thorize the public officials of the United States to obstruct ordinary commerce in arms between citizens of this country and the rebellious or other parts of the territory of the Republic of Colombia." 31

Attempts have also been made by the parent state to obtain advantages of a blockade without the obligations of war through a proclamation declaring ports held by insurgents closed. Foreign states have, however, usually taken the position that such decrees are of no effect, and the ports in the hands of the insurgents are closed only to the extent to which an effective force may physically prevent entrance.

The parent state cannot prescribe the attitude which a foreign state shall assume toward insurgents. It is, however, within the competence of the foreign state to determine its own attitude toward insurgents, so far as this may accord with the laws of humanity and its obligations to a friendly state. The foreign state has full right to deny to the insurgents the right to exercise any belligerent rights toward its subjects. A foreign state, for example, would not be under any obligation to allow the exercise of the right of visit or search of its vessels, and, if its vessels were seized by insurgents, the war vessels of the foreign state might rescue them on the high seas. Admiral Benham, at the time of the Brazilian revolt of 189394 took a position which has been generally approved. He maintained that American merchant vessels in the harbor of Rio Janeiro were liable to risk if they came within the field of actual hostile operations during the continuance of an engagement, but that interference by insurgents with legitimate. movements of American merchant vessels at other times would not be permitted.32

Yet acts of the insurgents are liable to such penalties as the parent state may inflict. Foreign states do not generally take extreme measures against insurgents. They do not permit insurgents to exercise the right of visit and search on the high seas, as the obligation to submit to this interference with the

31 Foreign Relations U. S., 1885, p. 238.

32 Foreign Relations U. S., 1893, p. 116, ff. Admiral Benham's position was sanctioned in the opinion of the Institute of International Law in its session of 1901.

freedom of commerce rests upon a neutral only when there is war, and until there is war there can be no neutral in the sense of international law. The right of visit and search is, of course, denied during an insurrection to the parent state on the same grounds as to the insurgent.

As regards relations of insurgents and parent state, it may be said that they must so far as possible observe the rules of civilized warfare. This is expedient, in order that the parent state may maintain the respect of sister states, and in order that the insurgents may, if successful, be more readily admitted into the family of nations.

A foreign state would not permit the parent state to prescribe the attitude which the foreign government should assume toward its insurgent subjects. A foreign state would not permit the insurgents to prescribe what attitude the foreign government should assume toward other parties involved in the insurrection. Probably the most frequent action of this kind on the part of the insurgents is seen in the attempt of the insurgents to proclaim blockades. It is clear, however, that blockade is a war measure, and involves the existence of courts to pass upon its violations and to decree penalties. In absence of such responsible courts, a foreign state would not be under obligation to respect such insurgent proclamation. As Secretary Hay said in a letter to the Secretary of Navy, November 15, 1902:

"It seems important to discriminate between the claim of a belligerent to exercise quasi sovereign rights in accordance with the tenets of international law and the conduct of hostilities by an insurgent against the titular government.

"The formal right of the sovereign extends to acts on the high seas, while an insurgent's right to cripple his enemy by any usual hostile means is essentially domestic within the territory of the titular sovereign whose authority is contested. To deny to an insurgent the right to prevent the enemy from receiving material aid cannot well be justified without denying the right of revolution. If foreign vessels carrying aid to the enemies of the insurgents are interfered with within the territorial limits, that is apparently a purely military act incident to the conduct of hostilities, and, like any other insurgent in

terference with foreign property within the theater of insurrection, is effected at the insurgent's risk."

He also maintained that, "within the territorial limits of the country, the right to prevent the access of supplies to their enemy is practically the same on water as on land-a defensive act in the line of hostility to the enemy. But in no case would the insurgents be justified in treating as an enemy a neutral vessel navigating the internal waters; their only right being, as hostiles, to prevent the access of supplies to their domestic enemy. The exercise of this power is restricted to the precise end to be accomplished. No right of confiscation or destruction of foreign property in such circumstances could well be recognized, and any act of injury so committed against foreigners would necessarily be at the risk of the insurgents." 33 Balmaceda, in 1891, declared various ports of Chili closed. Some of the European states, as well as the United States, declined to respect the decree. If ports in the possession of the insurgents could be closed by decree, there would be a close analogy to the old idea of a paper blockade. The principle has come to be generally recognized that in time of insurrection closure, to be respected, must be by effective force.

