would the actual operations of the government be in the least impeded; it would only engraft a fruitful branch on a solid trunk. I am aware, that the first attempt would be imperfect, but successive attempts would rectify all former errors, and ultimately yield a simple, clear, and correct detail of the facts which are required to be known. In all exertions of duty,there is something to be hazarded; but I am not conscious that any evil could arise from the adoption of this method of simplifying the administration. At all events, it is the basis of the military plan, which I shall recommend in my next number. If there be objections to it, I shall be happy to learn them, that I may either strive to remove them, or acknowledge my own errors.

HISTORICAL DIGEST.

Notwithstanding the eagerness of public curiosity, and the variety of speculations. which were afloat respecting the destination of the armament, I have observed the most rigid silence, being resolved to be dull rather than to hazard an expression which might injure the national interests. Having reprobated, in former numbers, the practice which has too long prevailed of publishing every circumstance relative to our military operations, it was not to be expected that I should depart from that rule of propriety, the violation of which I had censured so severely in others. Besides, I have no idea of building up a theory for the pastime of the day, in order to overthrow it on the morrow: events only fall within the scope of a teview. Now, however, that the object of the expedition is made public through the proper official channels, I seize the earliest opportunity to express my most unqualified approbation of the judgment, promptitude, and vigour, which the government has displayed in this important transaction. The mere statement of the facts will suffice to bespeak their praise.

As soon as the intelligence of the treaty of Tilsit had reached this country, an extraordinary degree of activity was visible in all our naval and military departments, which gave rise to a thousand conjectures concerning the object of the expedition that was about to leave the country. The most profound secrecy was observed, and even persons intimately connected with the government were ignorant of its destination. In a shorter period of time than had ever been known before, a fleet of men of war, transports, bomb vessels, and flat-bottomed boats were collected, large bodies of troops of every description were embarked, and the armament sailed with the first favourable wind. Thus far, whatever might be the destination of this formidable force, the dispatch and secrecy with which it was fitted out and sent from our coasts, merit the highest praise. If it had failed, its failure must have been owing either to some inadvertence on the part of those entrusted with its execution, or to some misinformation at the outset respecting the degree of opposition it would experience from a disparity of numbers; but no blame could possibly attach to the government for the manner in which the plan was executed previous to its departure. No efforts were relaxed at home to accelerate the proceedings, which circumstance was of itself a sure pledge, that the instructions given to the commander in chief of the expedition, would be correspondent with the vigour manifested in its preparation. The conjuncture of affairs was peculiarly critical; a gloom, bordering on despondency, had overspread our island, and a general persuasion began to be entertained, that the views of the ruler of France could not be thwarted by the exercise of human exertions. What must have been the surprise of the trembling people of Europe, when they beheld the spirit of our government unbroken by their subjugation, anticipate the policy which our enemy had meditated for our destruction?What confidence should we not confide in a government, which has thus defied the accumulated power of the foe, and, rushing forward, singly, amidst the confused fragments of subverted society, wave indignantly the banner of independence upon the yet unsubdued confines of the civilized world? Never was a government placed in a situation of greater difficulty than our own. Ministers stood upon high, but ticklish ground. Other men would have seized the opportunity, which the prostration of the greatest power on the continent had opened to them, of pacifying the victorious enemy: considering, that the British empire had not been reduced to the condition of putting forth its last effort, they would have thought it the perfection of sound policy to have avoided the necessity of the dubious issue. The present ministers, with a better Compréhension of the magnitude of the public dangers, and with a provident fore

sight of their probable increase, during a period of inactivity, resolved to pursue a system which should at once impress the world with a sense of our national power, when called into exertion, and keep the necessity of a last effort in the back ground, if not obviate its exertion altogether.

It will be wondered at by no one who has been in the habit of perusing the numbers of this Review, that I should exult, in a peculiar degree, at the policy which the British government has felt itself constrained to adopt-a policy which I have uniformly urged and justified, whenever the affairs of Europe have fallen under our investigation. In my humble opinion, the present administration have given us a good earnest of their ability to conduct this great contest, and have afforded, by their vigorous policy, infinite satisfaction to those who, like myself, have contributed their disinterested efforts in supporting them.

