principle of internal interference in support of despotism.

We have already noticed the fundamental doctrine of the combination to be, that no change must be made in the internal constitution of any state, unless by the sole and spontaneous act of the monarch, not moved or prompted thereto by any dread or symptom of discontent on the part of his subjects. Then there was a speculative difference between Austria and Russia; the one holding that no change should be made whatever; the other, that some changes were eligible; but both systems entirely harmonizing as to practical result. By a singular sophistry, it was asserted, that this thorough and radical interference with the internal arrangement of states, was no interference at all. They did not, it was said, dictate any precise form of government, because they left this point to be settled by the sole will of the monarch. If the effect of the system had been merely to modify the rights of the people, it would have been interference; but because it went to deprive the people of every right, it was no interference. If a sovereign will forcibly arbitrate in the internal quarrels of his neighbours, the only principle on which he can make any pretence to justice, is, by holding the balance even between the contending parties. To lay down from the beginning the principle of interfering only on one side, is rendering the iniquity ten times more flagrant. The sovereign might break all his promises, might throw his people into dungeons, and exercise every form of tyranny; the Holy Alliance would look on unconcerned, would make no interruption to their amity, and would at best whisper only gentle and private counsels; but the moment that the people shewed any disposition to fail in what was conceived their duty, army after

army was to be marched to put them down. Thus Russia, admitting that there ought to have been some modification in the despotism of the Italian states, lent, without reserve, the whole influence and terror of her arms to the support of measures, which, considering the known policy of Austria, could have no possible result, except the entire re-establishment of that despotism.

During the movements which terminated in the subversion of the constitutions of Italy, France had looked on approving, but neutral. Sympathizing, as the King evidently did, with the general cause of royalty, his own character, moderate and timid, the similar disposition of the ministry whom he was still able to retain, and the dread of the influence of the liberal party, deterred the government from affording the cause any active support. Louis testified his good will only by a letter to the King of Na. ples, inviting him to accede to the proposition of repairing to Laybach.

Since that short campaign, which terminated in the extinction of Italian liberty, the administrative power in France had put on a considerably new phase. Louis, compelled by a somewhat hard necessity to choose between the two inflamed factions into which his kingdom was rent, naturally submitted to take the one whose fault lay in seeking to exalt too high himself and his power. He was thus induced to admit into power a class of statesmen, whom he had hitherto viewed with dislike from their violence, and with alarm as to the consequences to which their system might lead, among a people containing yet so many ele ments of disorder. This party, bold, fierce, and domineering, though they' did not attempt the entire subversion of the representative system, were en tirely leagued in heart with those who

id combined for its suppression over Le continent. They found at their controlled disposal, all the resources France. In consequence of the w mode of forming the elections, of e influence of every kind which mi. stry put forth, and probably of one those turns to which public opinion liable, a fixed majority had been cured to them in the Chamber of eputies. France, too, liberated from reign occupation, and having enjoy 1 seven years of peace, had resumed uch of her pristine energy. With a rritory so extensive and fertile, a eople so active and intelligent, she uld never long remain in a state of pression. The taxes, though heavy, ere productive, and paid without urmuring; public credit was comletely restored, and insured the raing of such funds as might be necestry for the most extensive enterprizes. The army also was now recruited, and s numbers again considerable. In ircumstances thus favourable, this old faction conceived the ambition of valling the recent glories of Austria, nd of inscribing their name in the anals of the Holy Alliance, by a simiir achievement. It was, moreover, rivily argued amid its circles, that he memory of the Napoleon dynasty ould never be duly effaced, unless by Bourbon war, and the exploits of a Bourbon army. Under these views, heir eyes were turned upon Spain. The anti-revolutionary insurrection in hat country, supported by a large nass of the population, and fed by French gold, had assumed an attitude which seemed to insure the triumph of any foreign power that might appear at its head. Such were the views espoused with reserve by Villele, whom, as the most prudent and moderate of his faction, the King had selected to place at the head of affairs -but urged eagerly and furiously by the devotees of the faction, among

whom were a large proportion of the royal family, including the destined heirs to the throne.

