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Belligerent powers his friendly interposition, and, in consequence, he does not
hesitate to communicate to
the offer of his mediation and good offices.
"But, considering the extended and complicated nature of the present war, the
emperor would feel that he had but imperfectly expressed his ardent wishes for peace,
and his hopes of its speedy and complete re-establishment, if he did not declare, at
the same time, his firm conviction, that it can be only by the united attention of all
the powers concerned in the war, and by a general negociation which should com-
prehend their respective interests, that permanent tranquillity, and such a solid and
durable peace as may, for the future, confirm the political relations of Europe, can
be established From this strong impression, which the frankness of his majesty's
character will not allow him to conceal, his imperial majesty feels it to be his duty to
communicate this pacific overture to those cabinets who are to take a part in the con-
ferences; and, in consequence, he hastens equally to invite the Courts of St. Peters-
burgh, London, and the Thuilleries, to adopt the same views of conciliation, and to
enter into negociations for peace, in which the most important concerns of all the
parties interested may be combined as far as it is possible.

"The emperor has expressed his earnest wish to see peace re-established. He will not allow himself to suggest the particular form of the negociations, still less to anticipate the intentions of other powers, or to express any opinion respecting the preliminaries which it may be necessary to lay down, in order to establish the principles of the first approximation between the Belligerents.

"His imperial majesty, notwithstanding, in the hope that the friendly offer of his interposition will be regarded in the manner that the rectitude of his intentions inclines him to think it will, hastens to propose, for the purpose of facilitating by his interposition, the opening of the negociations, such place in his dominions as, from its situation and locality, may be convenient to all parties, and which, on this account, should not be too contiguous to the theatre of war; and in this, as well as in all other points, the emperor will feel the greatest pleasure in contributing to accelerate the period of so desirable an union.

"Vienna, April 3, 1807."

Answer of the Court of France.

"The undersigned minister for foreign affairs has lost no time in laying before his majesty the emperor and king, the note which his excellency general baron de Vincent, did him the honour of addressing to him on the 7th of this month.

"His majesty, the emperor Napoleon, accepts for himself and his allies, the friendly interposition of his majesty the emperor of Austria, to effect the re-establishment of peace, so necessary to all nations.

"His majesty has only one fear; it is, that the power who hitherto seems to have laid it down as a plan, to found its elevation and greatness upon the divisions of the continent, will endeavour to extract from the congress which may be formed, new subjects of irritation, and new pretexts for disagreement. However, a mode which holds out a hope of stopping the further effusion of blood, and of affording consolation to the bosoms of so many families, ought not to be rejected by France, who, as all Europe knows, was forced against her inclination, into the present war.

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"His majesty the emperor Napoleon, finds, moreover, in this circumstance, a favorable opportunity of strongly expressing the confidence with which his majesty the emperor of Austria has inspired him, and the desire he has to see those connec tions re-established between the two nations, which, in other times, produced their mutual prosperity, and which, at this day, could more than any thing else consolidate their tranquillity and happiness.

"The undersigned, happy in the opportunity of expressing these sentiments in the name of his august sovereign, renews to his excellency, general baron de Vincent, the assurances of his most high consideration.

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"C. M. TALLEYRAND, "Prince of Benevento."

Printed and published by G. SIDNEY, No. 1, Northumberland-Street, Strand;
Sold by H.T. HODGSON, Wimpole-street, and by all the News-venders in Town & Country.

Vol. III. No. 6.

Saturday, August 8, 1807.

Price 10d.

97

OF THE FOLLY OF CHERISHING THE HOPE, AND THE DANGERS WHICH MUST ENSUE FROM THE CONCLUSION, OF PEACE.

(Continued from page 70.)

Although it be obvious that when we shew the dangers which must result from a peace with France under her present system, the folly of cherishing the hope of it is implied in the discussion; yet, it was not ill-timed to recal to the minds of my readers, the causes which compelled us to embark in the war: For, a thorough knowledge of these causes will fortify our determination to resist any attempt to reduce the power, or to interfere in the domestic institutions of our country. It was with this view that I commenced the discussion, in the preceding number, with a general contemplation of the subject. In the present article,, I shall enter into particulars.

