Assuming that all energy was exerted in selecting and sending the four transports required for the enterprise projected by Captain Fox for the succor of Sumter,* Mr. Lincoln and his Cabinet must have expected that such an expedition could not reach Charleston before Major Anderson had exhausted his subsistence, hauled down his flag, and retired from his position under a stress that did not necessarily involve war. This expectation is found in the instructions to Captain Talbot directing him to proceed to Charleston and notify Governor Pickens "that an attempt was about to be made to supply Fort Sumter with provisions only, and that, if such an attempt be not resisted, no effort to throw in provisions, arms, or ammunition will be made without further notice, or in case of an attack upon the fort "which instructions both opened and ended with the significant suggestion that, upon arriving at Charleston, he might find that Fort Sumter had been already evacuated!

Captain Talbot having reached Charleston and discharged his commission by reading to Governor Pickens in the presence of General Beauregard, on the 8th of April. the notification of the purpose of the Federal Government to provision the garrison of Sumter, of course General Beauregard telegraphed the Confederate War Department concisely: "Authorized messenger just informed Governor Pickens and myself 'that provisions would be sent to Sumter.'"+ At the same time, however, he was also at the pains to inquire by telegraph of the Confederate commissioners at Washington as to the authenticity of the notification. Commissioner Crawford replied affirmatively on the 9th of April; adding that "diplomacy had failed," and that "the sword" must now be relied on to "preserve the independence" of the seceded States.

On April 10th, the Confederate Secretary of War telegraphed Beauregard that, if satisfied of the authenticity of the notification of the purpose of the Washington government to supply Sumter by force, he should at once demand its evacuation; and in the event this were refused, to proceed to reduce it in such manner as he might determine. That demand was accordingly made in writing at 12 meridian, on the 11th of April; simply a demand for the "evacuation" of the fort, coupled, however, with a proffer of all proper facilities for the removal of Major Anderson and his command, together with company arms and property and all private property, to any post in the United States that the Major might select. "The flag which you have upheld so long and with so much fortitude, under the most trying circumstances, may be saluted by you on taking it

* Steamer Baltic, and the steam-tugs Uncle Sam, Yankee, and Freeborn.

+ Reb. Official Recs., Series I., Vol. I., p. 245.

down," were the courteous words with which this important summons ended. Major Anderson, if with soldierly brevity, also with felicitous freedom from bravado, declined in writing to comply. As he had, however, casually remarked to the aides-de-camp of the Confederate general, that he "must be starved out in a few days" should he "not meanwhile be battered to pieces," Beauregard-having communicated these words to his superiors at Montgomery-was authorized to inform Anderson, as he did. on the 11th of April, that if he would fix a time for the evacuation of his position and agree meanwhile not to use his guns against the Confederates, unless theirs were employed against him, fire would not be opened upon Fort Sumter.

To this Anderson replied on the 12th of April, that, if provided with the proper transportation, he would evacuate Fort Sumter by noon on the 15th of April, and that he would not in the mean time open fire upon the Confederate forces unless compelled to do so by some hostile act against his fort or the flag of his government by the forces under Beauregard, or by the perpetration of some act showing a hostile intention against Fort Sumter, or the flag it bore, should he not receive prior to the 15th of April controlling instructions from his government or additional supplies.*

As this answer, on its face, was unsatisfactory, and Messrs. James Chesnut, Jr., and Stephen D. Lee, aides-de-camp to General Beauregard, who received it, were under instructions in that event to give formal notification in writing, that within one hour thereafter the Confederate batteries would open fire upon Fort Sumter, the notice was duly given under their official signature, at 3.30 in the morning of the 12th of April, that hostilities would begin at 4.30.

Meanwhile, and of course, Captain Fox was unable to leave New York until the 10th of April on the Baltic. Preceded twelve hours by one of his steam-tugs, he left the other two to straggle on to the rendezvous off Charleston as best they might. The Baltic reached its destination, as Captain Fox reported, at 3 o'clock in the morning on the 12th of April; that is, barely one hour and a half before fire was opened on Fort Sumter. At the time, a gale was blowing, and of the war vessels only the Harriet Lane had come upon the scene. At 7 A.M., however, the Pawnee anchored twelve miles to the eastward of the lighthouse to await the advent of the Powhatan, the flagship of the naval force, which, as well as the Pocahontas, had not come in sight, and neither of which ships seems to have made its appearance subsequently in that quarter, wherefore, as respects the

*Reb. Official Recs., Series I., Vol. I., p. 14.

