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understanding between the two nations will be restored: if she reject it, her refusal will prove that she is become an inveterate, inflexible, and implacable enemy, whose animosity nothing but blows can control or subdue. In this latter case, no hesita→ tion will be necessary respecting the line of conduct that we should adopt towards her. It will no longer be a principle of honour to stay the hand that wields the elements of destruction; but summoning from the stores, in which mercy had confined them, all the dreadful forms of national terrors, we should pour them out in the necessary vindication of our public safety, upon the obdurate and hostile land. After having emptied their arsenals, we should root them up from their foundations; Not a stone should be left standing upon another, not a pile nor an abutment should survive the strokes of the axe, and the fury of the flames. The docks, the citadel, the crown-batteries, the ports of Denmark, should be levelled with the dust. or be crumbled into ruins; and clothed in the apparatus of an injured and exasperated nation, our fleet and army should leave "not a wreek behind."

It may be urged, against the adoption of so destructive a policy, that its severity would exceed the measure of offence,-to which I answer, that this observation would be just, if we had not exhausted every effort to tranquillize and conciliate the Danish government, and if any attempt had been made to enforce it, previous to the commencement of hostilities. But, as the Danes were duly apprized of our sole object for investing their capital; as they saw that the force we sent, to give weight to our representations, was so powerful as to exonerate them from any imputation of dishonour in yielding; and as, in defiance of these circumstances, and of the imminent dangers of the liberties and independence of mankind, which were assailed through Great Britain, confessedly their last bulwark, the Danish government made its election to act in a marmer which had a tendency to accelerate our fall;-any fresh demonstration of hostility, on her part, must be considered, and treated by us, as if Denmark had already pawned her independence and her resources into the hands of the governor of France. Hence, though it would be desirable, as long as it could be avoided, that the evils which we may inflict on her, should not be extended to the people; yet, it is our right, and our duty, Denmark continuing hostile and contumacious, to pare her claws, and to draw her teeth, so as to put it out of her power, if she possessed the inclination, to occasion any injury to our country. This we should obtain for ourselves; and we ought to go to work with such deliberate, and mathematical nicety, as to make it hereafter a matter of perfect indifference to us, in point of security, whether she side with our enemy or not.

The next consideration, therefore, applies to the mode in which this object is to be effected. In all cases of this sort, we must not employ mere temporary expedients, which most commonly occasion greater perplexity than was experienced before they were resorted to; but we should look forwards to the probable, and even to the improbable, course of things; or, as Frederick the Great observed, we should see les choses de loin. Hence it follows, that we must disarm Denmark of every further means of offence which she yet retains; and by so doing, it will be proved, eventually, and none will acknowledge the fact sooner than the Danes themselves, that our apparent rigour towards them, has been the result of the most enlightened humanity. Our journals have confined their advice to our permanent occupation of the Isle of Zealand, which some of them consider as a panacea against all the evils which the ruler of France may meditate against us from the shores of the Baltic; while others consider it as an impracticable measure, which we have not the means to enforce.* I hold neither of these opinions: If it were judged expedient for us to retain Zealand, we should not be at a loss to find a sufficient number of troops for the purpose, inasmuch as our armed force is, with a few necessary improvements, more than competent to defend our country against an invader. And, as to the former opinion, before we prescribe so hastily what ought to be done, we ought to ascertain whether it be the intention of Sweden to co-operate with us to the last extremity; for unless we are sure

* If the military system, which I have unceasingly adverted to for two years past, had been adopted, the idea of our not being able to furnish a sufficient number of men to hold Zealand, would be treated as an absurdity. It is not too late to resort to something of the kind, as I shall endeavour to shew in my next number,