We could not conclude a peace with Buonaparte, without relinquishing the three fundamental bulwarks of our public security-honour, independence, and maritime power. These three bulwarks I hold to be inseparable, and if ever the day should arrive when either of them should be yielded by us, that day must be considered as the last of the British empire. Let us inquire how they would be affected by a peace with France. The restitution to France and her allies of all the conquests, or at least of the most valuable of them, that we have made in the course of the war, must be a preliminary condition; for Buonaparte has solemnly pledged himself to procure their recovery. Are the people of England prepared to make this concession after all their sacrifices, and after the experience they have acquired from the treaty of Amiens, that no cessions or concessions will abate the inveterate hatred of Buonaparte against this empire? Besides, can any motive justify the dereliction of our conquests, while the ruler of France retains the absolute sovereignty of the continent of Europe? To conclude such a peace as is consistent with the character of two independent nations, it is absolutely necessary that a peace of equivalents should be made for I presume it will not be disputed that, at this time, the power of Great Britain is, at least, equal to that of France. What equivalent can France yield to Great Britain for the cession of all her maritime conquests?-Hanover. It is not worth our acceptance-It is worse than nothing for no loyal Englishman would desire to see our sovereign, in the capacity of a German prince, become a vassal of France, and a constituent member of that confederation of the Rhine, which hath arisen out of the ruins of the Germanic empire, and of which the enemy of his majesty's throne has assumed to himself the title of protector. In what possible mode could the king of Great Britain receive Hanover in lieu of those trans-atlantic acquisitions which consolidate the power of his throne? He would receive Hanover, in fact, as the dependent of France; for, as duke of Brunswick Luneburgh, he would be surrounded completely by the royal agents, or factors of Buonaparte. The duke of Brunswick (for I no longer use the term elector, the German empire being extinct) could have no communion of interests with the king of Great Britain; on the contrary, as a suffragan of the arch-protector of the Rhenish confederation, he would, from necessity, become the enemy of Great Britain whenever this country might happen to be involved in a war with France. The restitution of Hanover is not therefore, worth a farthing candle, while the present dilapidated condition of Europe remains. Excepting Hanover, France has no continental territory to offer, and certainly none, which we can accept. We know, by bitter experience, that Europe is allotted to new masters, every one of whom is subordinate to the Corsican. He has created a race of kings that he may rule viceroy over them, and it is his unvaried and resolute determination to admit of no superiour to himself upon the face of the earth. His ruinous ambition has been carried on rather with a view to destroy, than to improve; and they who fancy they perceive in his career the revival of the - ancient Roman system, confound the character of the individual with the genius of nations.

VOL. III.NO. 6.

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The Romans are better entitled to the admiration of mankind, for their policy i preserving and governing, than for their valour in making their conquests. Their valour was sanguinary and destructive; but their policy, though selfish and interested, was salutary and beneficial. By the former, they spread desolation and the horrors of war through all the countries of Europe, and through several provinces of Asia and Africa: by the latter, they introduced civility, order, wise laws, and regular governments into all the countries which they conquered. But the conquests of that extraordinary people were effected over barbarous or half-civilized nations, among whom they dispensed those laws by which they were themselves governed. It is remarkable, that the Romans never carried their arms beyond the Alps and Appenines, until they had received the lights of civilization which they afterwards distributed over the vanquished provinces of their empire. Their first struggles were undertaken while they were yet a race of untamed savages, for the purpose of establishing their independence and power as a people: prima ætas sub regibus fuit, propè ducentos quinquaginta per annos, quibus circùm ipsam matrem suam cum finitimis luctatus est: hæc erat ejus Infantia.* While they were thus engaged in hosti lities with their immediate neighbours, they obtained from the most polished states of Greece, the rudiments of urbanity and refinement. Strengthened by their acquisition, they pushed their victorious eagles into the regions of barbarism, which, after frequent, long, and sanguinary wars, they finally reduced under their dominion. The conquests of the Romans, therefore, were the achievements of knowledge and discipline, over ignorance and ill-regulated valour. Hence, after the first torrent of conquest had spent itself, the vanquished were inducted into order, and the loss of their vagrant independence was amply compensated by the establishment of laws, and the arts of industry. Such were the schemes and progress of Roman ambition. But the ambition of France is the very reverse of these. If the principles of the Roman conquests were indefensible, the subsequent policy of the victors drew a veil over their injustice; but the conquests of the French are not only wicked in principle, but injurious in their effects to the happiness of mankind; for they are the triumphs of a ferocious and ignorant people over laws, civilization, and independence. The good produced by the success of the Roman arms was some mitigation of the evils which their ambitious wars occasioned; but there is not the semblance of an argument to palliate the violent usurpations of the French. In many instances, they have disturbed the tranquillity of nations which had attained a greater degree of civi lization than they can pretend to; in others they have blasted the comforts of their equals; in none, have they triumphed over a people, who were their inferiors in the knowledge and pursuit of that policy which leads to the happiness of mankind. Whoever reflects upon the relative state of the several communities of Europe, before their invasion by French armies, must be sensible of this striking contrast between their character and that of the ancient Romans, whom they affect to imitate. Every nation of Europe was making a perceptible progress towards improvement in all the branches of domestic and legislative policy, when the tremendous pest of revolution demolished the unfinished fabrics, which their experience and good sense were erecting for the preservation of social order. The continental powers do not seem to have felt this distinction, and accordingly we have seen them beaten down, in succession, for the want of a common principle of action, and for their stubborn jealousy of each other's power, when the safety of all was menaced by a greater danger. Aware of the existence of this discordant and fatal policy, the French availed themselves of it, to make almost every power instrumental to the ruin of its neighbour. With this view they formed alliances with such states as they could inveigle, or whose cupidity they could excite, for the purpose of preventing the formation of a general confederacy in defence of public freedom. No sooner had they succeeded in this object, than they gained a plausible pretence for obtruding their commands upon their allies on all occasions, under the guise of friendly advices; and if these were not observed, they quarrelled with them, and reduced them to subjection. In this they have but too successfully imitated the Roman policy. Speaking of the uncommon favours heaped upon Cogidunus, one of the British kings,