From what time, and in what manner, these purposes were framed in the French cabinet, has not been fully unveiled to the eyes of Europe. The original formation of the cordon sanitaire, seems to have been fully justified by the calamitous state of the Catalonian cities, in the end of 1821. The effects as to the creation of royalist insurrection, which it perhaps unexpectedly produced, were too agreeable to make the French government willing to withdraw it. Not only was the cordon maintained after its purposes had ceased; but supplies of money, arms, and clothing, were amply afforded in aid of the cause. Ministry, both to the chambers and to the Spanish government, had disavowed all intentions, except those of peace; but cabinets, and in an especial manner, perhaps, the French cabinet, are but too apt to consider themselves emancipated from the common ties of honour and faith. This comment cannot be considered as too uncharitable, when it is recollected that the protestations were undoubtedly prolonged beyond the period when they could possibly be genuine. The first recorded testimony, however, of the designs of the French government, occurs in the interview between Villele and the Duke of Wellington, when the latter was on his way to the congress. It was then announced, that the affairs of Spain were to come before that body; and a first attempt was made to probe on this subject the intentions of the British government. Had a less discouraging response been received, a liberal confidence might have disclosed the train of the French councils. It might have shewn that, instead of being about to introduce the subject to the notice of the high monarchs, France was in fact deeply indebted to

them for the impulse by which she was driven into this line of policy; she might at all events hold herself well assured, that, on the instant of pro. pounding such an intention, she would be applauded, encouraged, and aided by the sovereigns congregated against the liberties of Europe.

The issue, as was shewn in our last volume, completely answered this expectation. Montmorency returned from the Congress, with the full understand ing, that unless Spain could be persuaded, or more strictly speaking, intimidated, into a thorough change of her institutions, France should immediately engage in a war for the purpose of replacing her under the unlimited sway of Ferdinand. It was announced, that to France the high monarchs had left the decision of the course which was to be followed in regard to Spain, only pledging themselves to support, with the whole weight of their power, whatever decision she might form. The manner in which Montmorency was hailed at Paris, and his immediate elevation to the dukedom, proved that the French cabinet was entirely disposed to concur in the views with which he had come impregnated. Yet a few days had not elapsed, ere they began visibly to pause at the entrance of their headlong career. The fall of Montmorency, almost immediately succeeding his elevation, signalized the change. The cautious moderation of Villele, seconded by a corresponding temper on the part of the King, wrought this transformation. Everything was done to soothe the pride of Montmorency; the difference on which he had retired was declared to be trifling, and even verbal; it related merely to the terms of the note which was to be presented to Spain. In fact, however, nothing could be more important than this note, which, in Montmorency's edi

tion, had denounced war as the immediate result of the well-foreseen refusal of Spain to alter her institutions; while in that actually presented, a barrier of separation, a withdrawing_of all favour, proseription from the European community, and a species of political excommunication were alone threatened. The alternative of war was placed only in shadowy and doubtful perspective. The views of the cabinet were still more fully developed in a series of articles, in the Journal des Debats, a paper understood to be in the immediate interest of Villele, from whose pen it was even alleged that the articles proceeded. Here, while the order of things in Spain was bitterly inveighed against, all the grounds were fully exposed, which rendered it dangerous and inexpedient for France to interpose by force of arms. The system of watching, of separation, of excommunication, was enforced in preference. The transplantation of these into the Moniteur, heightened their official character. But, at the same moment, deadly war was urged against them by other journals, stamped with a still higher character of royalism. In these, the course above recommended was branded as replete with weakness and ignominy, and war, immediate war, represented as alone consistent with dignity and policy. To these last representations, the greatest importance was attached, as they were understood not only to express the sentiments of individuals possessing the highest influence, but were even secretly understood as supported by members of the royal family, and future heirs to the throne. The eyes of all Europe were fixed on this journalist contention, on the issue of which it was felt that the repose and liberty of the world was suspended.

We now turn to Madrid, to observe the effects produced there by the Ve

ina issues. These, conveyed by ruour, and indeed positively announced the French papers, excited in the lubs and official circles a silent and ollow fermentation; but they did not ome before the government in any fficial shape. At length, on the 9th f January, the ambassadors of the our powers delivered their notes, which ave been already before our readers. There was something very novel in he character of these communications. t was new to diplomacy to see one ower lecturing another on the abtract principles of legislation, pointing ut its aberrations from it, demandng their recall, and threatening bloody ssues in the event of refusal. Such a liscussion, to have any chance of gainng its aim, of not being deeply offenive, ought, at least, to have been caried on with much delicacy, and many softenings. Very different was the tone in which these notes were conceived. When the Spanish constitution was described, not as one which had hastily admitted some dangerous elements, but as "an event the most deplorable the work of perjured soldiers as overturning the whole social system, and recalling times which made Europe tremble;" the evident tendency of such language was not to persuade to the adoption of the measures recommended, but to rouse fierce resistance against it. The passages complimentary to the Spanish nation, and expressing interest in its welfare, went for nothing, because they expressly excepted all who had been concerned in producing and supporting the constitutional system, being the persons at present in power, and those from whom alone the allies could expect any amicable fulfilment of their wishes. The notes of the allied powers were therefore injurious, and afforded just ground of resentment. But before yielding to the expression of that pas.