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of that power, it would be idle to talk of our troops retaining Zealand. The main object of the expedition has been accomplished; we wanted to prevent the fleet of Denmark from falling into the hands of the French, lest they should employ it in the invasion of this country or Ireland. If, therefore, in the event of Denmark making a party with France against us, we proceed to demolish its means of maritime construction, I think we shall have gained all the security against invasion which the cir cumstances of the times require. Should Russia prove hostile to this country, no one will pretend to affirm that the navigation of the Baltic will be of that importance to make the occupation of Zealand desirable. Our fleet might cruize up and down the Baltic in the Summer months; but it must retire during the winter, or be exposed to be land-locked in a single night. By an inspection of the map it will be seen, that every purpose of defence against invasion might be just as well obtained without leav ing a British soldier on the Danish territory. The only ground that I can perceive whereon the possession of Croneburg would be advantageous is, to enable us to protect Sweden; but it must be observed that, should Russia commence operations against that country, it would be wholly out of the power of our fleet to ensure its independence. In the years 1720 and 1721, when we had the friendship of Denmark, and the co-operation of the Swedes, Admiral Norris, with thirty sail of the line, was unable to undertake a single operation, while the Russians laid waste the coast of Sweden, to within twenty miles of Stockholm. If Sweden cannot be extricated from her perilous situation; if she resolve to abide the chances of war, we shall be unquestionably bound to make great sacrifices in her behalf; but if she be compelled to refuse our shipping an admission into her ports, I should be glad to know of what consequence it will be to us, whether Croneburg be occupied by the Danes or by our own forces? Our commercial navigation in the Baltic will be at an end; and, considered in a military sense, our forces could make but little impression upon its coasts. We should better consult our interests, instead of harbouring the project of such an excursion, to devise means of excluding from the Baltic, every ship of whatever flag.or country, and of preventing any ship whatever from sailing out of it. But, we shall be told, the French will occupy Zealand and Funen; and all the ports of the Baltic will resound with the noise of naval preparations against us. Let them resound. I do not wish to under-rate the exertions or the means of the French; but I maintain, that if we demolish, according to the plan laid down above, ali the present conveni ences which Denmark possesses for the construction of ships, our troops may be use fully occupied in other quarters, which may yield some return, or rather compensation, for the loss of the Baltic trade; (keeping steadfastly before us the hopeful Brazils;) and four years at least must elapse before the French could fit out in the Baltic a naval expedition which might undertake the arduous task of out-flanking our left. In that interval, the ports of the Baltic would be exposed to an annual visit from our squadrons every summer; for I believe no one now doubts, that the castle of Croneburg is not the key of the Baltic. The Daues themselves never considered it in that light; and the entrance into that sea cannot be barred against an English Fleet, unless Hel singburg as well as Croneburg become Gibraltars. But I may be reminded, that they will become such in the hands, or under the influence of the French. Against this argument, I content myself with alledging the policy of Russia. It will be extremely difficult, I believe, to persuade any one that Russia will willingly act contrary to her vital interests; and therefore, we may infer, that she never would consent to see the entrance into the Baltic, that sea which she considers as her patrimony, devolve into the hands of the only power of the continent, of whom she has any cause to be wary.

Upon the whole, therefore, I sincerely hope that our forces will be withdrawn from Zealand, after having utterly destroyed the docks, and arsenals, &c. of Denmark, that they will bring away with them the fleet which they have conquered, together with the 6000 sailors who are kept in constant pay and employed in the dock yards, whom we ought to detain as bostages for the good behaviour of the Danish government. As to the remaining part of the Danish seamen, 4 or 5000 have either arrived, or will shortly arrive, in our ports; and the residue, consisting of about 18,000 men, who employ themselves as pilots, or fishermen along the coasts of Denmark and Norway; they cannot be taken from their pursuits, not even

*

by the French, without exposing their families to the privation of the means of Sustenance, as I have observed in a former Number, and, therefore, if they should be pressed into the service of the French adventurer, their wives and children must go with them.

