On the morning of March 29 General Kilpatrick advised Mr. Covarrubias that Admiral Nuñez was disposed to say to the intendente of Valparaiso that, inasmuch as it was a purely commercial and un fortified port, the magnanimity of Spain would not permit its destruction if Chile, in reply, would state that she yielded to magnanimity what she refused to yield to force. Mr. Covarrubias answered by proposing that, as Admiral Nuñez had given as a reason for the bombardment that he could not meet the vessels of the allies, their squadron should be placed 10 miles from Valparaiso, there to engage an equal force from the Spanish fleet (the Numancia being excluded), Commodore Rodgers to match the ships and act as umpire. Admiral Nuñez declined this proposal, saying that as a military man he knew the superiority of his forces, and should, of course, avail himself of it." On the morning of March 31 the bombardment took place, lasting three hours. The shots were chiefly directed at the public buildings-the bonded warehouses, the intendencia, and the railway station. Four of the warehouses were destroyed, containing neutral property valued at $10,000,000. White flags were at the Admiral's request placed on the hospitals and churches, but some of these were struck. A part of the streets Planhada and Cocharne, extending from the intendencia toward the customs stores, was destroyed by fire, and some twenty-five private dwellings were consumed. The total loss was estimated at $15,000,000, less than 5 per cent of which fell on Chileans. Two or three persons were killed and as many wounded.' Mr. Seward, in acknowledging General Kilpatrick's dispatches, said: "The conclusion at which you arrived . . that it was not your duty to advise or instruct Commodore Rodgers to resist the bombardment by force, is accepted and approved." Subsequently Mr. Seward, in a letter to the Attorney-General, expressed the opinion that citizens of the United States domiciled in Valparaiso would have no claim for indemnity either against Spain or against Chile." and the Attorney-General gave to this view his sanction. Mr. Welles, Secretary of the Navy, in his annual report of Dec. 3, 1866, stated that Commodore Rodgers" was not required to interpose his force against or for either party;" that it was "his duty, even while endeavoring to mitigate the harsh severities of war, to main a Dip. Cor. 1866, II. 391, 392. b Dip. Cor. 1866, II. 386–393; 56 Br. & For. State Papers, 971. For a circular of Mr. Covarrubias of April 1, 1866, on the bombardment, see Dip. Cor. 1866, II. 421. d Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Stanbery, At. Gen., Aug. 24, 1866, 74 MS. Dom. Let. 64. e Stanbery, At. Gen., 1866, 12 Op. 21. tain a strict neutrality;" and that, "the officers of other neutral powers having declined to unite in any decided steps to protect the city, no alternative remained for him to pursue consistently with the position of this Government towards the parties than that which he adopted." a Lord Clarendon, on hearing of the bombardment, described it in a communication designed for the Spanish Government as "a wanton destruction unparalleled in modern times and unjustifiable on any grounds, of a vast amount of neutral property stored up in the magazines of a defenceless town, without any material damage to the enemies of Spain, but with most disastrous consequences for those whom Spain professes to regard as friends." It appears, however, that Admiral Denman had been instructed "not to transgress the limits permissible to the representative of a neutral power, or to associate himself with any proceedings of the United States commodore which might be inconsistent with the neutral character." The opinion of publicists is expressed by Hall, who declares that "the act gave rise to universal indignation at the time, and has never been defended." c The bombardment practically ended hostilities in Chile; but, to the great inconvenience of neutral powers and particularly of the United States, it effectually blocked the way to the conclusion of a peace. At length, after repeated efforts at mediation, a conference between representatives of Spain and the allies was opened at Washington Oct. 29, 1870, under the presidency of Mr. Fish. April 11, 1871, an armistice was concluded whereby the de facto suspension of hostilities was converted into an indefinite truce, which was not to be broken by any of the belligerents except on