Powhatan alone, it is explained by Fox that that vessel had been withdrawn from the expedition without his knowledge on the 7th of April, or "without the least intimation to him that the main portion-the fighting portion" of the expedition "was taken away." That is to say, the Powhatan and the 300 extra sailors aboard of her that were relied on as essential to the success of the enterprise had been deliberately eliminated from it by the authorities at Washington-a course which can only be rationally accounted for, I repeat, by the theory that the Fox expedition was dispatched only because it was expected that Major Anderson would have been starved out of Fort Sumter before its arrival! Be this as it may, in the condition it reached the scene of its projected operations any attempt to execute its mission Captain Fox himself has said would have been absurd. At 4.30 in the morning, the hour designated by General Beauregard, a signal shell was thrown into Sumter from the mortar battery on James

Island. This was immediately followed by all the Confederate batteries which encircled the doomed work. In a few moments thereafter 30 guns and 17 mortars were being actively served against it. Anderson did not respond, however, until 7 o'clock, when Captain Doubleday replied, with the first shot from the battery in the right gorge angle of Sumter. All the officers and soldiers of the Federal command had been divided into three reliefs, of two hours each, for the service of their pieces, including the 43 engineer workmen who had been previously trained for such an exigency, and nearly all of whom volunteered and acted as cannoneers or to carry shot and cartridges.* The armament disposable embraced 21 pieces in casemates, 27 in barbette, and 5 heavy columbiads on the parade, mounted for mortar service-in all 53 pieces. Only the casemate guns, however, seem to have been used.

* One of the officers who took an active part in the defense of Sumter, Lieutenant R. K. Meade, of the engineers, subsequently resigned and entered the Confederate service when his native State, Virginia, seceded.

The Confederate vertical or mortar practice appears to have been so good that one-half of their ten-inch shells either fell within the fort or exploded immediately above it, the fragments falling within the parapets. Such was the precision of this vertical fire, Captain Foster tells us, that Major Anderson soon determined not to subject his command to the great loss that must have ensued had he attempted to man and fight the first tier or barbette guns, notwithstanding the traverses and bomb-proof shelters which the engineers had provided. Therefore, those guns were only fired once or twice by volunteers who ventured the service, without effect at all commensurate with the hazard, as was found.

From all quarters of the compass meanwhile the Confederate shells sought and reached every part of the beleaguered fortress, and, as Foster reports, their fuses were so well graduated or timed that they exploded

just within the parapets. The direct firing, however, was not so well directed and effective.

Starting with but 700 cartridges for his guns, and unable to keep more than six needles busy making the necessary cartridge bags, Anderson had so reduced his stock by midday that he was forced to narrow his service to six guns during the afternoon. Two of these were addressed to Fort Moultrie, two to the batteries on Morris Island, and the others to the works on the west end of Sullivan's Island; that is, he in right soldierly fashion devoted himself chiefly to seeking to disable the batteries that would be used against the impending effort to relieve him from the side of the sea. Several times during the afternoon of the 12th the barracks were set on fire from the exploding shells, but were readily saved from conflagration. However, the quarters were soon completely riddled through and through to their basements by shells fired from the west end of Sullivan's Island.

The night of the 12th was very stormy, and both wind and tide were high, so that had the whole Federal fleet been outside, as efficiently constituted for the enterprise as Fox claims it was projected, it could not possibly have done aught to succor Anderson and his little force. About every fifteen minutes, through the dense darkness, Beauregard's mortars threw a shell at Sumter-however, without reply. But meanwhile the supply of cartridge-bags was increased-to which end all the extra clothing of the men was cut up, and all the coarse paper to be found and extra hospital sheets were consumed. On the morning of the 13th of April, for twenty-four hours without bread, the last of some damaged rice that had been used as a substitute was cooked with the salt pork, the only character of food remaining. The Federal fire was now resumed as briskly as the supply of cartridges justified. The Confederate artillery service also was resumed at daylight with vigor, and the direct fire with better aim, from practice, than on the 12th. Hot shot were now thrown from Moultrie, and with such effect that the already riddled officers' quarters were soon so completely ablaze that the safety of the garrison from a sudden terrible death made it necessary to hermetically close the magazine. Before this was done only fifty barrels of powder could be brought forth and distributed in the lower casemates for future service, barely in time to save them from explosion, when the magazine doors were closed, and earth heaped and packed against them. In this and in the service of the guns the officers worked manually as well as the men. All the time the Confederate batteries rained down shells, or, for the most part, red-hot shot. By 12 M. all the wood work of the casemates and barracks was in flames; and only by unrelaxing effort was the fire kept from sweeping down the stairways to the wood work of the quarters below, and soon it became necessary to throw away all the powder to avoid its explosion from flying sparks that began to penetrate even to the casemates. Therefore, all but five barrels were thrown into the bay. Thus the ammunition was so reduced as to enable Anderson only to fire a gun every ten minutes.

The flagstaff, that had been repeatedly struck during the forenoon, finally came down at 1 P.M. The flag, secured as it fell by Lieutenant Hall of the artillery, was speedily rehoisted on a temporary staff by Lieutenant Snyder of the engineers.

By this time ex-Senator Wigfall, a volunteer on the staff of Beauregard, had made his way by an open boat from Morris Island to Sumter, with a white flag, and was permitted to enter through an embrasure whereupon, previously to meeting Major Anderson, he represented in sub. stance to the other officers, that as their flag had been shot away and a fire