to pay, for adequate portions of territory, that division in the government, so much and so justly complained of, has been completely abolished. The new arrangements, therefore, are equally beneficial to both parties. They have conferred on the tributaries many important advantages. The nature of their obligations to the British government are now clearly defined. Instead of being bound to the payment of a tribute, which necessarily fluctuated according to the political contingencies of the empire, the full extent of their pecuniary engagements is now precisely fixed, by a permanent territorial cession. Whilst, on the other hand, the British government now commands its own means & security in those dependent states, without the necessity of having recourse to those frequent measures of constraint, in order to enforce payment of the arrears of tribute, which, being in their nature vexatious, were so much calculated to wound the feelings, and thereby to estrange the respect and confidence of the native chiefs. In those dependencies, where the chiefs had been allowed to retain military establishments of their own, the new arrangements were productive of further mutual advantage to the contracting parties, by the reduction of these establishments, which the reviewer admits to have been mutinous, ill paid, inefficient, and alarming to their own leaders;" and which the whole evidence on this point, now before the House of Commons, proves to have been sources of perpetual tumult and disorder, of danger to the internal governments, and of impoverishment the most distressing, and oppression the most cruel, to the ruined and miserable peasantry of those devoted states. The dissolution of such establishments, therefore, and the introduction of the company's disciplined native troops in their stead, could not fail to be reciprocally useful to the British government, and the chiefs of those states, as well as eminently conducive to the welfare, quiet, and happiness of their people: whilst, in the territories which have been ceded to the company, in commutation of tribute, the introduction of the permanent revenue settlement, of the whole code of civil regulations, and of the pure and uniform administration of justice, according to the Hindu and Mohammedan laws, as established in the British provinces, is calculated not only to give entire satisfaction to the great bulk of the inhabitants of those territories, but likewise to inspire them with sentiments of attachment to that government, which has at once rescued them from such indescribable misery, and conferred on them such unexpected blessings. That, extending to their territories the civil regulations, and the system of jurisprudence which has been established in the provinces of Bengal and Behar, will be felt by the people as real and substantial blessings,-must be at once admitted by every one who shall consider, that, under their native rulers, the fruits of their labour were exposed to continual public exaction, and private plunder, without the chance of obtaining a remission of the one, or legal redress for the other; and that, under the British government, they were assured, from the known example of the neighbouring provinces, that the land-rents would be reduced to a moderate and fixed standard, and that both their property and their persons would be protected by the firm and due administration of their ancient laws."

2. While examining the assertion of the reviewers, respecting the origin of the wars in India, Mr, Campbell employs no other evidence than that of Tippoo, Scindiah, and Holkar, to demonstrate the entire falsehood of the remark, that these wars were kindled by the English cabinet." He then observes, that "in the whole view of this part of the subject, respecting the origin of the late wars in India, I apprehend the reviewer will not be much satisfied with what has been said. The train of plain facts, and the dry evidence of Tippoo, Scindiah, and Holkar, which have been introduced as essential to the point at issue, are, indeed, likely to offend the delicate taste of the reviewer, whose invincible repugnance to matters of detail I have before had occasion to remark; but they may, notwithstanding, serve to impress on the public mind, a strong conviction of the utter fallacy of his assertion," that the late wars in India were kindled by the British government." The teritory which has been acquired in those wars, and by the system of policy under review, is, no doubt, considerable : but if I have succeeded in proving, that those wars were founded in justice, expediency, and necessity, and that that policy is adapted to the peculiar character and circumstances of the states of India, as well as to the nature of their relations with the British government, then, the extension of dominion, which is the unavoidable result of victorious war, and the acquisition of certain portions of territory, which constitute the security and permanency of the policy thus proved to be fundamentally right,

wil there ne vente te mfunince right corollary, that our late extension of La natimies he men and strengthened the line of our ge

Ten Rida kiray mung und power bulwarks of our security those gogo Fla de Lilo mr værte and prodatory neighbours, enabled them remore; but also, by a great augmen provinces, which we were previously