From the moment the treaties of Tilsit had been ratified, the war took a very different direction, the whole power of the continent having been either neutralized, or cailed into the service of Buonaparte against us: considerable apprehensions also existed relative to the line of conduct which Russia would thenceforward observe

towards this country. For, no doubt can be entertained that the treaty between Russia and France included secret articles, the very existence of which were sufficient to awaken our suspicion. The Russians are withdrawing from the Adriatic, and the continental papers announce, that Catarro is either evacuated, or about to be evacuated by them. In this state of things, Buonaparte is in a condition to pursue, undisturbed, his views of maritime dominion, which it is well known, he can never realize during war, while Great Britain maintains her present ascendancy at sea. But, having witnessed the policy of this man, since he has assumed the sovereign power of France and Italy; having seen him force all the weak and neutral states of Europe to be instrumental in the promotion of his scheme of maritime aggrandizement; had we any reason to expect that Denmark would be exempted from his controul? We know that he had been long tampering with that power, and we are ready to acknowledge, that Denmark had not hitherto manifested any disposition publicly to accede to his demands. But, with all the rest of the continent at his feet, is it likely that he would allow the continuance of a system of neutrality, which, while it existed, would materially impede his views? Possessing the power, we may be assured, that he possesses also the inclination, to compel her to be a party in his cause. If our expedition had not sailed, what would have been the consequence? He would have marched an army into Holstein, as he marched his troops into Hamburg, Lubeck, and other neutral commercial states, under the pretext of excluding this country from all intercourse with the continent, that he may compel us to accept the terms of peace, which he might dictate. At first, perhaps, he would occupy the Danish territories under the disguise of a friend; but it would not be long before he would avail himself of the Danish navy, under the plea of hastening the maritime peace, or, in fact, of destroying the power of Great Britain. It is probable that Denmark would, at first, refuse to comply with his proposals; but she must eventually have been obliged to submit reluctantly to the dictator's will, inasmuch as she does not possess the means of opposing it. Neutrality has been the governing policy of the court of Denmark; but the length of time in which she has preserved it, and which has excited so much admiration from foreigners, was not so much owing to her ability, as to the broils of the greater powers of Europe, who, while the grand struggle for European independence was sustained, passed her over as an harmless power, too feeble and insignificant to be disturbed. It was necessary, however, that Buonaparte should beat every continental state, before he disclosed his final decree respecting the fate of Denmark. While he was engaged in war, he continued to negociate with her, knowing well, that if his arms proved successful, he would be able to command, and she must become an easy prey. Fortune, or rather the pusillanimous and changeable politics of Russia, have produced the event which he wished to accomplish; and, now that all his usurpations, and the alterations he has made in the form of Europe, have been acknowledged and solemnly ratified by the only remaining power of the continent which could have opposed them, what hindrance existed as a bar to the consummation of his project? I have already observed, that the neutrality of Denmark was not the effect of ability, but of foreign causes : cherishing the principles that I do, I should be justified in branding this neutrality as

crime, committed against the liberties and. independence of civilized nations. But this forms no part of the present discussion. Notwithstanding all that has been said concerning the inoffensive demeanour of the Danish government, the wisdom and moderation of its pacific councils, I do not think that I should experience any dif ficulty in proving, that the effects of her conduct have been offensive, and that her councils have been selfish, short-sighted, and devoid of public spirit. Her present predicament establishes the justice of the remark; and for the selfishness of her prin ciples, my readers may consult the decisions of Sir William Scott, and their frequent revisions before the privy council. I come not, however, to impeach her policy; my business is to shew, that she was not indebted to her ability for the long observance of her neutrality, during these desolating convulsions of Europe, but solely to the busy pursuits which occupied the attention of the greater powers. Her fate was long ago decreed, and the execution of the decree was merely deferred until a convenient opportunity. That opportunity is arrived; the moment is come, when, by the course of events, her neutrality can no longer be permitted; for it must have been henceforward equivocal at the best, but most probably injurious either to France or Great Britain. The alleged wisdom of her system is now, therefore, perceptible: her independence has passed away like a shadow; she hath finished her course, and owes to the generous policy of Great Britain, that the fruits of her industry and her neutrality shall not serve to enrich the cupidity of a wasteful spoiler, but be retained for her until better and more tranquil times.

