A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America, Against the Attack of M. Turgot in His Letter to Dr. Price, Dated the Twenty-second Day of March, 1778, 第 3 卷
J. Stockdale, 1794
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第 217 頁 - The moment the idea is admitted into society, that property is not as sacred as the laws of God, and that there is not a force of law and public justice to protect it, anarchy and tyranny commence. If " THOU SHALT NOT COVET," and
第 526 頁 - Individuals entering into society must give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest. The magnitude of the sacrifice must depend as well on situation and circumstance as on the object to be obtained. It is at all times difficult to draw with precision the line between those rights which must be surrendered and those which may be reserved...
第 299 頁 - In every society where property exists, there will ever be a struggle between rich and poor. Mixed in one assembly, equal laws can never be expected. They will either be made by numbers, to plunder the few who are rich, or by influence, to fleece the many who are poor.
第 515 頁 - ... be for the ufe of the Treafury of the United States; and all fuch laws (hall be fubject to the revifion and controul of the Congrefs.
第 527 頁 - That it will meet the full and entire approbation of every state, is not, perhaps to be expected ; but each will doubtless consider, that had her interest been alone consulted, the consequences might have been particularly disagreeable or injurious to others...
第 294 頁 - The poor should have a bulwark against the same dangers and oppressions; and this can never be without a house of representatives of the people. But neither the rich nor the poor can be defended by their respective guardians in the constitution, without an executive power, vested with a negative, equal to either, to hold the balance even between them, and decide when they cannot agree.
第 516 頁 - ... to a choice. In every cafe, after the choice of the Prefident, the perfon having the greateft number of votes of the electors fhall be the Vice-Prefident.
第 521 頁 - ... of two or more ftates, or parts of ftates, without the confent of the legiflatures of the ftates concerned as well as of the Congrefs. The Congrefs...
第 216 頁 - ... personal property; if we take into the account the women and children, or even if we leave them out of the question, a great majority of every nation is wholly destitute of property except a small quantity of clothes and a few trifles of other movables.
第 293 頁 - It is agreed that the people are the best keepers of their own liberties and the only keepers who can be always trusted; and, therefore, the people's fair, full, and honest consent to every law, by their representatives, must be made an essential part of the constitution; but it is denied that they are the best keepers, or any keepers at all, of their own liberties when they hold, collectively or by representation...