A general agreement on the part of various states was shown in their attitude toward the Haitien insurgents in 1902. This is evident in the letter of the commander of the U. S. S. Machias to the insurgent commander on August 10, 1902. The letter was as follows:

"Sir: I wish to give you notice that I am charged with the protection of British, French, German, Italian, Spanish, Russian, and Cuban interests, as well as those of the United States. You are informed also that I am directed to prevent the bombardment of this city without due notice; also to prevent any interference with commerce by the interruption of telegraph cables or the stoppage of steamers engaged in innocent trade with a friendly power. All interference excepting with Haitien interests, I shall endeavor to prevent."

That insurgents have not belligerent status is sufficient reason for refusing to their vessels the rights of belligerents in foreign ports.

33 International Law Situations, Naval War College, 1902, p. 79.

Section 4295 of the United States Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 2950) made it lawful for a private vessel to resist the aggression of an insurgent not yet recognized as a belligerent. This statute provides:

"The commander and crew of any merchant vessel of the United States, owned wholly or in part by the citizens thereof, may oppose and defend against any aggression, search, restraint, depredation or seizure which shall be attempted upon such vessel, or upon any other vessel so owned, by the commander or crew of any armed vessel whatsoever, not being a public armed vessel of some nation in amity with the United States, and may subdue and capture the same; and may also retake any vessel so owned which may have been captured by the commander or crew of any such armed vessel, and send the same into any port of the United States."

Insurgency may be regarded as a fact which is generally accepted in the international practice. The admission of this fact is by such domestic means as may seem expedient. This admission is made with the object of bringing to the knowledge of citizens, subjects, and officers of the state such facts and conditions as may enable them to act properly. In the parent state the method of conducting the hostilities may be a sufficient act of admission, and in a foreign state the enforcement of a neutrality law. The admission of insurgency by a foreign state is a domestic act, which can give no offense to the parent state, as might be the case in the recognition of belligerency. Insurgency is not a crime from the point of view of international law. A status of insurgency may entitle the insurgents to freedom of action in lines of hostile conflict which would not otherwise be accorded, as was seen in Brazil in 1893-94, and in Chili in 1891. It is a status of potential belligerency which a state, for the purpose of domestic order, is obliged to recognize. The admission of insurgency does not place the foreign state under new international obligations, as would the recognition of belligerency, though it may make the execution of its domestic laws more burdensome. It admits the fact of hostilities, without any intimation as to their extent, issue, righteousness, etc. The admission of the existence of this status of insurgency makes unnecessary much of the

earlier diplomatic circumlocution prevailing between the state divided by domestic strife and foreign states, and makes it possible for states to conduct negotiations with much less liabilty to misunderstandings. This is particularly evident in the diplomatic correspondence of late years. The tendency to depart from or to give special interpretations to the principles ordinarily governing the recognition of belligerency is much less, because, when a status of insurgency is admitted, many of the domestic reasons for such recognition may disappear, and the formal recognition need only take place when the international relations warrant such action. The admission of insurgency is the admission of an easily discovered material fact. The recognition of belligerency involves, not only a recognition of a fact, but also questions of policy touching many other considerations than those consequent upon the simple existence of hostilities.34

LOSS OR MODIFICATION OF STATUS.

19. The loss or modification of the international status of a political unity may affect treaty relations, public obligations, public property, and private property and relations.

Grotius maintains that the political unity may be destroyed through the disappearance of the body politic, as by destruction of the people by flood or famine. The unity may disappear through the destruction of the bond of union which holds the people together, as in civil war. The international personality may disappear when one political unity is merged in or subordinated to another political unity, as when one state is conquered by another.35 The destruction of the people of a state by pestilence, by flood, or other similar disaster, is now hardly conceivable. The dissolution of political bonds through revolt or otherwise has frequently occurred. The loss of inter

84 Wilson, Insurgency, Lectures U. S. Naval War College, 1900; International Law Situations, 1902, pp. 57-83; Id. 1904, pp. 26-62 ; Insurgency and International Maritime Law, 1 American Jour. International Law, p. 46.

35 De Jure Belli ac Pacis, lib. II, cap. IX, 4-8.

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