But here, as so commonly, the importance of the "provision of opportunities for sublimation" is much exaggerated, and in general the writer gravely overestimates the parents' rôle, particularly in his insistence on the importance of "confidence" between parents and child in order that the child's unconscious may be open to the parents' influence. One sometimes cannot avoid a feeling of dismay about the fate of the children of this generation who will be subjected to the experimental handling of parents with a smattering of psychoanalysis. The old-fashioned God who knew all was alarming enough in the childhood of our grand-parents; a replacement of Him by the parent in the flesh would seem to close to our grand-children all avenues of escape from the horror. Those with any real knowledge of the truth of psycho-analysis-above all knowledge gained by experience and not from reading are well aware that anything in the way of analysis of child by parent is impracticable and impossible, by reason of emotional factors on both sides. The advantages of analytic knowledge in the parent will be found in its application to the broad lines and general principles of training, and not to the opportunities it offers of prying into and "influencing" the child's mind. The parents' attention is mainly required in connection with the surrounding conditions; the child must develop itself.

In conclusion, it should be repeated that as a laudable and honest attempt to confer an acceptable benefit on the human race by means of a small dose of diluted psycho-analysis the book cannot be condemned, but that as a serious contribution, even to popular knowledge of the subject, it is negligible.

On the other hand, it may be hoped that it will arouse interest in some who may then be impelled to pursue their study further.

JOAN RIVIERE.

The Psychology of Medicine. By T. W. MITCHELL, M.D. Methuen & Co., Ltd. pp. 179. 6s. net.

Under this rather non-committal title the author gives a concise and closely reasoned account of all the modern developments of psychology as applied to medicine.

The book opens with an account of the work of the mesmerists and then passes on to a consideration of the phenomena of hypnotism and of hysteria. Janet's theory of dissociation is carefully expounded and the necessity for a more dynamic explanation of these conditions is demonstrated. This serves to introduce Freud's conception of repression. Psycho-analysis as a body of doctrine, as a method of psychological investigation and as a therapeutic instrument is then dealt with, special chapters being devoted to dreams and the unconscious. In the latter there is a very helpful attempt to unravel the rather confused terminology which clings to this aspect of psychology. The book closes with chapters on the various neuroses and on psycho-therapeutic procedures.

In covering all this ground, in what must be admitted to be an adequate manner, within the modest compass of 180 pages Dr Mitchell has achieved a real tour de force. The book is intended primarily for the use of "readers who have had no professional training in either medicine or psychology," or of those professional students who desire to make a "preliminary survey" of the

ground. The requirements of both these classes are not quite identical, but one must admit that Dr Mitchell has avoided, on the one hand, an altogether too cursory sketch, and, on the other, a too perplexing condensation of his subject-matter, and thus as nearly as possible meets the demands of both types of reader. He achieves this compromise largely through the successful use of the historical method in the earlier chapters. It has often been contended that the historical method of treatment is fatal to clear exposition, but the present volume illustrates what can be done not only to render the subject interesting but also to present it in a succinct and eminently readable fashion by regarding the subject to some extent from the point of view of its development.

The book can be heartily commended to those for whom it appears to have been written. Even those who have some acquaintance with the subject can find in Dr Mitchell's volume a very clear exposition of the fundamental principles of modern psychology as applied to medicine. Here they will find a wonderfully complete and orderly statement of all those essentials which otherwise can only be acquired by dint of strenuous application coupled with wide reading.

W. MCALISTER.

Insanity and Mental Deficiency in Relation to Legal Responsibility. A Study in Psychological Jurisprudence. By WILLIAM G. H. COOK. xxiv + 192 pp. Routledge. 10s. 6d. net.

This treatise, which was approved as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Laws in the University of London, is an admirable survey of the law relating to torts, contracts and testamentary capacity as applied to the insane in the light of such precedents as exist. The law relating to the civil responsibility of lunatics has been generally admitted to stand upon very insecure foundation, and in this book Dr Cook has undertaken the task of setting out a statement of the law as declared by Statute or Courts of Justice, and also as in his opinion it ought to have been declared to be. To this end he has carefully examined upwards of 200 cases and the laws of many other countries for comparative purposes. Both for torts and contracts it is submitted that lunatics should be treated on the same footing as infants, as being incapable. The present law as to contracts, that the contracts of an insane person can only be avoided when the insanity can be shown to have been known to the plaintiff, is considered to be unsound in that the decision for the precedent rested upon other cases, which in fact were decisions as to contracts for necessaries, and moreover the law relating to capacity of lunatics to marry does not follow out to its logical conclusion this ruling. No hard and fast rule is laid down as to testamentary capacity and the ruling that each case must be dealt with upon its own merits will find favour and support from psychiatrists. The book ends with two appendices: (1) a summary of chief powers and duties of lunacy and mental deficiency authorities in England and (2) suggestions for the reform of lunacy and mental deficiency administration. As regards the latter it would seem to be in the national interest, both from the point of view of efficiency and economy, if the maintenance of all pauper lunatics and feebleminded persons was made a national charge, so as to do away with the law of settlement of paupers, their care and treatment being placed in the hands of a Central Authority.

J. of Psych. (Med. Sect.) II

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The book is full of valuable information and should be of great assistance to all those who have to deal with the question of insanity. It might be objected by psychologists that its sub-title is hardly justified inasmuch as the psychological problems involved are scarcely touched upon, but for all that the conclusions are sound enough. And again most psychiatrists will still agree with Lord Blackburn that it is impossible to find a satisfactory definition of insanity though Dr Cook holds that it is now possible to give a definition which is both comprehensive and satisfactory, and they will also object to his broad use of the term 'mental deficiency,' which is now only used in the technical sense as being restricted to cases of innate deficiency which come under the Mental Deficiency Act of 1913.