In this view of the subject, it is evident, that the neutrality of Denmark could no longer be tolerated, consistently with the projects of France, or the safety of Great Britain; nor is Denmark in a condition to resist the demands of either of these powers, from her internal resources, or from the expectation of foreign succour. For, I presume no state will henceforward be eager to appeal to the protection of THAT power, which makes war for the defence of the feeble, and peace for the consolida¬ tion of the power of the strong; which fights magnanimously to rescue the weak from the oppressor's gripe, and terminates hostilities by charitably appropriating to itself a portion of the dominions of its weaker neighbour, whose cause it came to avenge. If, then, Denmark could not appeal with safety to a more powerful protector, it is obvious that she had no other alternative than to throw herself into the arms of one of the two combatants. This leads us to the next consideration, whether her choice between these two evils, for such we must acknowledge them to be, should fall on France, or Great Britain? In all such cases, the primary consideration is, which of the two powers is likely to commit the least depredation, to act more in the capacity of a real friend, and to afford the most effective protection against the resentment of the other power? Here experience, and common sense, must lead to the conclusion. With respect of experience, Denmark, from her long_neutrality, from the number of her subjects who have visited both this country and France, and from their frequent opportunities of carrying on their commercial pursuits in countries which have been subdued by our arms, must be sensible, that in no instance, during the whole of this mighty contest, has Great Britain, by its misconduct, wrung a tear from the eyes of any of the people, or abused the power of conquest by the rapacity, extortion, brutal violence, or inhumanity of its fleets and armies; while she must have observed, that wherever the ensanguined eagles of France have been planted, the track of their desolating route has been marked by the most merciless ravages of devastation, by scenes of pillage, savage cruelty, and insolent oppression, which have involved the wretched population whom they have overspread, in a state of expressible and unexampled calamity. The inference, therefore, must be, that the power which, in the raptures of victory knows how to respect the rights of the conquered, to cherish good order to encourage industry, by the protection it affords to property, to keep holy every religious opinion, to set an example itself, of a regard to morals, laws, and institutions, is to be preferred to the power, which avowedly despises, and tramples under foot, these conservative principles of civilized society. There can be no hesitation in choosing between two powers invested with such opposite characters; and, as the contrast between them, has been elucidated upon every occasion where their arms have been successful, or their protection has been extended, Denmark, unless she is blind to her best interests, must naturally feel inclined to fall, if she must fall, into the arms of Great Britain. Let the proclamation of admiral Gambier, and lord

Cathcart, inserted below, be read with attention, and shew me when and where the revolutionary hordes of France, with all their tygerous mewing, and whining rhapsodies upon philanthropy, freedom, and friendship, have ever permitted their operations to be preceded by a declaration so frank, honest, and explanatory of the stern necessity of their motives. When and where have they, I will not say, conformed to such principles, but when and where have they abided, in a single instance, by the promises which they themselves have made to the inhabitants of the countries which they were about to invade, or to the neutrals whose independence they have destroyed under the pretext of protecting it? This proclamation will be an unfading monument, by which after ages will contrast the national character of the people of France, and that of the people of Great Britain.

With respect of the power best capable of affording protection to Denmark against the resentment of the other, no doubt can be entertained, while Great Britain retains its maritime preponderance. If the expedition had been postponed until the French had occupied Holstein, and commenced their preparations for the seizure of the Danish fleet, the isle of Zealand must have been treated by us as an hostile province, and in the event of our success, the fleet of Denmark would have been transferred to the victors for ever. But now, we have gone, "in the most amicable manner," not to rob, to cheat, or to surprize under fraudulent pretences, but avowedly, "not as enemies, but in self-defence, to prevent those who have so long disturbed the peace of Europe, from compelling the force of the Danish navy to be turned against us!" Accordingly, we require only a temporary deposit," of this navy, in one of his majesty's ports, until the conclusion of a general peace, "when every ship shall be restored in the same condition and state of equipment, as when received under the PROTECTION of the British flag!" These are the words of the proclamationthis the object of our expedition; and is it not obvious, from its spirit and letter, that if this deposit be made, we consider ourselves as pledged to protect Denmark with the utmost power of Britain, against the resentment of France? And can the Danes, who are not ignorant of our maritime greatness, doubt the certainty of our power, being, under the providence of God, adequate to protect them? The French have not a single ship of war in the Baltic, nor can they, by the exertion of the most violent means, construct a fleet in that quarter, while we command the sea: It would be an insult to our naval commanders to say, that it would be possible for them to unite their different squadrons now stationed in their various western harbours, with a view to force the passage of the Sound, while a British admiral's flag is visible at its entrance. The isle of Zealand, therefore, would be wholly protected from French invasion, and I trust that the beneficence of our government will place the Danish commerce, and industry, under the same protection as our own.