* Florus in Prom.

by Claudius, Tacitus observes, "vetere ac jam pridem receptá populi Romani con◄ suetudine, ut haberet instrumenta servitutis ac reges."

We have seen to what an extent the French have carried this policy, and with what success it has been attended. At present, we are left wholly to our own exertions, and consequently we need not apprehend any breach of the unity of the principle upon which we are destined to act. As there is no equivalent which France will give for our relinquishment of our conquests, as her authority is all-powerful by land, we ought to pursue steadfastly the means of maintaining our predominance at sea. This cannot be secured in any other way than by a vigorous prosecution of the war. For, it will very soon appear, that the treaties concluded at Tilsit, are framed with a view to the diminution of our maritime preponderance. It has ever been the avowed object of Buonaparte to raise a navy equal to cope with the British, and a peace will enable him to accomplish this purpose; because he will obtain a freer access to the Baltic than we can possibly expect to enjoy, and France will be treated as the most favoured nation. Besides, the ascendancy which he has acquired at the Porte will furnish him with the means of procuring materials, for the construction and equipment of a navy, from the shores of the Black Sea. Immediately after the termination of hostilities, or what he would call the close of the second Punic war, he would begin to collect materials and to build his ships. Of what avail would be any representations, on the part of our government, against such measures? He would answer, that he has a right to augment his maritime power, and he would bid us defiance, if we dared to interrupt him. Even admitting the absurd idea that he would assent to a condition in the treaty, restraining him from building more than a given number of ships of war every year, no dependence could be placed upon his faithful observance of it; because we know, by repeated facts, that he never hesitates in violating a treaty, when his ambition prompts him to discard the obligations of morality and public faith. Besides, our threat of war, he would justly consider as an empty menace. Peace would be now the highest gratification to his mind; it would be the consummation of his power and ambition; because he is aware that we possess the means of preventing the establishment of his naval system, and that those means can only be exerted during a period of war. For however alarming his preparations might be in an interval of peace, Great Britain could not, under a competition of commerce, fit out an armament, on an emergency, capable of averting the evils which he might inflict upon her on the recommencement of hostilities. Instead of fighting for a dominion, which none can now presume to contest with her, she would then have to fight for her existence merely. In the space of two years after the ratification of a treaty of peace, the French government would collect together 150 line of battle ships, and as many frigates. Every port upon the continent of Europe would be engaged in the construction of vessels, while we should be compelled to dismantle our fleets. But it may be said that it would not be necessary to dismantle them, and that the utmost vigilance and precaution would be expedient. To this I answer, that if in peace, our naval establishment is to be kept up; if we are to incur all the expenses of war without profiting by its advantages, we may as well continue the war; for we know the utmost extremity to which an unsuccessful war may reduce but the dangers of peace are indefinite and incalculable. Besides these conside rations, it is difficult to assign any resources for the support of a large naval and military establishment, after the cession of those colonies from which we now draw a great part of our revenues. In short, the spirit of the country would be wearied, if not broken, and the want of stability in our affairs would reconcile the minds of many to submission and non-resistance. These consequences would be sufficiently ruinous in themselves; but great as they would be, undoubtedly they would be but as grains of sand in the scale of our public distresses. Buonaparte would exact from us, as a condition of his forbearance, that we should surrender the liberties of Englishmen into his hands; that is, he would not demand a formal surrender, because he is sensible that men brook injury easier than insult; but he would proceed by sap; he would insist upon it, that our government should prevent free discussion, which, as our government cannot do without a flagrant infringement of the constitution, they dare not attempt to do, without setting themselves at variance with the people. Domestic broils must be the consequence, and this is precisely the wish of Buona

