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to our little affairs, and take cognizance of things which minister to our amusement or agitate our passions. They can conceive of a providence which keeps worlds in their sphere and legislates for the universe. This general government fills them with magnificent ideas, worthy as they think of the Supreme; but to such petty concerns as the common incidents of human life, they judge it beneath his majesty and felicity to attend!

This sort of argumentation is not the only instance in which atheism puts on the cloak of reverence for God. I do not assert that all who adopt such notions are atheists, but that the doctrine itself is atheistical there can be no doubt. It makes a distinction between a general and a particular providence, admitting the former and exploding the latter. We are to believe, then, that Jehovah rules the whole of his universe but not its parts; or that he has fixed certain laws by which its operations go on independently of his interposition. A fine world of creatures truly, that can "live, and move, and have their being," in a state of complete separation from the influence of their Creator! According to this scheme, he has had no sort of interest in them from the moment he gave them out of his plastic hand, and never shall have any during the whole period of their being. And as for those who dream of his presiding over suns and

stars, without noticing the puny inhabitants of our globe, they might with equal reason dream of his creating suns and stars without his having created men, or beasts, or insects, at all. That which it was not unworthy of him to create, it is not unworthy of him to preserve and govern. It would surely be inverting all propriety to maintain, that in proportion as creatures are feeble, they can dispense with his fostering care; and that rational creatures, formed for immortality, are exempted from the empire of his law. For however artfully the sophist may play off his quibbles, a sound mind will perceive that, without a particular providence, man cannot be accountable.

This doctrine of a providence extending even to the most trivial occurrences pervades the system of revelation, and is stated in the scriptures with the utmost precision and perspicuity. I form the light, and create darkness; I make peace, and create evil. I, JEHOVAH, do all these things. (Is. xlv. 7.) Thou sendest forth thy Spirit, they (the young animals) are created; and thou renewest the face of the earth. civ. 30.) Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of them shall not fall on the ground without your Father: but the very hairs of your head are all numbered. (Mat. x. 29, 30.) What can be of less importance than the perishing of a sparrow? What more worthless than

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a hair of one's head? And yet, the Truth itself being witness, both are objects of the divine regard. "It accords with the most liberal spirit of philosophy to believe, that not a stone can fall or plant rise without the immediate agency of divine power.' This is good sense, and Christianity owns it all. If, then, the providence of God directs and disposes all other, the most minute events, by what reasoning shall it be proved to have no concern with lots? especially as he has declared the lot to be under his immediate inspection? The lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord. (Prov. xvi. 33.) This will be decisive with him who in simplicity and reverence inquires after the truth. But as there are captious spirits which seek to hide themselves in the mist of objections, and as arguments addressed to the love of dissipation and of gain are apt to make “the worse appear the better reason," we shall pursue a little farther the denial of such a providence as embraces the drawing of a ticket or the cast of a die.

To deny, then, that the divine providence is concerned in decisions obtained by lot, is to deny that it has any concern with individuals or their actions. For it cannot be shown that the government of God affects any individual or any

* Malthus. Essay on the Principle of Population. Vol. II. p. 67.

action, but upon the broad principle of its extending to every individual and every action. If this position is incorrect, a line of distinction must be drawn between persons and actions that vre and are not under his immediate control. If there are individuals to whom his providence, which is another name for the administration of his government, does not reach, then all such individuals are exempted from the obligation of his law, and are neither accountable nor dependent. For it is absurd to talk of dependence, and law, and responsibility, while you exclude the only agency which, by ascertaining facts, motives, and character, can lay the basis of a perfect judgment.

If, on the other hand, the divine providence embraces all persons, but not all actions, it follows that the actions thus omitted are not subject to the divine law; and, of course, that men are at one period of their lives amenable to God for their conduct, and at another period are not amenable. And between these two states of being with and without law to God they are perpetually vibrating. But how are they to know when these alterations take place? God has not revealed it, and they cannot discover it for themselves. But no judicious man can be reconciled to so miserable a subterfuge from a pinching argument. It will not bear examination for a single moment. The alternative is,

that the providence of God directs every thing or nothing. If the former, then even the casting of a die; if the latter, we are plunged into atheism at once; for a God who does not govern the world is no God at all.

Perhaps it will be urged, that the Creator has "fixed certain laws in the physical world; that the doctrine of chances, founded upon these laws, is a subject of calculation; and that their operation is the only thing to be seen in the combination of chances."

I assent to the proposition, but contend that the objection grounded upon it is either futile or impious.

Futile for it amounts to no more than this, that the Most High acts by second causes; unless, indeed, they can act without him. The objection, to have any force, must mean that they can so act; and then,

It is impious-for it strikes at the whole government of God, in so far as it is carried on through the medium of physical laws. To repeat the substance of a remark already made, if his providence has no concern in one, two, or twenty actions or events, occurring according to physical laws, it is equally unconcerned in all such events and actions; and thus we arrive at the old inference, that God has nothing to do with us nor our affairs. This mode of reasoning, pushed a little farther, will expel every thing

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