three years' notice, given through the Government of the United States; and so long as the truce lasted all restrictions on neutral commerce were to cease. last session of the conference took place January 24, 1872. Mr. Fish renewed his entreaties for a permanent peace. The Spanish minister declared this to be the desire of his Government. The Chilean minister, with the support of the ministers of Peru and Ecuador, replied that peace would be made if Spain would "remove the obstacle" by making reparation for the bombardment of Valparaiso. The Span1sh minister declined to enter into a discussion which could produce no beneficial result." At this announcement Mr. Fish expressed his disappointment, declaring that the United States had hoped that 4 Messages and Documents, 1866-67, Abridgment, 703. 656 Br. & For. State Papers, 942, 953-954, 987. Int. Law (4th ed.) 556. See Calvo, Droit Int. (5th ed.) VI. § 428. 4 Military necessity The does not permit . . . the doing of any hostile act that would make the return of peace unnecessarily difficult." (Stockton, Naval War Code, art. 3.) H. Doc. 551-vol 7-24 in view of the great changes which had taken place in the executive government of Spain, "the present sovereign .. might not be held morally accountable for the severe act of his predecessor in the assault on Valparaiso, but might satisfy the natural sensitiveness of Chile by expressing regret that the Government of Isabel II. had omitted to offer Chile satisfactory explanations on that subject." Nearly twenty years elapsed before treaties were made by Spain with Peru and Bolivia, the first of the allies with which she was able to conclude a formal peace." In 1879 the ministers of France, the United States, Great Britain, Italy, and Germany, in Peru, addressed a remonstrance to the admiral of the Chilean squadron against the bombardment of unfor tified commercial towns, as illustrated in the proceedings of the squadron in Mollendo and Pisagua, and in a lesser degree at Iquique. The American minister declined to sign the document till it had been so altered as to make the protest dependent on the truth of the facts assumed in it. Mr. Evarts commended the prudence of the minister in this regard, as it was subsequently alleged that the firing on one of the places mentioned was in retaliation for the firing on a flag of truce. In regard to the law applicable to the bombardment of unfor tified places, Mr. Evarts referred to and inclosed a copy of the opinion of Attorney-General Stanbery, of August 31, 1866, 12 Op. 21, holding that no claim for compensation of private individuals grew out of the bombardment of Valparaiso by the Spanish fleet on March 31, 1866. Mr. Evarts, Sec. of State, to Mr. Christiancy, min. to Peru, No. 20, June As to the threatened bombardment of Port au Prince by a German man- 6. BRITISH-FRENCH DISCUSSIONS, 1882, 1888. § 1171. A discussion of the subject of coast warfare was started in 1882 by Admiral Aube, of the French navy, who, in an article against the proposed discontinuance of Rochefort as a military port, argued that "as wealth is the sinews of war, all that strikes at the wealth of the enemy, a British French a Moore, Int. Arbitrations, V. 5048-5056, As to a resolution of the Chamber of Commerce of New York on the bombardment of Valparaiso, see Mr. F. W. Seward, Acting Sec. of State, to Mr. Wilson, May 22, 1866, 73 MS. Dom. Let. 139. fortiori all that strikes at the sources of his wealth, becomes not only legitimate, but imposes itself as obligatory. It must therefore be expected to see the fleets, mistresses of the sea, turn their power of attack and destruction, instead of letting the enemy escape from their blows, against all the cities of the coast, fortified or not, peaceful or warlike, to burn them, to ruin them, and at least ransom them without mercy. This was the former practice; it ceased; it will prevail again."