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NEW YORK, JULY 3.

The patriotism and unanimity which has been displayed at the different town meetings, called in consequence of the cowardly and inhuman attack of the British ship of war Leopard, on the United States' frigate, Chesapeak, must be truly grateful to the feelings of every American. It will prove to our enemies, and to the world, that however we may be divided on local considerations, we will, when the moment of danger arrives, or when the honour of the country is insulted, and its laws set at defiance, cordially unite for the common defence. We hope the spirit of the people will be communicated to their administration, and that they will adopt measures at once vigorous, honourable, and effective.

The unanimous election of two gentlemen, of different politics, to fill the offices of chairman, and secretary, to the meeting held in the park yesterday, is a proof of the sincere desire of all to sacrifice, on the altar of patriotism, every political animosity, and cheerfully to co-operate with the nation at large, in their determination to resist aggression, from whatever quarter is may come.

"At a general meeting of the citizens of New York, held in the park, on Thursday, July 2, 1807, the hon. De Witt Clinton was unanimously called to the chair, and general Jacob Morton was unanimously appointed secretary to the meeting. "Having received, with the most lively indignation, authentic information that, on the 22d ult. an attack, unwarranted by the known usages of nations, and in violation of our national rights, was made off the capes of Virginia, on the United States' frigate, Chesapeak, commodore Barron, by his Britannic Majesty's armed ship the Leopard, capt. Humphrey, the citizens of New York, assembled in general meeting, deem it to be their duty to express their opinions on this fresh outrage offered to their national sovereignty by the navy of Great Britain.

Resolved, That it is, and has been, the policy of our government, and the wish, because it is the interest of our citizens, to be at peace with all the world.

Resolved, That although we cherish peace with the greatest sincerity, yet that we hold ourselves ready, at the call of our government, to resist all infringements of our national rights, and violation of our national honour.

Resolved, That we consider the dastardly and unprovoked attack made on the United States' armed ship, Chesapeak, by his Britannic Majesty's ship Leopard, to be a violation of our national rights, as atrocious as it is unprecedented.

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"Resolved, That we are determined to maintain the rights and dignity of our country with our lives and fortunes, and that we will support our government in whatever measures it may deem necessary to adopt, in the present crisis of affairs Resolved, That whatever differences of opinion may exist among us on our merely local concerns, yet that we love our country, and will cordially unite in resist ing the attempts of any nation to invade our rights, or tarnish our national honour. Resolved, That the offending ships at Hampton roads have wantonly violated the laws of, and forfeited their title to, national hospitality.

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"Resolved, That we highly approve the spirited and patriotic conduct of our fellow-citizens at Norfolk, Portsmouth, and Hampton.

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Resolved, That we deeply lament the death of those of our fellow-citizens who fel, and sincerely sympathize with those who were wounded on board the Chesapeak.

"DE WITT CLINTON, Chairman. "JACOB MORTON, Secretary."

Printed and published by G. SIDNEY, No. 1, Northumberland-Street, Strand; Sold by H.T.HODGSON, Wimpole-street, and by all the News-venders in Town & Country.

Vol. III, No. 7.

Saturday, August 15, 1807.

113

PRO ARIS ET FOCIS.

Price 10d.

OF THE NECESSITY OF A VIGOROUS PROSECUTION OF THE WAR, AS THE ONLY
SECURITY, WHEREBY THE POWER, LIBERTIES, AND INDEPENDENCE
OF THIS COUNTRY CAN BE PRESERVED.

Ita prælium atque arma, quæ fortibus honesta, eadem etiam ignavis tutissima sunt.
Sublatâ spe veniæ, tandem sumite animum, tam quibus salus, quam quibus gloria carissima est.
Tacit. in vit. Agricol.

When I entered upon the discussion of this subject, I stated that the secession of the allies from the contest, had induced many persons in this country to wish for a peace with France. Little did I suspect that this sentiment would have found its way into the columns of our journals, and be so soon adopted even by those which appear to be favourable to the present administration. The fact is, however, but too well established to require any further illustration of it, and therefore the necessity of repressing this malignant wish becomes the more imperious.