Since writing this article, I have read the French critique, in the Moniteur, upon our capture of the Danish navy, every paragraph of which furnishes sufficient reasons for inducing us to applaud the vigour and foresight of our government, in carrying their plan, against that navy, into execution. The Moniteur asserts, that, if, after such conduct as this, the Danes do not wage an unfeigned war against England; if the sentiment of hatred and vengeance does not inspire every individual, between old age and infancy, from the admiral to the cabin boy, there is an end of the Danish nation. They will absolutely cease to exist, if the insult they have received should be suffered to pass with impunity. Human language has not terms sufficient to characterize the nature of this enterprize. Denmark has acted a very weak part: with respect to France, she has always mistaken the interest she had upon the continent. She has always had a favourable ear to the promises and protestations of the upright cabinet of London. Certainly, if the Danish army had been in Zea land, instead of being upon the continent, at the moment the English shewed themselves, they would not have met with the success they have had. Bat, upon the whole, the English ministry have no great reason for self-gratulation The principal result of their expedition will turn out to the prejudice of England; history wil exhibit it as an absurd cruelty.-For what was its object? It was, say they, to prevent the French from getting possession of the Danish fleet. But could they have effected that, while the fleet was shut up in a port in a distant island ?--And had they effected this object, could they have fitted out this fleet, and brought it into a French port? Would the English wish to increase their fleet with fifteen or twenty blockships, or the timber, &c. in the arsenal of Copenhagen ?—But it was not ships that the English were in want of!-Did they think to make themselves masters of the Sound, and to remain in possession of it as they do of Gibraltar? No: by the capitulation, the English general has engaged to evacuate Zealand, and not to attack Funen. Did they apprehend that France wished to increase its military strength by the addition of that of Denmark. The means of preventing this was not those adopted by the English. Had the Dancs been influenced by the menaces of England, might not the French have made themselves masters of three parts of Denmark? But the Danes, as might have been expected from the noble character of the Crown prince, and the courage of the nation, have resented the insulting offers made them. Goaded by the cruelty they have experienced, they have been compelled to fly into the arms of France, and make common cause with her. Thus, whatever turn things might have taken, England was sure to create new enemies; nor could their ministry ever liave adopted such a measure, but from the advice of ignorant politicians, or secret enemies; but it is a consoling consideration for mankind, that an unjust attack is never successful. The English cabinet could not wish for any thing more prejudicial to itself; for nothing is so calculated to disgust all Europe as this shameful act of perfidy. Do they think that by means of a capitulation obtained by strength over weakness, or, possibly, a want of vigilance, that they shall be able to extricate themselves from so unpleasant a situation? No: England has now lost the esteem of Denmark, and all other nations, for ever. She can make no use of the ships she has taken, nor yet retain Zealand. The season approaches when the East and West Indies, Ireland, and even England itself may be attacked, while the greatest part of their power will run the risk of being shut up in the ice of the Baltic. Or, should the English attempt to remain in Zealand, they will be driven out, whatever their army may be; or should they evacuate it, according to their capitulation, the Sound is then shut against them for ever. Perfidy and treachery succeed but once! Denmark had a land-force sufficient to have repelled any attack from the English; and if it had not been for the false security with which they flattered themselves, and the unnecessary

* See No. 12, in which I have enumerated the various classes of the Danish seamen, and exposed the absurd belief that their sailors will be made over to the French government.

alarm they indulged as to the objects of the French, they might have had 40,000 men at Copenhagen, and lord Cathcart would have met with a reception under its walls, similar to that which the duke of York met at Dunkirk, in Holland, and, in fact, at every place upon the continent wherever the English have dared to set foot. Was it by taking the Danish fleet, and setting fire to the capital, and thus violating the independence and impartiality of Denmark, that the English ministry, or their general, thought to preserve its neutrality. In that case, we should be justified in forming an idea equally as unfavourable to their foresight as their justice. If they think to remain in Zealand, they ought to bring an army of 80,000 men together; and even then it would be of little signification. This attack must be viewed as still more absurd, if it is to be understood as an experiment upon the continental powers, Let us estimate the hatred it will excite, and the means which it will administer to the arm of vengeance. The emperor Alexander had offered England his mediation. In reply to this offer, they attack that sea, for the independence of which this prince was guarantee. They steal the fleet, and burn the capital of a power, to which they are united by the ties of policy, friendship, and neighbourhood. Thus the English repay the services which Russia has at all times afforded them; the privilege which she has given to their commerce, and the immense sacrifices which she has made to their ambition. When they might have availed themselves of their remaining aily, they put her to defiance in a point of honour; and attack her in her dearest interests; and in the discord they excite, they expose the respectable house of Denmark, ber longing to the family of the king of England, as the only sacrifice to their wanton cruelty. It will be in vain to endeavour to obtain forgiveness for this offence, by endeavouring to make it believed that France had views against the interests of Den mark. And even so, was it prudent to anticipate France. by a transaction so much more scandalous? But the interest which the French emperor takes in his glory, and that of his people, would have prevented him from such a violation of the immu table rights and morality of nations; one consequence of a contrary conduct would have been to kindle a new war, to offend Russia, and again deliver up the continent to fire and sword. In all cases, it was the interest of England to have acted prodently. She might at any time have placed her fleets before the island of Zealand for its defence, and then, besides the justice of her cause, she would have had Denmark, Sweden, and Russia in her favour. If we view the expedition in its object, its execution, and its effects, we can see nothing in it but the blind and cruel policy of fear, which makes no calculations, nor acknowledges or respects any power. After all, it will be very difficult to believe, in the excellence of a constitution which admits of such combinations, and not to be astonished at the idle speeches of a parliament which suffers, and, we may say, sanctions such acts of injustice."

