In general, it may be said that in actual practice intervention becomes a matter of policy. Nonintervention is the duty resting upon states as regards one another's affairs. Each state must judge for itself of the propriety of intervention, or of an agreement to intervene under given conditions, and must. then abide the consequences. In practice it has never been difficult to find an ostensible reason for intervention in the affairs of a foreign state, when the wish was present.

Formerly the tender of good offices or of mediation by a third state, in case of disagreement between two states, was sometimes regarded as intervention, and as an unfriendly act; but the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 1907, provides that "the exercise of this right can never be regarded by the one or the other of the parties in dispute as an unfriendly act." 15 Thus, for the states parties to the convention, constituting practically all civilized nations, the tender of good offices and mediation becomes a right.

Intervention as a policy has been avowed by a group of states as in the "balance of power" doctrine, and by a single state as in the "Monroe Doctrine."

what their municipal laws should be, or as to the manner in which they should be administered. Nevertheless, the mutual duties of nations require that each should use its power with a due regard for the results which its exercise produces on the rest of the world. It is in this respect that the condition of the Jews in Russia is now brought to the attention of the United States, upon whose shores are cast daily evidences of the suffering and destitution wrought by the enforcement of the edicts against this unhappy people. I am persuaded that His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia and his councilors can feel no sympathy with measures which are forced upon other nations by such deplorable consequences. "You will read this instruction to the minister of foreign affairs, and give him a copy if he desires it."

Foreign Relations U. S., 1891, p. 739.

15 Title II, art. 3, Appendix, p. 520.

WILS.INT.L.-5

POLICY OF INTERVENTION.

24. Two well-established policies have been based upon intervention, viz., the balance of power in Europe, and the Monroe Doctrine in America.

(a) The maintenance of the balance of power implied that the members of the European family of nations would view as a cause for intervention the concentration of such power in any one of its members as to enable that state to coerce the others.

(b) The Monroe Doctrine implied that the United States would view as a just ground for intervention any attempt to extend European dominance on the American continent.

The principle underlying the doctrine of the balance of power seems to be that the increase in the power of one state or the change in relations of states may endanger the existence of others; hence it is necessary that states in such geographical proximity as to be endangered must take measures for their preservation. There is no claim that the increase in power or change in relations may involve wrong dealing or injustice, but rather that, owing to the neighborhood of the states, their security as political unities is involved. This may be interpreted so as to justify the refusal of the fruits of conquest or diplomatic negotiations to a state, or so as to uphold the government of a weak state, lest a strong state may absorb it, and thus disturb the equilibrium.

(a) Some ideas of the European balance of power among states appear very early.16 The Treaty of Westphalia, 1618, embodies its principles. The Treaty of Utrecht between Great Britain and Spain, in 1713, gives as its object the establish

16 Hill, speaking of the end of the fifteenth century, says: "Too distrustful of one another's designs to unite in permanent confederations, the Italians had learned to preserve their local independence by a system of diplomatic equilibrium. In the conflict for pre-eminence which was soon to fill the broader arena of Europe, the experience of Italy was to furnish the method by which the nations were to maintain their local sovereignty against imperial aspirations so colossal in their proportions as to render the pretensions of the past comparatively insignificant." II History of European Diplomacy, p. 164.

ment of peace and tranquility in Christendom through a just equilibrium of power. This object was frequently reaffirmed in treaties during the eighteenth century. The memory of acquisition of great power in the hands of a single ruler at the time of Napoleon caused all European states to view with suspicion the increase of power in the hands of any ruler. To protect, to maintain, or to re-establish the balance of power or the European equilibrium was a common nominal object for which conferences were called and agreements made during the nineteenth century. The European states have particularly concerned themselves with the status of Southeastern Europe. Each power feared any movement which would change the conditions in these domains. An Asiatic rule at one of the most important strategic positions in Europe has been maintained through fear of the results if Constantinople should fall into the hands of a European power. Conferences, in which representatives of the peoples directly concerned have not been present, have settled the boundaries, political relations, etc., of countries of Southeastern Europe.

(b) Referring to the claims of Russia on the northwest coast of the American continent, President Monroe, in his message of December 2, 1823, said: "The occasion has been judged proper for asserting as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers." As to the attitude of the allied powers toward the states to the south of the United States he says: "We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered, and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence, and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their

destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States."

Thus there was announced the doctrine that (1) the American continents "are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers"; (2) the United States would "consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety"; and (3) as to existing governments on the American continent the United States would "not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States." This statement of policy received the name of the "Monroe Doctrine." 17

It is accepted that, while the doctrine is generally called by the name of the President, it was in a sense not his work, but was distinctly "the work of John Quincy Adams." 18

While the doctrine has never received formal sanction by Congress, Congress has many times taken action in accord with its principles, Secretaries of State have reaffirmed it, Presidents have interpreted it to meet the needs of the period, and, though no action was taken by the Hague Conferences, it was formally mentioned in the reservation under which the United States became a party to The Hague Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1899 and 1907. 19

17 President Monroe's Message, December 2, 1823.

18 John Quincy Adams and the Monroe Doctrine, Worthington C. Ford, 7 Amer. Historical Rev. 1902, 676, and 8 Id. 28; Reddaway, The Monroe Doctrine, 87; Hart, Foundations of American Foreign Policy, 214; Tucker, The Monroe Doctrine, 12.

19 "Nothing contained in this convention shall be so construed as to require the United States of America to depart from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the political questions of policy or internal administration of any foreign state; nor shall anything contained in the said convention be construed to imply a relinquishment by the United States of America of its traditional attitude toward purely American questions."

While the United States participated in the International Confer

In commenting on this action, President Roosevelt gives a broad interpretation to the earlier doctrine in his message of December 3, 1901:

"This same peace conference acquiesced in our statement of the Monroe Doctrine as compatible with the purposes and aims of the conference.

"The Monroe Doctrine should be the cardinal feature of the foreign policy of all the nations of the two Americas, as it is of the United States. Just seventy-eight years have passed since President Monroe in his annual message announced that 'the American continents are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power.' In other words, the Monroe Doctrine is a declaration that there must be no territorial aggrandizement by

ence of Algeciras and with the European powers signed the General Act of April 17, 1906, it was done under reservation that this action was for the general protection of United States interests in Morocco and was without "assuming obligation or responsibility for the enforcement thereof." The United States Senate appended a further explanation of the conditions of ratification to the effect that it was "without purpose to depart from the traditional American foreign policy, which forbids participation by the United States in the settlement of political questions which are entirely European in their scope." 1 Amer. Jour. Int. Law, Official Documents, p. 47.

In a pro memoria of December 11, 1901, the German ambassador to the United States distinctly announced the intention of Germany to observe the Monroe Doctrine while pressing the claims against Venezuela:

"The Imperial Government proposes therefore to submit the reclamations in question, which have been carefully studied and have been considered as well founded, directly to the Venezuelan Government, and to ask for their settlement. If the Venezuelan Government continues to decline as before, it would have to be considered what measures of coercion should be used against it.

"But we consider it of importance to let first of all the Government of the United States know about our purposes, so that we can prove that we have nothing else in view than to help those of our citizens who have suffered damages, and we shall first take into consideration only the claims of those German citizens who have suffered in the civil war.

"We declare especially that under no circumstances do we consider in our proceedings the acquisition or the permanent occupation of Venezuelan territory."

Foreign Relations U. S., 1901, p. 194.