JER, 第 4-5 卷Hanyang Economic Research Institute in collaboration with Hanyang University College of Business and Economics, 1999 |
搜尋書籍內容
第 1 到 3 筆結果,共 36 筆
第 186 頁
... mechanism coordinator ) to process information and to en- force the terms of trade . There are several reasons why we need a coordinator to execute a mechanism . First , the mechanism coordinator may be called upon to balance the budget ...
... mechanism coordinator ) to process information and to en- force the terms of trade . There are several reasons why we need a coordinator to execute a mechanism . First , the mechanism coordinator may be called upon to balance the budget ...
第 187 頁
... mechanism coordinator , there may exist tradeoffs between the existence of efficient mechanisms and their execu- tion . And a mechanism coordinator can promote efficiency by executing a coordination mechanism . In this paper , we focus ...
... mechanism coordinator , there may exist tradeoffs between the existence of efficient mechanisms and their execu- tion . And a mechanism coordinator can promote efficiency by executing a coordination mechanism . In this paper , we focus ...
第 205 頁
... mechanisms are not " efficient self - enforcing " . That is , for some ex post incentive efficient and ex post individually ra- tional mechanisms we need a mechanism coordinator in the execution of mechanisms because of the information ...
... mechanisms are not " efficient self - enforcing " . That is , for some ex post incentive efficient and ex post individually ra- tional mechanisms we need a mechanism coordinator in the execution of mechanisms because of the information ...
內容
ChangJin Kim Tian Zhu Contingent versus Noncontingent Contracts | 87 |
MyungJig Kim KyoungYong Jee and ShinWon Kang Environmental | 101 |
William Latham | 131 |
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常見字詞
adjusted data analysis assume assumption buyer C₁ capital central bank coefficient competition correlation cost function countries Cournot currency curve decrease default probabilities delegation effect environmental equation equilibrium estimated ex post efficient ex post incentive ex post individually exchange rate exists externalities F-statistic factor forecasting growth Hanyang University Hotelling incentive compatible income increase inflation Journal of Economic Korea labor supply land value tax Lemma Lindahl equilibrium Lorenz curve mechanism coordinator monetary policy money-supply shock monopolist municipal bond negative number of firms oligopoly oligopsony output paper parameters percent period positive post incentive efficient post individually rational price discrimination price level production profit R-squared random-effect model RCLEO recovery rate regression reranking risk premium sample seasonally adjusted seller siblings Statistical supply shocks Table target tax rate taxation Theorem trade U.S. West Coast unskilled valuation variables vector wives x(SL zero