Having already enumerated many of the inevitable evils to which this nation would be exposed in the event of a peace with France, under her present system, I shall now briefly enforce the necessity of a vigorous prosecution of the war, as the only pledge of our national security. By vigour I do not mean the bare circumstance of parrying, with promptness and energy, the blows which our enemies may aim against us; but the habit of inventing, unceasingly, the means whereby they may be placed in a defensive attitude. If the vast circumference of the French empire, comprehending the territories of the dependent states, be considered, it will be manifest, that that empire is vulnerable at many points, and that we have the power of choosing the time and objects of attack. This is an advantage resulting from our relative geographical position, of which we ought to avail ourselves. I have shewn in our last number, that the exuberant liberality which we displayed at the last peace, was not productive of those benefits that we vainly hoped to derive from it; since the surrender of all our colonial acquisitions, under the delusive idea of administering an efficacious opiate to French ambition, at the critical juncture, when we might, by a little more fortitude and perseverance, have placed the civilized world in a condition of independence, not only failed in its object, but rendered our policy a subject of disgust to enlightened statesmen, and of astonishment to the vulgar. From that period, calamities have been unremittingly crowding upon those whom it was our wish and our interest to see preserved, and our own exertions have been augmented in proportion. After an experience, so bitter and mortifying, we have no reason to suppose, that with Europe prostrated at his feet, Buonaparte's ambition will become moderated by success, and that his animosity against the power, liberties, and independence of Great Britain, will be appeased by concessions on our part. That turbulent and restless man knows well, that these properties of our country are incompatible with the permanent duration of the absolute sway which he exercises at present over the subjugated continent. Peace to him, therefore, is desirable: it is his interest to wish for peace; but he will have such a peace as shall deprive us for ever of the power of waging another war against his meditated usurpations. Calculating upon the pressure of our financial establishments, he conceives that a free, independent, and compact nation, must be reduced, sooner or later, by a deficit between receipt and expenditure, to the yoke of servitude. With this view, he attempts, and he may succeed to a certain extent, in excluding our commerce from the continent. But while pursuing this policy, he forgets that he owes the throne he usurps to the very circumstance upon which he contemplates our speedy ruin: he forgets that it was amidst the chaos of her dilapidated estate, amidst the struggles attendant upon het bankrupt credit, that France, driven by a necessity which no human ordinances could counteract, and no political sagacity controul, ejected from her bosom the most formidable confederacy of hostile powers that ever threatened the independence of a VOL. III.-NO. 7.

people, and put forth resources of genius, talent, and valour, before unknown to herself, and unexpected by the most sanguine admirers of her cause.

If France were capable of displaying such prodigious efforts as would have ennobled the character of Frenchmen in a better cause; if a people, proverbially base in principles, and foul in practice, could, by reducing vice and impious profligacy into a system of political action, scatter before them the enemies by whom they were assailed; if, in short, they could make anarchy, with all its blood-stained concomitants, instrumental in demolishing the vestiges of social order, and in erecting, upon the ruins of extinguished virtue, the colossal fabric of a cruel and vindictive despotism, shall it be entertained for an instant, that religion, morals, equal laws, and public freedom, cannot equally invigorate the human character, and inspire it with ability and energy, to maintain the independence which is the fruit of those exalted blessings? That corruption hath made a considerable progress in this country; that alien miscreants contribute largely towards its invasions, I dare not deny; but there yet remains a fund of goodness, of common sense, and of courage in this country, which prognosticates the dawn of happy and victorious days, if Britons will only exert the powers which Almighty God hath placed in their hands. We are not so degenerate as our fathers were, in the time of Charles II. and history furnishes examples of nations passing from even a vicions effeminacy, to an enthusiasm that regenerates every virtue. Thus we are encouraged to suffer adversity with patience, and to encounter danger with fortitude. Nor should the temporary triumph of the enemy occasion any abandonment of these rules of action. He has terrified the continent into submission; and as fast as success has administered to his audacity, he has vented his malign hatred against our country, as the source of all the impediments thrown in the way of his ambition. But, it is indeed within our power to mock these resent ful menaces. Enthusiasm, as well as terror, is infectious, and therefore it is our duty to create that spirit, to foster it with care, and to direct it with judgment, remembering always that no nation should exult in success until it is complete, or despair of its safety until it is subdued. As, therefore, peace would be only a respite from an ignominious death, let every man, according to his means, contribute his portion of zeal, talent, and patriotism, in arraying the island-empire in the fulness of her reserved, but awful, power; let war fall upon the enemy in its most dreadful forms; then, and not till then, France will be as solicitous as ourselves to sheathe the sword. She will acknowledge the stability of a nation, possessing the means of counterbalancing her pernicious ambition; and the appearance of a French ambas sador, at our court, instead of exciting dismay as a bird of ill-omen, will really be the signal of peace, liberty, and independence to our country. These reflections bring me to the last and most important division of our subject, namely,

THE MEANS BY WHICH THE WAR MAY BE PURSUED SO AS TO
CONSOLIDATE OUR SECURITY.

