of first discussing the subject, and then submitting the documents on which the discussion was founded. From the statement of the right honourable Secretary, he was really left in the dark, as to the conduct of his Majesty's ministers. He suspected all they would be found to have done, was merely to tell the allies, that they would not join them in their aggression against Spain. "Do we owe much gratitude to his Majesty's ministers because they have not actually embarked in a crusade against Spain? Because the language which they held to the potentates and ministers was to this effect: Gentlemen of the congress, emperors of Verona, king of France, and Chateaubriand, Brummagem minister and pamphleteer, scribbler of bad pamphlets, and worse manifestoes, we will not do that which we dare not do for our lives, or what we hold dearer than our lives our places; we will not tell the Parliament of England that we intend to plunge the country into a war against Spain to assist the tyrants of the north of Europe.' No minister of this country, not even Mr Pitt, in the plenitude of his power, would have dared for his life to avow that such a war was in the contemplation of the government of England." Mr Brougham insisted that there was an evident difference of feeling between the members of the cabinet. "While the minister for foreign affairs was giving utterance to sentiments, which, however they may have failed to influence the majority of the cabinet, did him the highest honour, as a man, a minister, and a statesman, and which will be followed by the heart felt sympathy of his country men-while those sentiments were received with loud expressions of delight in this and almost every part of the House-while even the hinder benhes of the ministerial phalanx were >vercome for the moment with generous emotion, and re-echoed the aproving shout, a death-like silence evailed on the treasury bench, nor one solitary cheer break the dread pose of those chosen guardians of the ple's rights-those grave assertors he national honour-that official trusty portion of our members." as sincerely to be hoped that the tiation might be found to have conducted in the spirit of the thonourable Secretary, and not bose silent members. Amid all darkness in which he must be ined, till he had leisure to peruse locuments, it still appeared to him, the right honourable gentleman been most grossly duped. The The nch government had succeeded in sing his credulity, by a more shed specimen of perfidy than ever raced the annals of modern Italy, ncient Greece, the two countries in ch human perfidy and human atrocivent hand in hand, where the wiles of intriguer paved the way for crime. en the perfidy of those countries, wever, was thrown into the shade by more finished baseness, the unexpled treachery, of the French gonment. Even the right honourgentleman had denounced the picable conduct of the French goment, and characterized it in less measured than are wont to ployed by a minister accustomnegotiate with the objects of his ration. The whole sum and nce of the right honourable man's statement amounted to a tion, that a more cunning, wheed. itiful, perfidious governmentnment more destitute of princiore devoid of probity, and more ned to all sense of honour, ne ver yet existed, than the French go. vernment, with which he had been lately negotiating. But he was perfectly astonished, that after all this experience, the right honourable Secretary could write a dispatch which was to go to France, and afterwards to be laid before this House, giving them full credit for the purity of their intentions, declaring his belief that they were actuated by no motives of ambition, and that there was nothing in the circumstances of the war between France and Spain, to excite suspicion in the mind of the most suspicious person, that France had embarked in the war from a desire of aggrandizement, while she was overrunning Spain with her armies; he could not conceive any ground, on which such a dispatch could be justified or explained. He was anxious to justify himself from being supposed for a moment to countenance the absurd, not to say unprincipled notion, (for its want of principle was lost in its folly and absurdity,) that any state of this country, or of Europe, or any state of our domestic or foreign relations, could justify the holding out a threat, without baving the means of carrying it into execution. "Let us make our election between neutrality and war; but if we choose neutrality, let it be a real and not a mock neutrality. Let both sides of the question be maturely weighed, before we either embark in war, or resolve to adhere to peace." At the same time, one motive for being prepared for war was, that it was impossible to say how soon it might no longer be in their choice to avoid war. Let Britons consider how they would relish the enforcement of that right of neutral visitation, which had been first claimed by this country, and which Sir William Scott had reduced into a system. Mr Canning's speech appeared to him a decided failure, owing solely to the badness of the cause. It was impossible, how ever, in justice to themselves, for his side of the House to enter upon the question, in their present state of information. Yet he could not forbear expressing his cordial concurrence in the sentiments expressed