us;

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The Romans are better entitled to the admiration of mankind, for their policy in preserving and governing, than for their valour in making their conquests. Their valour was sanguinary and destructive; but their policy, though selfish and interested, was salutary and beneficial. By the former, they spread desolation and the horrors of war through all the countries of Europe, and through several provinces of Asia and Africa: by the latter, they introduced civility, order, wise laws, and regular governments into all the countries which they conquered. But the conquests of that extraordinary people were effected over barbarous or half-civilized nations, among whom they dispensed those laws by which they were themselves governed. It is remarkable, that the Romans never carried their arms beyond the Alps and Appenines, until they had received the lights of civilization which they afterwards distributed over the vanquished provinces of their empire. Their first struggles were undertaken while they were yet a race of untamed savages, for the purpose of establishing their independence and power as a people: prima ætas sub regibus fuit, propè ducentos quinquaginta per annos, quibus circùm ipsam matrem suam cum finitimis luctatus est: hæc erat ejus Infantia.* While they were thus engaged in hostilities with their immediate neighbours, they obtained from the most polished states of Greece, the rudiments of urbanity and refinement. Strengthened by their acquisition, they pushed their victorious eagles into the regions of barbarism, which, after frequent, long, and sanguinary wars, they finally reduced under their dominion. The conquests of the Romans, therefore, were the achievements of knowledge and discipline, over ignorance and ill-regulated valour. Hence, after the first torrent of conquest had spent itself, the vanquished were inducted into order, and the loss of their vagrant independence was amply compensated by the establishment of laws, and the arts of industry. Such were the schemes and progress of Roman ambition. But the ambition of France is the very reverse of these. If the principles of the Roman conquests were indefensible, the subsequent policy of the victors drew a veil over their injustice; but the conquests of the French are not only wicked in principle, but injurious in their effects to the happiness of mankind; for they are the triumphs of a ferocious and ignorant people over laws, civilization, and independence. The good produced by the success of the Roman arms was some mitigation of the evils which their ambitious wars occasioned; but there is not the semblance of an argument to palliate the violent usurpations of the French. In many instances, they have disturbed the tranquillity of nations which had attained a greater degree of civi lization than they can pretend to; in others they have blasted the comforts of their equals; in none, have they triumphed over a people, who were their inferiors in the knowledge and pursuit of that policy which leads to the happiness of mankind. Whoever reflects upon the relative state of the several communities of Europe, before their invasion by French armies, must be sensible of this striking contrast between their character and that of the ancient Romans, whom they affect to imitate. Every nation of Europe was making a perceptible progress towards improvement in all the branches of domestic and legislative policy, when the tremendous pest of revolution demolished the unfinished fabrics, which their experience and good sense were erecting for the preservation of social order. The continental powers do not seem to have felt this distinction, and accordingly we have seen them beaten down, in succession, for the want of a common principle of action, and for their stubborn jealousy of each other's power, when the safety of all was menaced by a greater danger. Aware of the existence of this discordant and fatal policy, the French availed themselves of it, to make almost every power instrumental to the ruin of its neighbour. With this view they formed alliances with such states as they could inveigle, or whose cupidity they could excite, for the purpose of preventing the formation of a general confederacy in defence of public freedom. No sooner had they succeeded in this object, than they gained a plausible pretence for obtruding their commands upon their allies on all occasions, under the guise of friendly advices; and if these were not observed, they quarrelled with them, and reduced them to subjection. In this they have but too successfully imitated the Roman policy. Speaking of the uncommon favours heaped upon Cogidunus, one of the British kings,

* Florus in Præm.

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