Let this policy be compared with the treacherous conduct of the French government, and of this same free-booter Buonaparte, towards the state of Venice, whose peaceful neutrality they violated, and whose independence was subverted, by a com. plicated series of frauds and villanies. And for what? To possess its treasures, to sack its arsenals, and seize its navy, for the purpose of facilitating that guilty and rapacious expedition to the shores of Egypt, which was undertaken with a view to destroy Great Britain, by attacking her extremities, and which, originating in perfidy and vice, terminated in discomfiture and shame. Buonaparte, and his ravenous myrmydons, extinguished at a blow the glory and independence of the Venetian republic, under the same pretexts upon which he meditates the extinction of Denmark. The arts practised by the French, to ruin and corrupt the morals of the people, and to excite divisions amongst them after they had been admitted into the Venetian state, sufficiently show the species of protection which neutrals must expect from them. To be safe, it became necessary to betray the state: the press was converted into a perpetual fountain of adulation upon Buonaparte, and his army, and of calumny and destruction for all others. In the midst of the general dilapidation, an organized system-of crimes, made the citizens lose all enjoyment of life; the rapine and oppression of the French army, still further deprived them of it. Industry was injured in all its relations, commerce exhausted in all its branches, and agriculture despoiled of its most useful implements. A contemporary writer, who has favoured the public with an account of the fall of this republic, mentions, that the most illustrious monuments of the fine arts, pictures, sculpture, bronzes, cameos, manuscripts, scarce books,

all were plundered by the French; the churches were robbed, pious institutions pillaged, and even from the mounts of piety in Terra ferma, 80 pounds of diamonds (worth nearly half a million sterling) were carried away. The ships of the state, the ordnance, arms, and the immense deposit in the arsenal, were plundered, and what could not be carried off, was destroyed. The walls alone of that enormous edifice remained uninjured.

The spoils amounted to above forty millions of ducats, those of Corfu to seven millions. The funds of public bodies, the national treasure and magazines, every thing was stript from a power then, for the first time, disarmed. The inviolable rights of private property were insolently regarded as trophies by the French: the holders were oppressed with frequent imposts, forced loans, enormous requisitions, and daily compelled to resign, to French officers, all sorts of conveniences essential to the ease and comfort of life. Carriages, horses, palaces, apartments, wines, provisions, costly or moderate tables, all were destined to the use of soldiers, who frequently compensated so much munificence by devastating the houses, chambers, and villas of their hosts. Robbing, they condemned the theft; they restored, perhaps, some trifling object, to preserve the rest of their prey; some acts of justice, which chance caused to spring from self-interest, was magnified, through the means of the press, while the blackest predatory crimes were buried in profound oblivion. Property being violated, persons were not respected. Abuses of power were every where exercised with the most cruel excesses. By treachery, violence, blows, murders, the inhabitants were daily harassed, and daily treated with that merciless austerity, with which the Spartans trampled upon the Helots. A most severe command tore from the arms of desolace moles their unwilling children, to expose them to all the toils and dangers of foreign warfare. Another severe cominand robbed every habitation of its arms, and useless and frequently destructive resistances, thus leaving the citizens unable to defend their private rights, and compelled to bend to the will of a tyrant, who was announcing, in clamourous proclamations, the most ample liberty, though, at the same moment, inflicting servile obedience with drawn swords. At length, after having corruptel and sacked the provinces of the republic, the French delivered them into a foreign hand, leaving, to the Venetians, only the bitter remembrance of those who had betrayed them, and their native soil to inundate with their tears. When the lapse of ages shall have left no vestiges of this magnificent capital but wretchedness and solitude; when, upon its august walls, and even its superb towers, the grass shall grow; when Venice shall be utterly abandoned, and remain a desert; the inhabitant of the most barbarous land shall still seek there the ashes of her ancient heroes; and, full of admiration at the crumbling ruins of her greatness, shall exclaim with wonder, how this monument of human genius was sacrificed in circumstances destructive to religion, pernicious to man, and fatal to the throne.*

This lamentable example of French protection, taken from the most authentic source, will be sufficient to point out the distinction between the British and French nations. Denmark could not hope to experience greater lenity than the Venetians, if the French were to obtain a footing in their country.

Having thus assigned adequate reasons, which would justify Deumark in accepting of our protection, in preference to that of France, I shall next advert to the justice and policy of the measure which our government is pursuing. As I have often had occasion to censure the invasion of the neutrality of other countries by the French, it may be asked upon what principle I can reconcile the condemnation of their policy with the applause which I have bestowed upon our own government, for adopting the same line of conduct?

(For want of room this question must be answered in our next, as the printer states that we have carried the subject far beyond our limits.)

Nothing, therefore, remains but to detail the manner in which the commanders of our expedition have hitherto proceeded in the execution of the plan of the governOn the 1st instant, the following bulletin was published by our govern

ment.

ment:

*For a full account of the events which oduced and attended the fall of Venice, see Mr. Hinckley's translation of an Italian work, entitled "An accurate account of the Fall of the republic of Venice, &c."