« Similar views were expressed by other French writers. Contrary opinions were maintained by Admiral Bourgois, who deprecated any suggestion of repudiating "the principles of the law of nations which protect inoffensive citizens, noncombatants, and open and undefended towns against the horrors of war." e The effect of these discussions was reflected in the British naval maneuvers of July and August, 1888, in which the enemy's fleet shelled "fine marine residences and watering places" and levied ransoms on undefended towns. These proceedings were objected to by Holland, on the ground that they might be cited as giving an implied sanction to such a mode of hostilities. They were also condemned by Hall, who declared that "the plea that every means is legitimate which drives an enemy to submission would cover every barbarity that disgraced the wars of the seventeenth century;" that the proposal to revive in maritime hostilities a practice which had been "abandoned as brutal in hostilities on land" was "nothing short of astounding; " but that, before such things were done, "states are likely to reflect that reprisals may be made, and that reprisals need not be confined to acts identical with those which have called them forth." f 7. CHILEAN REVOLUTION, 1891. § 1172. As to the insurrection in Brazil, 1893, see supra, § 70. January 16, 1891, during the contest between the government of Balmacedo and the Congressionalists, two forts at Valparaiso fired & Revue des Deux Mondes, L. 314, March 15, 1882. M. Etienne Lamy, Revue des Deux Mondes, LIII, 320, Sept. 15, 1882; M. Gabriel Charmes, La Réforme Maritime," Revue des Deux Mondes, LXVI. 872, LXVIII. 127, 770, Dec. 15, 1884; March 1, 1885; April 15, 1885. "Les Torpilles et Le Droit des Gens," La Nouvelle Revue, April 1, 1886, 494; "La Défense des Côtes et Les Torpilleurs," Dec. 1. 1887, 489, and Feb. 1, 1888, 453. In the same publication, June 1, 1886, 474, there is a reply to Admiral Bourgois's first article by "Un ancien officer de marine." The London Times, Aug. 7, 1888. e Studies in Int. Law, 96 et seq. Int. Law (4th ed.), 556. on the Congressionalist man of war Blanco Encalada, killing and wounding a number of persons on board. The attack "was not returned for reasons of humanity toward the people and the town."« February 16, 1891, a report having reached Iquique that the government troops had been defeated on the pampas near that place, the intendente surrendered the town to the Congressionalists, who occu pied it with their naval forces. Early in the morning of February 19 government troops, about 250 strong, surprised the city, and the marines retired into the custom-house, where they were supported by the squadron. Firing continued all day, and two fires broke out. Late in the afternoon a British naval officer, at the request of the revolutionary leaders on the Blanco Encalada, went ashore under a flag of truce, and arranged a suspension of arms to enable foreigners and noncombatants to leave the town. But for this, said the British Admiral, Hotham, “Iquique would have disappeared, and with 250 drunken Chilean soldiers, no discipline nor police, and supplemented by roughs, the sufferings, and worse, of noncombatants, especially women and children, may be imagined.” › March 26, 1891, Mr. Tracy, Secretary of Navy, addressed to RearAdmiral Brown instructions in relation to the protection of American interests in Chile during the revolution then going on. With reference to the fleet of the Congressional party, whose belligerency had not been recognized by the United States, Mr. Tracy said: "Should the bombardment of any place, by which the lives or property of Americans may be endangered, be attempted or threatened by such ships, you will, if and when your force is sufficient for the purpose, require them to refrain from bombarding the place until sufficient time has been allowed for placing American life and property in safety. You will enforce this demand if it is refused, and if it is granted, proceed to give effect to the measures necessary for the security of such life or property. July 7, 1891, Mr. Kennedy, British minister at Santiago, inclosed to Lord Salisbury a correspondence relating to the then recent bombardment of the town of Pisagua without provocation or notice of any kind by the Chilean Government ships Almirante Condell and Imperial, on June 8. 1891. Among the inclosures there was a protest of the consular body at Pisagua, which stated that the vessels came close into the port about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and without notice of any kind began to fire their guns into the town, causing much damage. On July 7th Mr. Kennedy addressed a protest to a Blue Book, Chile, No. 1 (1892), 24. This abstention on the part of the Congressionalists is said to have been due to the influence of Captain St. Clair, of H. M. S. Champion. (Id. 83.) b Blue Book, Chile, No. 1 (1892), 82-83. c H. Ex. Doc. 91, 52 Cong. 1 sess. 245. See, also, id. 237, 244, |