Le mus.enors in the Carnatic, Mr. Campbell's obser TE - ER then the nabob had not the smallest preten Tut I be the modgy of a prince, or to the sovereignty of z va deter te g me of that province, possessing the title of set to the power by whom he had been The received his government from the EngDante de right of disposing of it, from their having But, and who appointed the nabob to govern it, emperor, and according to the forms of the the Loglish, confiding in the nabib's attachment management, but on a revertable condition, st: there by uniting, in the same person, the office according to a fixed maxim, as well as to the Constitution, had always been kept separate and L., at the same time, retained in their own hands, parer of the state, and debarred the nabob, under negociation, or ɑry political intercourse or corresponBali, a votre Indian or Europea. F That the nabob, er. wil ik Lagush, was bound to say, fom the revenues son, sufficient to defray the whole expence of their the n.be having invariably faced this obligation, MUSILLAJEMCİR, and the most grinding cpression, in the VELOPA, Candace, the revenues, and ered the people,

Tev kt. Le anthok over de execues with which

To ta dem upo" the margener i her own officers.

tas restored to the La very the English govern

DE TUR ATH-ASTERS THE enote Carnatic, TURTLE OF HOUKI am unself to pay to the 3 EN TUES errat distruts as a security ་་་་་མགྲོ། བན་ས་ 108 ts, and to hold no with my oven state."

I ze correspondence found at Seor enters that passed between

• ? murumrah, and the accredited cute at Ibums with the two sons of bages o the Jutisi government, for the cace concinded at Seringapatam in 2. Saku JmDigity or expression, which, in Rave strie, vhich is so well calculated for herefore, can only be ascertained by a Such a difference of opinion may fairly , from is nature, amount to any tout entering into any interpretation of kets, which admit of no equivocation, he nabobs in a positive breach of at with the British government. The Dunia 2 IUSTOMLINE WAs maintained, for upwards > acralica ministers; and a corresweil ne bobs and Tippoo himself; daflect letters from Tippoo to the Secred. That the nabob Moes e aver lissu, Ordut-ul-Omrah,

*&*

in a mosque, or place of worship, which they accordingly did; and when Omdut-ulOmrah, after questioning the ministers with a marked particularity, as to their having FULL POWERS TO NEGOCIATE," he told them, That his father had made it a testamentary injunction to his children, taking God and the holy prophet to witness! to pray night and day for Tippoo Sultaun, and to consider the prosperity and welfare of that sovereign, as inseparably connected with their own." Third. That, on a subsequent day, the nabob Omdut-ul-Omrah met the ambassadors, by appointment, privately in a garden, where he made use of some particular expressions of his attachment, which he required them, upon oath, not to commit to writing; but to defer the communication of those expressions until they should return to the presence of his majesty, Tippoo Sultaun. Fourth. That for the more effectual preservation of this secrecy, which was so solemnly enjoined, and so strictly observed, throughout this negociation, a cypher appeared to have been established, and actually employed; for, amongst the letters in question, a key to a cypher was discovered. Fifth. That a meeting of Mussulmans had been assembled, by the ambassadors, at a mosque, contiguous to the nabob's house, near Madras; which meeting was attended by the sons of the nabob Mohammed Alli, and at which one of the ambassadors delivered an exhortation, calling on all true Mohammedans to join the standard of his master, Tippoo Sultaun, in a holy war against all those who dissented from the doctrines of the Koran. Sixth. That Omdut-ul-Omrah, in a letter to one of Tippoo's public ministers, requests him to convey to the Sultaun, in the words of a poet, this sentiment regarding him "in the preservation of Tippoo's person consists the permanency of the faith; and bet him not remain who wishes not his preservation.” *

These facts, taken together, amount to a clear, irrefragable proof, that the nabobs Mohammed Alli, and Omdut-ul-Omrah, did, without the consent of the British government, enter into, and carry on, for some years, a NEGOCIATION with a foreign prince, through the accredited ministers of that prince, for some purpose, ca purposez of a nature so secret, and, consequently, of un importance so great, a to fend it necessary, in the opinion of the parties concerned, to adopt the politic precaution of employing a cypher, in the communication of their real sentiments and views, and to induce the nabobs to be so scrupulously careful, as not to impart to the accredited ministers, with whom they were treating, the object of their wishes, until they had previously adjured them not to commit it to writing. I, therefore, ask, whether this proceeding, on the part of the nabobs, was not a treacherous and positive violation, both of the spirit and letter of the following clause, in their compact with the British government?

"The said nabob agrees, that he will not enter into ANY NEGOCIATION, or political correspondence, with any European, or NATIVE POWER, WITHOUT THE CONSENT of the coinpany."

