JER, 第 4-5 卷Hanyang Economic Research Institute in collaboration with Hanyang University College of Business and Economics, 1999 |
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第 1 到 3 筆結果,共 38 筆
第 160 頁
... individual's average . the return for working is reduced . For each hour the individual works , he receives w ( 1 − t ) instead of w where w is wage rate and t is income tax rate . That is , his return for working is reduced by the ...
... individual's average . the return for working is reduced . For each hour the individual works , he receives w ( 1 − t ) instead of w where w is wage rate and t is income tax rate . That is , his return for working is reduced by the ...
第 196 頁
... individual rationality implies interim individual rationality . And we know from Theorem 2 that for the family of consistent beliefs inequality ( 2 ) is necessary for the existence of ex post incentive efficient mechanisms with x ( SH ...
... individual rationality implies interim individual rationality . And we know from Theorem 2 that for the family of consistent beliefs inequality ( 2 ) is necessary for the existence of ex post incentive efficient mechanisms with x ( SH ...
第 100 頁
... individual effect does not exist in equations ( 12 ) and ( 13 ) , so that it is better for us to estimate those ... individual effect even though we can observe the individual effect in equation ( 16 ) and ( 19 ) . = Secondly I try to ...
... individual effect does not exist in equations ( 12 ) and ( 13 ) , so that it is better for us to estimate those ... individual effect even though we can observe the individual effect in equation ( 16 ) and ( 19 ) . = Secondly I try to ...
內容
ChangJin Kim Tian Zhu Contingent versus Noncontingent Contracts | 87 |
MyungJig Kim KyoungYong Jee and ShinWon Kang Environmental | 101 |
William Latham | 131 |
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常見字詞
adjusted data analysis assume assumption buyer C₁ capital central bank coefficient competition correlation cost function countries Cournot currency curve decrease default probabilities delegation effect environmental equation equilibrium estimated ex post efficient ex post incentive ex post individually exchange rate exists externalities F-statistic factor forecasting growth Hanyang University Hotelling incentive compatible income increase inflation Journal of Economic Korea labor supply land value tax Lemma Lindahl equilibrium Lorenz curve mechanism coordinator monetary policy money-supply shock monopolist municipal bond negative number of firms oligopoly oligopsony output paper parameters percent period positive post incentive efficient post individually rational price discrimination price level production profit R-squared random-effect model RCLEO recovery rate regression reranking risk premium sample seasonally adjusted seller siblings Statistical supply shocks Table target tax rate taxation Theorem trade U.S. West Coast unskilled valuation variables vector wives x(SL zero