sion, the statesman is imperiously called upon to consult another principle

that of prudence. Nothing can dispense with his obligation, coolly to weigh in every circumstance the interests of the empire entrusted to his care. There may be some heroism in an individual, who, where himself only is concerned, gives vent to the expression of a just indignation, and braves the result. But when it is his country that must bleed for his rash words, all the glory vanishes, and his conduct becomes as criminal as imprudent. Such, we must say, appears to us the censure that attaches to the Spanish responses. It was impossible to look at the situation of Spain, with half her people in insurrection, her army weak, her finances ruined, and not to feel that a war with a power more than triple in extent and resources, backed by kingdom after kingdom to the farthest extremities of Europe, must, at the very best, be an event pregnant with dire calamity. It was one, which every step short of an actual sacrifice of institutions deemed essential to the welfare of Spain, ought to have been taken to arrest. The institutions of Spain, and the conduct of its government, might have been temperately justified; the unfavourable judgment of the allied powers might have been imputed to misapprehension, or to false reports spread by its enemies. In the present hesitating temper of France, it appears highly probable, that by such a prudent use of soft words, the threatened tempest might have been averted, and the peace, the liberty, and the happiness of Spain, might have been preserved.

The Spanish ministry followed a very different course. They did not even deign a direct reply to the communications of the allied powers. They noticed them only by dispatches sent to the Spanish ambassador at the respec

tive courts, and which he was authorized to communicate to their ministers for foreign affairs. To France, whose note, by the process above traced, had been considerably softened down from the Verona pitch, the reply was not much more than haughty. The constitution of 1812, was represented as produced by the united will of Spain; its overthrow was represented as the work of perfidious counsellors; its restoration as effected, not by military insurrection, but by the general will of the nation. The offer of his most Christian Majesty to contribute to the tranquillity of Spain, was duly appreciated; but the means employed were felt as producing an effect directly opposite. The aids desired from the French government were purely negative; to withdraw its army of observation, and to cease to afford an asylum to the factious enemies of Spain. It was added, "To say that France desires the welfare of Spain, and its tranquillity, while she holds continually lighted up these firebrands of discord, which feed the disorders that afflict her, is to fall into an abyss of contradiction." With the notes of the other powers no measures were kept. They were characterized, in the very preamble, as a tissue of falsehoods and calumnies;" and the notes went on to repel their interference in a still more peremptory and indignant tone.

Had the Spanish ministers been guided by the counsels of wisdom, they would have anxiously sought to withdraw these documents and proceedings from the eyes of the Cortes and of the public. Acting upon such inflammable bodies, they could not fail to call forth words and deeds tending to widen the breach, and to inflame still farther the hostile spirit of the allied powers. The ministers followed a contrary course, and determined to

reap the applauses which such replie were sure to obtain from a popula assembly. On the 9th, therefore, they laid before the Cortes the notes of the allied ministers, and their own answers The Cortes manifested a lofty and ge nerous indignation, the expression of which could not in them be blamed though its effects might be lamented Galiano and Arguelles were the chief speakers; and the latter, though rank ed usually among the most moderate liberals, outdid now the others in de clamation against the principles and language of the European potentates, and in expressing a determination to resist to the utmost their attempt to dictate an internal constitution to Spain. A committee was appointed to draw up an address in reply; and the assembly closed amid loud cries echoed from the gallery, of Live the Constitution! Live the National Independence!

On the 11th, the committee laid before the Cortes their project of an address. It was agreed to unanimously, amid speeches breathing a similar spirit with those formerly uttered. One amendment only was moved, in reference to the expression," his people," applied to the Spaniards in reference to the king; and which, at the motion of Munarriz, was expunged as too servile. That the address might wear a still more popular character, it was delivered to Riego, who, being placed in the president's carriage, was drawn to the palace by the people amid loud acclamations. The address itself was conceived in such terms as might be expected from the circumstances of its production. The Cortes declared "their surprise and indignation at the strange calumnies, the manifest falsehoods, the calumnious imputations, contained in these documents, particularly in the three last, as vicious in their substance, as contrary in their