A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America, Against the Attack of M. Turgot in His Letter to Dr. Price, Dated the Twenty-second Day of March, 1778, 第 3 卷J. Stockdale, 1794 |
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第 1 到 5 筆結果,共 91 筆
第 11 頁
... executive , and judicial , was collected together in one fingle affembly . But how they reftrained the nobles and ple- beians to obedience we fhall foon fee . In the year 1329 , these anziani are called in 1329 . Fioravanti , p . 212 ...
... executive , and judicial , was collected together in one fingle affembly . But how they reftrained the nobles and ple- beians to obedience we fhall foon fee . In the year 1329 , these anziani are called in 1329 . Fioravanti , p . 212 ...
第 23 頁
... executive council had the fame center with the legislative council . 1 It is further found , that in the firft times of the government of the twelve anziani , viz . in 1267 , there were two councils , one of forty counsellors of the ...
... executive council had the fame center with the legislative council . 1 It is further found , that in the firft times of the government of the twelve anziani , viz . in 1267 , there were two councils , one of forty counsellors of the ...
第 33 頁
... executive powers were confounded together in one affembly . But if we go over again the feveral periods of the hiftory of Piftoia , we fhall find that fimilar caufes had the fame effects . At the end of the eleventh and beginning of the ...
... executive powers were confounded together in one affembly . But if we go over again the feveral periods of the hiftory of Piftoia , we fhall find that fimilar caufes had the fame effects . At the end of the eleventh and beginning of the ...
第 67 頁
... executive power from the legislative , rivalries arofe , which produced fuch ruin , both to the country and the contending families , as has been deplored by all fubfequent generations . The fact was , that by the death of Buonaccorfi ...
... executive power from the legislative , rivalries arofe , which produced fuch ruin , both to the country and the contending families , as has been deplored by all fubfequent generations . The fact was , that by the death of Buonaccorfi ...
第 124 頁
... executive power , three independent branches in the legiflature , and an independent judicial department ) be able to divide the ftate into two parties , one generally at the head of the gentle- men , the other of the fimplemen , tear ...
... executive power , three independent branches in the legiflature , and an independent judicial department ) be able to divide the ftate into two parties , one generally at the head of the gentle- men , the other of the fimplemen , tear ...
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常見字詞
abfolute accufe affembly affiftance againſt anziani ariftocracy authority becauſe beſt Cæfar cafe Cancellieri caufe cauſe Cavalcabo chofen citizens commonwealth confent confequence conftitution confuls council cracy Cremona decemvirs defire diftinct divifions duke elected emperor eſtabliſhed executive power faction faid fame families fecure fenate fent fervice fhall fhare fhould fimple democracy fingle firft firſt Florence Florentines foldiers fome foon fovereign fovereignty free ftate ftanding ftill fubject fucceffive fuch fupport fupreme Ghibellines gonfalonier grandees Guelphs Guelphs and Ghibellines hiftory himſelf honours houfe houſe increaſed inftitution intereft juftice king laft laws leaſt lefs liberty lord magiftrates Manlius ment Milan mixed government moft monarchy moſt muft muſt neceffary nobles obferved occafion Padoua paffions Panciatichi party patricians perfons Piftoia Placentia plebeians podefta poffible Ponzone popular prefent preferve Prefident purpoſe reafon reprefentatives republic Roman Rome ſhall ſtate thefe themſelves theſe thofe thoſe tion tribunes tyranny uſed Vifconte whofe
熱門章節
第 215 頁 - The moment the idea is admitted into society, that property is not as sacred as the laws of God, and that there is not a force of law and public justice to protect it, anarchy and tyranny commence. If " THOU SHALT NOT COVET," and
第 524 頁 - Individuals entering into society must give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest. The magnitude of the sacrifice must depend as well on situation and circumstance as on the object to be obtained. It is at all times difficult to draw with precision the line between those rights which must be surrendered and those which may be reserved...
第 297 頁 - In every society where property exists, there will ever be a struggle between rich and poor. Mixed in one assembly, equal laws can never be expected. They will either be made by numbers, to plunder the few who are rich, or by influence, to fleece the many who are poor.
第 513 頁 - ... be for the ufe of the Treafury of the United States; and all fuch laws (hall be fubject to the revifion and controul of the Congrefs.
第 525 頁 - That it will meet the full and entire approbation of every state, is not, perhaps to be expected ; but each will doubtless consider, that had her interest been alone consulted, the consequences might have been particularly disagreeable or injurious to others...
第 292 頁 - The poor should have a bulwark against the same dangers and oppressions; and this can never be without a house of representatives of the people. But neither the rich nor the poor can be defended by their respective guardians in the constitution, without an executive power, vested with a negative, equal to either, to hold the balance even between them, and decide when they cannot agree.
第 514 頁 - ... to a choice. In every cafe, after the choice of the Prefident, the perfon having the greateft number of votes of the electors fhall be the Vice-Prefident.
第 519 頁 - ... of two or more ftates, or parts of ftates, without the confent of the legiflatures of the ftates concerned as well as of the Congrefs. The Congrefs...
第 214 頁 - ... personal property; if we take into the account the women and children, or even if we leave them out of the question, a great majority of every nation is wholly destitute of property except a small quantity of clothes and a few trifles of other movables.
第 291 頁 - It is agreed that the people are the best keepers of their own liberties and the only keepers who can be always trusted; and, therefore, the people's fair, full, and honest consent to every law, by their representatives, must be made an essential part of the constitution; but it is denied that they are the best keepers, or any keepers at all, of their own liberties when they hold, collectively or by representation...