Catholic clergymen, or for Roman Catholic establishments, and were considered as void and illegal, being equally against the policy and the enactments of the British legislature. In respect to the mode of administering charities in Chancery, it is not easy to extract from the authorities any consistent doctrine. Where the trust is for definite objects, and a trustee is appointed to administer it, who is in esse and capable of performing it, all the Court does is to watch over the charity, and see that it is executed faithfully, and without fraud; and if the trustees should die, so that it remains unexecuted, the Court will then act as trustee, and do as the trustees ought to do, if living. But where money is given to charity generally, without trustees or objects selected, in some cases the charity has been applied by the king under his sign manuel, and in others by the Court of Chancery, according to its usual course, that is, by a scheme reported by a Master and approved by the Court. It is not easy to perceive upon what principle the one case has in practice been distinguished from the other. Lord Eldon has observed, "all I can say upon it is, I do not know what doctrine could be laid down, that would not be met with some authority upon this point; whether the proposition is, that the Crown is to dispose of it, or the Master by a scheme."* It is laid down in books of authority, that the king, as parens patriæ, has the general superintendence of all charities not regulated by charter, which he exercises by the keeper of his conscience the Chancellor; and, therefore, the Attorney General, at the relation of some informant, when it is necessary, files ex officio an information in the Court of Chancery to have the charity properly established and applied. And, it is added, that the jurisdiction thus established does not belong to the Court of Chancery, as a court of equity, but as administering the prerogative and the duties of the crown. And it seems also to be held, that the jurisdiction vested in the Lord Chancellor by the statute of Elizabeth, is personal, and not in his or * Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. 36. 83. † 3 Bl. Com. 427. 2 Fonbl. Eq. b. 3. p. 2. c. 1. s. 1. and Note (a.) Cooper's Eq. Pl. xxvii. 2 Fombl. Eq. b. 2. p. 2. c. 1. Lord Falkland v. Ber tie, 2 Vern. 342. Mitf. Pl. 29. Bailiffs, &c. of Burford v. Lenthall, 2 Atk. 551. dinary or extraordinary jurisdiction in Chancery; like that, in short, which he exercises as to ideots and lunatics.* It seems in the highest degree reasonable, that the king, as paren patriæ, should have a right to guard and enforce all charities of a public nature, by virtue of his general superintending power over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with such right. But where money is given to charity generally and indefinitely without any trustees, there does not seem to be any difficulty in considering it as a personal trust devolved on the crown to be executed by the crown; and whether it be exec ted by the keeper of the king's conscience, his Lord Chancellor, as his personal delegate, or by himself under his sign manual, is not very material, and may well enough be considered as an authority distinct from that belonging to a Court of Equity. But where there is a trust and trustees, with some general or spe cific objects pointed out, or trustees for indefinite or general charity, it is not easy to perceive, why, as a matter of trust, a Court of Equity may not take cognizance of it in virtue of its ordinary jurisdiction; and the better authorities would seem to countenance this view of the subject. At all events, where there are trustees, and the trust is for a definite object, and su tainable in law, there seems no reason why a Court of Equity, as such, may not take cognizance of such trust at the suit of any competent party, whether the Attorney General or any interested private relator, as well as of any other trust, the execution of which is sought of the Court. In respect, however, to cases of indefinite trusts, or trusts where some general objects are pointed out, the distinction which appears to be most reconcileable with the cases, and to be acted upon in the modern decision, is this: that where there is a general indefinite purpose, not fixing itsel upon any object, the disposition is in the king by sign manual: • Bailiffs, &c. of Burford v. Lenthall, 2 Atk. 551. 2 Fonbl. Eq. b. 2 p. 2 c. l. s. 1. and Note (a.) s. 3. and Note (i.) + Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. 36. 83. 85, 86. Mills v. Farmer, 1 Meris. 55Paill v. Archbishop of Canterbury, 14 Ves. 364. Attorney General v. Mathews, 2 Lev 187. Attorney General v. Wansay, 15 Ves. 231. Attorney General v. Price, 17 Ves. 371. Waldo v. Caley, 16 Ves. 206. but where the execution is to be by a trustee with general or some objects pointed out, whether such trustee survive the testator or not, there the administration of the trust will be taken by the Court of Chancery, (either as personal delegate of the crown, or as a Court of Equity,) and managed under a scheme reported by a Master, and approved by the Court.* ge As to the remedy for misapplication of the charity funds, &c. in cases within the statute of Elizabeth, a proper, though not an exclusive remedy, is by commission under the statute.f But as the statute does not extend to any college, hospital, or free school, which have special visitors, or governors, or overseers, appointed by their founders, it is necessary to consider what is the remedy for frauds or misconduct in such cases. As to this, it may be observed, that all trustees, who are the managers of the revenues of such charities, are subject to the neral superintending power of the Court of Chancery, not as of itself possessing a visitatorial power, or a right to control the charity, but as possessing a general jurisdiction of an abuse of trusts, to redress grievances, and suppress frauds.