We have now arrived at that crisis, when our national existence depends upon our own strength only; when no expense or endeavour can be too great, because all we have is at stake, and consequently our utmost force must be exerted, inasmuch as the dispute will be determined, either in safety, or utter destruction. There are some persons who think, that in a war of this description, the enemy enjoys advantages which we do not possess, and that he can bring into action energies to which we cannot resort. This opinion is partly true, and the knowledge of the fact should serve as an additional motive for us to explore the means of public security, which are within our reach. If we be terrified at the idea of creating new resources, we ought, at least, to make the best use of those which we already hold; and, by a sober investigation of them, we shall find that the advantages of France do not preponde rate over those of Great Britain. In that country, affairs have been so long unsettled, that the lives and properties of the people are completely at the disposal of the government. From this, superficial observers have inferred that the elements of victory were created by the present tyrant. But this is an erroneous opinion: for they were generated during the convulsions which succeeded the reign of order and the laws. The only merit to which Buonaparte is entitled, as a general and a legislator, is, that he has the propitious moment for acquiring the sovereignty of the state, and that he nous application of the elements which were prepared for

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the subjugation of the continent, previous to his usurpation. The forced requisitions, the indiscriminate conscriptions, were devices of his precursors in the arts of revolu tion; and had any other man obtained au unlimited authority over the French nation, he would have betrayed great weakness of character, if he had been at a loss in keeping alive that energy and vigour which the revolution has brought forth amongst that people. But, it may be said, that, according to this mode of reasoning, Great Britain cannot expect to prevail over an enemy who has evinced the superiority of his power by overthrowing the confederated forces of Europe, unless she surrenders all her social institutions, and struggles for ascendancy through the terrific medium of revolution. Such a doctrine bears no analogy to our moral condition; for we are under no necessity of regenerating the state by shedding seas of blood. Abuses and corruptions may exist amongst us, but they are not so intense and incurable as to require the total subversion of our policy in order to remedy them. We have a large fund of good, for which we contend; and as our object is to maintain our laws, liberties, and national independence, it is by law that we ought to summon into activity the latent energies of the state. It is reserved for the people of Great Britain to prove, that by the combination of wisdom, prudence, and courage, the empire of law will prevail over the empire of despotism. Theorists may argue, as long as they please, concerning the irresistible force of military machinery, though impelled by no legitimate principle; I trust, however, the issue of this contest will demonstrate, that a people who fight for the most valuable behoofs of civil society, who are united and governed by a wise policy, and who justly appreciate the alternative, which they must accept from the hands of a conqueror, actuated by implacable resentments, and a thousand remorseless furies, derive strength from the justice of their cause, and acquire fresh power at every step they make towards its consolidation. In the inverted state of society in France, the lure to action is the hope of plunder; in our condition, the object of the people is security. I do not deny, therefore, that a community, agitated by rebellion, civil and foreign wars, is capable of efforts, which, to whatever pursuit they are directed, rapidly surpass the ordinary routine of nations in the enjoyment of internal quiet, of the long established formalities of law, of respect for property, and personal security. Political broils, and military exertion, infuse into a disordered society, a vigour of thought and action which are never felt in the days of opulence and tranquillity. But, surely, it will not be disputed, that a sober crew are more likely to conduct a vessel, tossed upon a troubled ocean, into a safe harbour, than a riotous and drunken crew; and for this reason, every man sees the danger, knows whither he is bound, and what is to be done. Now, this is precisely our relative situation.--Make the people sensible of their common danger, shew them the breakers upon which they may split by their inadvertency, inform them of the extent of their undertaking, and teach them what they are to do, and we may rest assured, that we shall see the vessel of the state after having weathered the storm, safely moored in a calm and capacious port. To accomplish this end, it is only necessary for the government to command with judgment, and for the people to execute with vigour. We are not engaged in a war for a sugar island, for the right to cut log-wood, or for any other subordinate consideration; the question is, the existence of the British empire, with all its appurtenant rights, which the French government is determined, if pos sible, to destroy. It is therefore, strictly speaking, a personal, as well as a national war; it is the business of every man, as much as it is the occupation of the state, for it must end by leaving every one of us, a freeman or a slave.