To animadvert on every part of this acrimonious philippic, would be a waste of time; but it is impossible not to rejoice, when we see Buonaparte biting his lip, because we were before-hand with him in seizing the prey which he was about to appropriate. We cannot avoid smiling when we are told, in the slavish journals of that vile usurper, that human language has not terms sufficient to characterize the nature of our enterprize, when we recollect his enterprizes against Rome, Venice, Tuscany, and Egypt, and his unprovoked invasion of the peaceful and neutral cantons of Swisserland. The fact is, that the defective terms of which our enemies complain, relate not to morals, or the law of nations, but to envy, hatred, malice, and disappointment. They have not, with all their natural and acquired villainy, a sufficient stock of curses wherewith to bespatter us, for having out-witted the imperial Grotius, who takes such an interest in his glory, and that of his people, that it would have prevented him,-sweet pattern of excellence!-from such a violation of the immutable rights and morality of nations. This is really carrying the joke too far. Buonaparte is the last man living who should throw the first stone at us; nor should he preach the necessity of an adherence to moral virtues which he has never practised, and which he does not hesitate to trample under his feet, whenever they are in the way of his ambition. It is impossible to avoid smiling at the doleful moanings, with which the weak conduct of Denmark is arraigned, for mistaking her interest so far as to keep her army upon the continent, when it ought to have been in Zealand for the discomfiture of the British, and for the convenience of offering to the French troops

an unobstructed entrance into Holstein. A considerable portion of this envious dissertation upon the morality of nations, is copied from the London journals, and dressed up for public exhibition, by the varnishers of Paris. Little do the writers of our papers imagine how serviceably they cater for the despot of Europe. I am warranted in using this expression from the epithets the Moniteur employs respecting the Danish navy; for contrary to known facts, it represents the Danish fleet as composed of fifteen or twenty block-ships, or the timber, &c. in the arsenal of Copenhagen. But, the most curious admission of the whole consists in the declaration, that Englaud" might, at any time, have placed her fleets before the island of Zealand for its defence;" and yet, a few paragraphs before, we are assured, that “had the French effected the seizure of the fleet, they could not have fitted it out, and brought it into a French port." This will afford a satisfactory answer to such of our writers who believe, that it is within the power of France to send an expedition against us from the Baltic, now that we are in possession of the Danish navy. In short, the whole force of this ethical essay of the French may be summed up in their own words,—“ WAS IT PRUDENT TO ANTICIPATE FRANCE?”

DUTCH DECREE AGAINST BRITISH COMMERCE.

They who have been flattering themselves and the public, with the idea that the attempt to interdict our commerce from the continent was a mere chimera, because it would occasion the ruin of Holland, and every other commercial country, have now an opportunity of learning, that the project was not so visionary as they were willing to believe. The prohibitory decree of Louis Napoleon, by the grace of God, king of Holland, which was inserted in our last Number, is so explicit, that no farther doubt can be entertained of the intention of "the throne which governs the world," to enforce, with the utmost rigour, our exclusion from every part of the continent. All vessels entering the ports of Holland are to give a double security, which is to remain in force until their papers are examined and allowed, and until it is proved that they have not touched at an enemy's port. Should it appear that the ship had touched at an enemy's port, the double security is to be immediately demanded of the sureties, and the amount paid into the treasury of the state. If any goods of British manufacture, or coming from an enemy's port, be unloaded, they are not only to be confiscated, but the double security is also to be levied, and the ship obliged immediately to put to sea; and, in case of bad weather, it is to have no shelter, except under the strictest precaution. There is also another article which enjoins the seizure and destruction of all letters, journals, &c. coming in a neutral flag; and all passengers who cannot prove that they do not come from the British isles, are to be immediately sent out of the Dutch territories. These new regulations are expressly declared to have been enacted for the purpose of obtaining a general peace, and the independence of the seas; two events which can never be reconciled upon the supposition, that Great Britain shall preserve her maritime power and ascendancy. Thus, there is an end to that rare and precarious intercourse which subsisted between this country and Holland, since the original decree of November last, in the sprit of which these regulations are framed. The whole of the naval and military power of Holland, is placed at the disposal of the minister of finance, for the sake of carrying into effect this evidence of Buonaparte's envy and rancour. Our commercial intercourse with Holland, produced no material addition to our públic resources, the advantage was on the side of Holland; but as it contributed to mitigate the evils attendant on a state of hostility, it was in every respect desirable for both countries. The prohibition of it must have the ffect of diminishing the resources of Holland, and of alienating the people from the government of their new master. They cust consider this attempt, to circumscribe so narrowly the sphere of the little exertion which remained to them, as an act of unfeeling oppression. Hence, the people will leave no means untried to elude the practical application of this decree. The severity of the government will keep pace with the evasions of is orders, and the governor and the governed will, at length, live in a state of variance with each other; probably, in a state of mutual detestation. It is not in the nature of things, that these prohibitions can be reduced into a permanent system; for a time they may be enforced by vigilance and terror, but they cannot be lasting, unless we can bring ourselves to

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