§ And if a corporation be the mere trustee of a charity, and grossly abuse the trust, the Court of Chancery will take it away from them, and vest it in other hands. But the general controlling power of the Court over charities, does not extend to a charity regulated by governors under a charter, unless they have also the management of the revenues, and abuse their trust; and this will not be presumed, but must be apparent, and made out in evidence.** Ib. † Bridg. Duke, 590. 602. This proceeding appears to have almost fallen prac. tically into disuse. Edin. Review, vol 31. p. 503. It has been mentioned before, that the proceedings may be by information or original bill; and by a recent statute, (52 Geo. III. c. 101.) a more summary remedy is given by petition. Stat. 43 Eliz. c. 4. 2d Proviso. Attorney General v. Smart, i Ves. 72. Attorney General v. Harrow School, 2 Ves. 551 § Fonbl. b. 2. p. 2. c. 1. s. 1. Note (a.) and the authorities cited by Mr. Justice STORY in the case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, ante. See also Attorney General v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch. Rep. 371. 384. 386. || Attorney General v. Mayor, &c. of Coventry, 7 Bro. Parl. Cas. 235. Attorney General v. Earl of Clarendon, 17 Ves. 491. 499. Attorney General v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch. Rep. 389. Bridg. Duke, 574, &c. ** Attorney General v. Foundling Hospital, 2 Ves. Jun. 42. It seems, that with a view to encourage the discovery of charitable donations, given for indefinite purposes, it is the practice for the crown to reward the persons who make the communication, if they can bring themselves within the scope of the charity, by giving them a part of the fund; and the like practice, whether well or ill founded, takes place in relation to escheats.* These are the principal doctrines and decisions under the statute of Elizabeth, of Charitable Uses, which it seemed most important to bring in review before the learned reader. And it may not be useless to add, that the statute of Mortmain and Charities of the 9th of George II. c. 36. has very materially narrowed the extent and operation of the statute of Elizabeth, and has formed a permanent barrier against what the statute declares a "public mischief," which "had of late greatly increased, by many large and improvident alienations or dispositions made by languishing and dying persons, or by others, to uses called charitable uses, to take place after their deaths, to the disherison of their lawful heirs." It was the original design of this note, to have included a summary view of the principal clauses of this statute, and the decisions which have followed it; but it is already extended to so great a length, that it is thought best to omit it. The learned reader will, however, find a very accurate statement of both in Mr. Justice Blackstone's Commentaries, (2 Bl. Com. 268.) and in Bridgman's Duke on Charitable Uses, and Highmore's History of Mortmain and Charitable Uses. This statute was never extended to or adopted by the colonies, in general. But certain of the provisions of it, or of the older statutes of Mortmain, (7th of Edw. I. stat. 2. De Religiosis, the 13th of Edw. I. c. 32. the 15th of Richard II. c. 5. and the 23d of Hen. VIII. c. 10.) have been adopted by some of the States of the Union ; and it deserves the consideration of every wise and enlightened American legislator, whether provisions similar to those of * Per Lord Eldon, in Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. 36. 71. Attorney General v. Stewart, 2 Merivale, 143. 3 Binney, Appendix, 626. Laws of New-York, sess. 38. c. 60, s. 4. 2 Caines Cas. 337. this celebrated statute are not proper to be enacted in this country, with a view to prevent undue influence and imposition upon pious and feeble minds in their last moments, and to check that unhappy propensity, which sometimes is found to exist under a bigotted enthusiasm, and the desire to gain fame as a religious devotee and benefactor, at the expense of all the natural claims of blood and parental duty to children. NOTE II. DIFFERENT PUBLIC ACTS BY WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS RECOGNIZED THE EXISTENCE OF A CIVIL WAR BETWeen spain and her AMERICAN COLONIES. Extract from the President's Message to Congress, November 17, 1818. "In suppressing the establishment at Amelia Island, no unfriendliness was manifested towards Spain, because the post was taken from a force which had wrested it from her. The measure, it is true, was not adopted in concert with the Spanish government, or those in authority under it; because, in transactions connected with the war in which Spain and the colonies are engaged, it was thought proper, in doing justice to the United States, to maintain a strict impartiality towards both the belligerent parties, without consulting or acting in concert with either. It gives me pleasure to state, that the governments of Buenos Ayres and Venezuela, whose names were assumed, have explicitly disclaimed all participation in those measures, and even the knowledge of them, until communicated by this government, and have also expressed their satisfaction that a course of proceedings had been suppressed, which, if justly imputable to them, would dishonour their cause. "The civil war, which has so long prevailed between Spain, and the provinces in South America, still continues without any |