These premises, properly understood, will reconcile the public to the vigorous measures which the times require, and contribute to encourage the zeal and patriotism of the people. I shall now endeavour to point out the means of carrying on the war. As this country is not in a revolutionary condition, and cannot employ the violent measures adopted by the different rulers of France, it is our duty to turn to the best account the means which we already possess. Accordingly, in reviewing the offensive and defensive state of the British empire, we find, that besides an unrivalled fleet, we have a disposeable army, and a defensive force of nearly 400,000 men. If numbers were requisite to ensure success, the whole male population of the country could, by law, be called out upon active service, for its defence against any attempt at invasion; for, it is known to every one who has made the constitutional polity of Great

Britain the subject of his attention, that the executive authority is empowered to compel every man in the kingdom to march, in person, against an invader. The main difference between our system and that of the French consists entirely in the contrariety of the principles of the two nations in England, a levy of this description is an emanation from established law, for the express purpose of defending the most sacred rights of mankind, without the least offensive views of national ambition. The French conscription being the very reverse of this system, and originating solely in views of aggrandizement, conquest, and rapacity, it is enforced in defiance of the personal rights of the subjects, and must prove, ultimately, a most pernicious expedient, and highly detrimental to the morals, industry, and true wealth of the state. But it is not our present object to contemplate the injury which our adversary may sustain hereafter; our duty is to encounter the force which, by the perversion of human power, he is enabled to bring against us. Indeed, the patriotism of our countrymen has obviated the necessity of a recurrence to this violent policy, by a display of volunteer zeal which has never been surpassed, or even equalled, in the history of the world. Hence a military conscription is not required here; and I have referred to it merely to shew, that if it had been necessary, the exercise of it would have been lawful.

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The wisest policy, therefore, consists in making a prudent disposition of our existing circumstances, which, I am confident, will more than suffice to repel the aggressions of all our enemies, as well as to make them feel the weight of our power. is upon this consideration, that lord Castlereagh's late plan of military augmentation is so highly deserving of public approof, because it launches into no theoretical vagaries, but engrafts, upon a solid stock, the exuberant branches of our physical strength, and renders the whole subservient to the ends of public safety.

Our present military force may be comprehended under three distinct branches, all of which, however, may be so combined and interwoven, as to support and cooperate with each other. These are the regular army-the militia-and the volunteers. Of these, the regulars constitute the only body which we distinguish by the name of our offensive or disposeable force. At present, I shall not offer any remarks upon their organization, because I do not consider them as the most important branch of the force, upon whose exertions the fate of our country may hereafter depend. Besides, the few amendments which I have to propose in the regulars, relate more to the composition and qualities of the staff and other officers, than to the privates, who, I glory in declaring, are not equalled by any troops in the world. For the same reason, I shall postpone any suggestion concerning the militia, and confine myself wholly to the formation, discipline, and exercises of the volunteers, who, though the most numerous, are, at present, the least effective branch of our military establishment.

It has been observed, in the preceding number, that we had more men under arms than we knew what to do with. I still retain the same opinion, and I flatter myself, that I shall be able fully to establish its justice in the course of our future inquiries. This fact, however, is not intended to obviate the expediency of instructing the whole male population of the country in the use of arms; on the contrary, the expediency of the measure is the basis of the proposition. I mean by it, that we may adopt such measures as to answer all the purposes of a general conscription, without its harshness, and to bring the volunteers to such a point of discipline as to give to the exertions of a lesser number, an equal degree of power with that which we now derive from a greater number; and yet so to contrive the arrangement, that every man may have an opportunity of sharing in the defence of his country.

I begin then with stating, that the original formation of the volunteer corps was fundamentally bad, because no regard was paid to the proper choice of their officers. While men are destined to move in compact bodies, and by command, no corps can be depended upon which is badly officered. Personal courage, which is the inheritance of Britons, will be victorious in single combats, but in war, there is a wonderful distinction between personal and disciplined valour. A battalion may be composed of the bravest men living, individually, and yet, from the want of military skill, may become so confused as to cause greater injury to their friends than to their enemies. We, who have witnessed the difference between disciplined and undisciplined valour, upon the theatre of actual warfare, may be permitted to pronounce a judgment from positive

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