The next point to which Mr. Campbell adverts is, the oral evidence taken on the occasion. The persons who delivered this evidence were those very accredited ministers of Tippoo Sultaun, through whom the secret negociation, in question, ́was con- ́ ducted. Though their evidence does not develope the mystery, nor give any satisfactory elucidation of the ambiguous expressions in the correspondence; it is, nevertheless, of importance, as affording decisive proof of the authenticity of the documents of which the correspondence is composed, and as corroborating the facts arising from them, which have been already stated. "The confessed inconsistencies in some of the answers of one of the ambassadors, and the manifest prevarication of the other, combined with their obvious and immoveable resolution not to divulge any part of that information which the nabob had adjured them to hold secret, with the equivocal nature of the documents, with the use of certain marked metaphorical phrases, which were evidently framed for the purpose of conveying a hidden meaning, and with the well-known rooted antipathy of Tippoo to the English name, altogether furnish a strong esumption, that the real object of the negociation was the formation of some plan of conspiracy against the British government in the Carnatic. Yet, as I wish to rest the merits of this question entirely on indisputable facts, I shall not incumber the

*The secret correspondence, from which these facts are taken, have been long before the public; and will be found in the 4th volume of the Asiatic Annual Register, State Papers, p. 134 to 146.

discussion, nor perplex the reader, with any conjectural comments on this part of the evidence. It is sufficient to state, that the important facts of the secret meeting, at the mosque, between Omdut-ul-Omrah and the ambassadors, of the subsequent meeting them in the garden, of the establishment of the cypher, and of the religious meeting, at which the sons of the nabob attended, are all fully confirmed by the evidence of Alli Reza Khan, the ambassador whose answers are the most consistent, and the two first facts are admitted by the other ambassador. Of the cypher, Alli Reza distinctly declares, "that it was instituted by the nabob Wallajah, for purposes of secret communication, and the original, he believed, was written, in pencil, by Khadar Newaz Khan, (the nabob's confidential adviser in all political affairs) or some other person about the nabob Wallajah; that it was delivered to him, and the other ambassador, Gholaum Alli, by Khadar Nawaz Khan, who told them, that it had been composed for communication with Tippoo and the nabobs Wallajah and Omdut-ul-Omrah; that a copy of it was given to Tippoo Sultaun, and the original brought back to Madras." But the only explanation which could be drawn from either of the ambas sadors, with respect to the real object of their secret meetings with Omdut-ul-Omrah, and to the real use for which the cypher was intended, was, that they both related to a proposition of marriage between a son of Tippoo Sultaun, and a daughter of the nabob-an explanation obviously untrue; and if it were true, in no way calculated to justify the conduct of the nabobs, in keeping it a secret from the British govern ment. One of the ambassadors expressly states, "that the nabob Wallajah considered lord Cornwallis's LEAVE TO BE NECESSARY to the marriage;" but, at the same time, he concealed it from his lordship with the most impenetrable secrecy. If it were credible, that a negociation, which lasted for three years, and which was conducted with such extraordinary and scrupulous secrecy, should have no other object than a matrimonial connection, it is undeniable, that that connection was considered by the parties concerned as a matter of great importance; and that the nabob, therefore, was bound, by the obligation of his covenant, not to have carried on such a negocia tion without the knowledge of the British government. The very circumstance of their adopting such unusual, and, for any innocent purpose, such unnecessary means of concealment, betrays a manifest consciousness of guilt, and is, in itself, the strongest possible proof, that the nabobs were aware of its being a direct violation of their covenant with us. The plea that secrecy is essential to that peculiar delicacy which is observed in matrimonial affairs amongst Mussulmans, is untrue, as it regards their customs in relation to marriage, and is, in itself, utterly preposterous. No person, of common sense, either in England or in India, can seriously believe, that the nabob of the Carnatic, and Tippoo, would think it requisite, from pure motives of delicacy, to establish a cypher, and to enforce an oath of secrecy on accredited public ministers, for the single purpose of conducting a correspondence relative to a marriage. If, therefore, a marriage can be imagined to have been the real object of the negociation, the secrecy with which it was maintained, must have been adopted from considerations of policy, and not from feelings of delicacy, which are neither inspired by their religion, conformable to their customs, nor consonant with the peculiar characters of the men. As a palliation, if not a defence, of the nabob's conduct in this negociation, it has been urged, that a friendly correspondence between him and Tippoo was encouraged by lord Cornwallis. But did his lordship recommend the use of a cypher, in this friendly intercourse, as the readiest means of facilitating and promoting it? Or did he wish the nabob's friendly communications to the Sultaun, to be of that delicate and curious nature which made it impossible to commit them to writing, or even to impart them to the accredited ministers of that prince, without the previous precaution of an oath of secrecy. A reference, however, to the public documents which have been printed, by order of the House of Commons, will shew the sort of correspondence between the nabob and Tippoo, which lord Cornwallis encouraged, and which was carried on under the sanction of the Madras government, during the very same period of time with the secret negociation, To enable the reader to judge of the difference, both in style and sentiment, between the avowed and the secret letters written by the nabob to Tippoo, I shall cite two, from Omdut-ul-Omrah, composed on the same occasion-the nuptial of Tippoo's sons.