by the right honourable Secretary, regarding the conduct of the French government, though he was unable to participate in the astonishment expressed by him. "I do not identify the people of France with their government, for I believe that every wish of the French nation is in unison with those sentiments which animate the Spaniards. Neither does the army concur in this aggression, for the army alike detests the work of tyranny, plunder, cant, and hypocrisy, in which the Bourbons have embarked. The war is not commenced because the people or the army require it, but because three or four French emigrants have obtained possession of power; and by gaining the too easy ear of the monarch, have engaged in the desperate attempt of effecting another revolution, in order to get back their confiscated estates; an enterprise with which the priests chime in, that they may recover their well-lost tithes. It is for such miserable objects as these that the Spaniards are to be sacrificed; it is from such despicable motives that the Spaniards are to be punished, because they have dared to vindicate their rights as a free and independent people. I hope to God, like the right honourable Secretary, that the Spaniards may succeed in the noble and righteous cause in which they have engaged. I heard with delight the ob. servation of the right honourable gentleman, that the war of the Bourbons was, in his opinion, not only unprincipled, but desperate as to the chan. ces of success. The right honourable Secretary must be better informed on this subject than I can be, and I heard this opinion, therefore, with sa tisfaction and delight. Though the French aggression may succeed to a certain extent, I will never allow myself to despair while Spain continues independent and free, though a French orator has predicted her downfal, or even though that veteran warrior, the Duke d'Angouleme, has laid his hand upon his sword, and sworn to conquer. The duty which the Parliament of England owes to its constituents, is to take such a part as may enable us to meet with confidence the censures of a people who are animated, as one man, with the warmest enthusiasm for the cause of right and liberty against injustice and oppression. Having of fered up one vow for the success of Spain, I will put forth another for the complete discomfiture and punishment condign of the Bourbons, who, if they shall be again destroyed, will owe it to themselves alone, and will perish amidst the delight of every free people. They will perish regretted by none, but some handful of persons whose breasts never beat with the generous emotions of free-born men, and who never yet acquiesced in any liberal sentiment unless it suited their place-keeping, time-serving interests. They will perish, and no hand will ever again be raised to attempt to restore them." With this animated peroration of Mr Brougham, the debate closed for the present, Mr Canning only remarking that he had not described the undertaking on the part of France as desperate, but only as dangerous. On the same day, an exposé, altogether similar in tenor, was made by Lord Liverpool in the House of Lords. In treating of the Spanish constitution, his Lordship gave some interesting information relative to the course pursued by the British government, after the first return of Ferdinand. His Majesty's minister, who was then in Spain, Sir H. Wellesley, advised Ferdinand VII. to accept the constitution of the Cortes, subject to modifications. After some hesitation on the part of that Sovereign, a different course was adopted. The king was led to think that the opinion of the people of Spain was decidedly hostile to the constitution, and in his belief of the existence of that opinion his Majesty appeared to be correct. Nay, he would go farther. He would say that he would not regret that the king of Spain had taken a course different from that which our minister recommended, had his Majesty only adhered to the promises he made when he refused to accept the constitution, on the ground that it was not conformable to the wishes of the people. But at the same time that he rejected the constitution which was offered to him, he issued a declaration, in which he recognized the principles of a limited monarchy, and promised to assemble the Cortes. Had this course been adopted, he was far from thinking that either Spain or Europe would have had any reason to regret his catholic Majesty's determination. But, notwithstanding this strong and voluntary declaration, no Cortes were assembled. Not only were they not as sembled, but a course of misgovernment was pursued, which made the events of 1820, however unexpected, (and unexpected he believed they were,) be viewed without regret by any one. In 1820, the constitution was restored, and the restoration of that constitution certainly did create alarm among our allies. He confessed he thought that the manner in which that restoration had been brought about was a matter of regret; but if ever there was a case of revolution in which other powers had no ground for interference, in which no pretext for hostility was afforded to any foreign state, it was that of Spain. The constitution of 1812, which was restored, had al ready subsisted two years in Spain: and during that period, all the powers of Europe made overtures of friendship, or