E. PRIDEAUX.

ABSTRACTS.

The Group Mind. A sketch of the principles of collective Psychology, with some attempt to apply them to the interpretation of national life and character. By WILLIAM MCDOUGALL, F.R.S. Cambridge University Press, 1921. pp. xvi+304.

This book is a sequel to the author's Introduction to Social Psychology, which was first published in 1908 and which has met with such widespread success. There can be little doubt that the present volume will be equally well, if not better, received by the general reading public. The two volumes together form what may be called a general system of Psychology and have established Prof. McDougall's position as a worthy successor of William James and as one of the leading psychologists of modern times.

In the earlier volume the foundations were laid of a science of the mind, doing equal justice to its biological and psychological aspects, and in the book before us we find McDougall applying the general principles thus acquired to the solution of the problem of the Group Mind. He makes it clear that, in his view, group psychology is not identical with sociology. The province of the latter science is much wider since it comprises contributions from other sciences such as climatology, epidemiology, physiology, genetics and economics, so far as they have bearing upon the life of individuals in society, whereas the more restricted task of group psychology is to examine

the conception of the collective or group mind, in order to determine whether and in what sense this is a valid conception; to display the general principles of collective mental life which are incapable of being deduced from the laws of the mental life of isolated individuals; to distinguish the principal types of collective mental life or group mind; to describe the peculiarities of those types and as far as possible to account for them....Some writers have assumed the reality of what is called the 'collective consciousness' of a society, meaning thereby a unitary consciousness of the society, over and above that of the individuals comprised within it. This principle is examined in Chapter II and provisionally rejected, but it is maintained that a society, when it enjoys a long life and becomes highly organised, acquires a structure and qualities which are largely independent of the qualities of the individuals who enter into its composition and take part for a brief time in its life. It becomes an organised system of forces which has a life of its own, tendencies of its own, a power of moulding all its component individuals and a power of perpetuating itself as a self-identical system subject only to laws of gradual change.

McDougall is able to conceive of group organisation as a form of mental unity because he regards the individual mind as most satisfactorily defined as "an organised system of mental and purposive forces" and in this sense it is clear that any social group might rightly be said to possess collective mind. His main reasons for denying the existence of a collective consciousness are two in number. First that it would involve the assumption that "the consciousness of the units is used twice over, once as an individual consciousness, once as an element entering into the collective consciousness; and no one has been able to suggest how this difficulty can be surmounted." Secondly, the analogy of an individual organism as the collective consciousness of its cells, with a

society as the collective consciousness of its units, breaks down in one very important respect. There is a spatial continuity of the cells in an individual organism which seems to be the essential condition of the fusion of the consciousness of the cells, whereas no such continuity exists among the individual units of the social group.

The central idea in McDougall's whole discussion is that of "organisation and he brings out the essential importance of this conception by dealing in successive chapters with the "mental life of the crowd" and the "highly organised group." Even in the crowd a minimum of organisation is essential for it to become a psychological crowd.

There must be some degree of similarity of mental constitution, of interest and sentiment among the persons who form the crowd, a certain degree of mental homogeneity of persons who form the group and the higher the degree of this mental homogeneity of any gathering of men the more readily do they form a psychological crowd and the more striking and intense are the manifestations of collective life. Under these conditions one of the most characteristic results of the formation of a crowd is the great exaltation or intensification of emotion produced. Individuals when in a crowd may have their emotions stirred to a pitch seldom attained under other circumstances; they feel carried out of themselves, caught up by their emotion and swept clear of feelings of individual limitation. One of the most characteristic intensifications of emotion in a crowd is the phenomenon of panic, and McDougall says panic is "the crudest and simplest example of collective life." He explains the intensification of emotion in a crowd by what he calls the principle of primitive sympathy.

The principle is that in man and in the gregarious animals generally each instinct with its characteristic primary emotion and its special impulse is capable of being excited in one individual by the expressions of the same emotion in another, in virtue of a special congenital adaptability of the instinct on its cognitive or perceptual side. In the crowd the expressions of fear of each individual are perceived by his neighbours and this perception intensifies the fear directly excited in them by the threatening danger.

In other cases again the intensification of emotional response may be explained by the fact that each member is aware of the crowd as a whole and conscious of his membership in that whole and thus loses his sense of individual responsibility, and gives himself up to the prevailing emotion without restraint. Dr Le Bon has compared this state of the individual merged for the time in the crowd in action to the state of fascination in which the hypnotised individual finds himself in the hands of the hypnotiser. But as McDougall points out "crowds undoubtedly display great suggestibility but great suggestibility does not necessarily imply hypnosis; and there is no ground for supposing that the members of the crowd are thrown into any such condition save possibly in very rare instances." Finally, a crowd acts by impulse, not by volition, and in its lack of self-consciousness and sense of responsibility is comparable to "an unruly child or an untutored passionate savage in a strange situation."

Whereas the mentality of the individual tends to be lowered in a crowd, in more highly organised groups the result is less detrimental; indeed, with a sufficient degree of organisation, the group mind may rise to a level superior to that shown individually by most, if not by all, of the members of the group. McDougall enumerates five conditions which are of importance in raising the collective mental life to such a higher level. These conditions are (1) continuity of existence of the group; (2) some adequate idea in the mind of each of its