A letter from the Nawab Omdut-ul-Omrah to Tippoo Sultaun, SENT WITH THE APPROBATION OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMEMT. "I have received your letter, informing me of the celebration of the weddings of Abdul Kalick and Mohammed Mooez-ud-Deen, together with a dress and jewels, and am made happy beyond measure with this agreeable intelligence. May the Almighty render this event happy and propitious to you."*

A secret letter from Omdut-ul-Omrah, addressed to Gholaum Alli Khan, Tippoo's confidential minister. "Good faith is the law for Syeds. I complain of frequent neglects: let me be sometimes called to remembrance. At all events, the intelligence of the marriage of the princes has rejoiced me. The presents, usual on such occasions, from my father, will be sent. Repeat the following couplet, on my part, to Tippoo Sultaun.

"In the preservation of my person is the perpetual permanence of the faith, "Let him not remain who wishes not thy preservation.

"Make my complaints to his highness, of his not writing to me. If permission be required for stating those complaints, you will obtain it. To the princes, respect: to Reza Alli Khan, compliment."

No man, I should suppose, will venture to assert, that the last of these letters was written with no other view than that of complying with the wishes of lord Corn wallis. On the whole, the facts which are substantiated by the written and oral evidence in this case, plainly prove, that the nabob was guilty of a perfidious breach of his covenant, and connecting this, therefore, with the circumstances of his continued and avowed violation of that covenant in another essential article, of his pertinacious rejection of repeated proposals made to him on the part of the company, for an amicable adjustment of their differences, and for a radical reform in the government of the Carnatic, and, finally, of the policy of delivering the country from that abominable system of extortion, rapacity, and cruelty, which ruined the interests, and endan gered the safety of the state, whilst it impoverished and corrupted the people All these bearing on each other, and considered in one view, will demonstrate the wisdom and justice of the British government, in dissolving a violated, and, therefore, an use less, compact, and in assuming, on the principles of the law of forfeiture, its original right of undivided sovereignty over the province of the Carnatic.

The preceding observations are too just, and moderate, to require any comment. It is evident, that Mr. Campbell has availed himself of no fact that does not appear to be admitted by all parties. He has neither noticed the hostile tendency of the cypher, to which I adverted when vindicating lord Wellesley in a former number; nor the overt acts of the nabob's treachery, which were decidedly confirmed by the oral evidence. He has rested his case SOLELY on FACTS, the occurrence of which cannot be denied; and, with these materials, completely exposes the specious fallacies of the reviewers. I have no doubt, therefore, that the whole of this important question, as well as lord Wellesley's general system of policy, will be better under stood from the excellent observations which Mr. Campbell has inade in reply to the remark of the Edinburgh Reviewers. To conclude, I entirely agree with Mr. Campbell, that, in the whole range of civil history, it will be difficult to find any scheme of policy better calculated for duration, than the one which he has reviewed; because it rests on a broad and solid basis, and is fitted to the characters and circumstances of the states on which it operates. The great prevailing defect in the foreign policy of almost all governments, is the want of any settled principles, or connected plan of proceeding. Too much regard is always paid to particular interests and passions; and far too little to those views of general utility, which can alone give weight and permanency to any great public measure, Hence temporary expedients, and undefined projects, usually regulate the foreign affairs of nations. But, in the policy of lord Wellesley's administration, we see a system formed on fixed and comprehensive principles, happily adapted to the peculiar characters, the anomalous politics, and the conflicting interests of Indian powers; and laying the foundations of our own security in that country, in the advancement of the prosperity and happiness of the natives at large, and in the prevention of those continual wars of rapine, which had stunted the growth of their industry, and often extended the despair of famine over a land

* See Carnatic papers, No. 1, p. 272.