concluded treaties of alliance, with the government which administered that constitution. Under this view his Lordship conceived, that there was no justification of the threatened aggression of France, or of the whole course pursued by the continental alliance. He proceeded to shew, as Mr Canning had done, that every means of advice, mediation, and remonstrance, of which circumstances admitted, had been diligently used by this country to avert the catastrophe. Then, however, he entered, at greater length than Mr Canning, into the motives which must deter this country from embarking in the contest. After having carried on a war unexampled in its extent and duration, and now recovering from the sufferings which our unparalleled exertions had occasioned, was this the time, when our commerce and manufactures were arrived at a state of prosperity which they had never enjoyed at any former period-when our agriculture was reviving from the difficulties which it had experienced-was this a moment when any rational person would question, that peace was desirable for this country, if it could be maintained consistently with its honour; and that we should not give to other countries those advantages which we at present enjoyed, but part of which, in the event of war, we must necessarily forego? In addition to these considerations, which ought to have great weight, there was another resulting from the nature of the country, in which, if we embarked in war, the contest must be carried on. Let it not be supposed that it would be sufficient to send a supply of arms and ammunition, or a small subsidy; our device must be Toto certandum est corpore regni. We must embark, as we did before, with a considerable force; it was not asmall army which must be sent, but the same exertions must again be made when that country was last the theatre of war. He was justified, also, from experience, in declaring, that a war carried on in Spain was four times as expensive as in any other counetry in Europe. Let us look to the last war, and see by whom the expensive operations were carried on, and on whom the conduct of the sieges fell. We must then be prepared, if it were war, not for maritime operations, but we must be prepared to make war in the Peninsula, on the scale of the utmost exertion. There was a third reason for the policy pursued by his Majesty's government. In the last war Spain was not the end, but the means the end was the safety of Europe: it was true that on the territory of Spain the most convenient ground was found, and it was there the battle of Europe was fought, and her safety as sured. But what was the state of Spain? She was then a united country, and from one end of it to the other there was not a difference of sentiment; there might be individual traitors, but they were exceptions to the general sentiment. Was that the case now? Spain was now a divided country: not as some countries were divided, when all the active spirits were on one side, and the quiescent only on the other; there was here activity and enthusiasm on the one side as well as the other; there was now raging a civil war in Spain-a war of the priests and peasants against the landholders and shop. keepers. He would admit that all the intelligence was on one side, but there was the fanaticism of liberty on one side, and the fanaticism of religion on the ther. Under the circumstances which he had stated, were we to engage, not alone to drive the French out of Spain, but to maintain one half the country against the other? He conceived that the war which at present was not popular in France, would be rendered popular by our interference; that, in fact, the French would consider themselves as at war with us only. If our policy was neutrality, he hoped it would be an actual, an honest neutrality. If it became necessary to interpose by arms, it would be open to Parliament, and to those who directed the councils of the country, to adopt such measures as they might deem proper; but until it was determined to draw the sword and throw away the scabbard, he trusted that we should not enter into a neutrality of false pretences. He wished at present merely to lay the papers on the table, without calling on the House for any opinion. Earl Grey made a few observations. He felt much embarrassed by the necessity under which he was placed, of either allowing the statements now made to go forth without objection, or of entering upon the discussion without the necessary materials. Still he could not forbear testifying his dissent to the general tenor of Lord Liverpool's speech. The noble Earl had most justly characterized the attack upon Spain-as an attack not justified by anything which Spain had done; as iniquitous in its principles; and, as he admitted, dangerous to the power that made it; and not only so, but, as the noble Earl had not stated, if successful, it struck at the foundation of the system on which the independence of Europe rested, and was highly dangerous to the honour and interests of this country-by transferring to France, in peace, that influence in the affairs of Spain, which, by long wars, and great sacrifices of blood and treasure, we had long laboured to prevent. Such was the character of the war which had now broken out between France and Spain, in defiance of our efforts. That these results |