Truth in Virtue of Meaning: A Defence of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction
OUP Oxford, 2008年2月28日 - 232 頁
The analytic/synthetic distinction looks simple. It is a distinction between two different kinds of sentence. Synthetic sentences are true in part because of the way the world is, and in part because of what they mean. Analytic sentences - like all bachelors are unmarried and triangles have three sides - are different. They are true in virtue of meaning, so no matter what the world is like, as long as the sentence means what it does, it will be true. This distinction seems powerful because analytic sentences seem to be knowable in a special way. One can know that all bachelors are unmarried, for example, just by thinking about what it means. But many twentieth-century philosophers, with Quine in the lead, argued that there were no analytic sentences, that the idea of analyticity didn't even make sense, and that the analytic/synthetic distinction was therefore an illusion. Others couldn't see how there could fail to be a distinction, however ingenious the arguments of Quine and his supporters. But since the heyday of the debate, things have changed in the philosophy of language. Tools have been refined, confusions cleared up, and most significantly, many philosophers now accept a view of language - semantic externalism - on which it is possible to see how the distinction could fail. One might be tempted to think that ultimately the distinction has fallen for reasons other than those proposed in the original debate. In Truth in Virtue of Meaning, Gillian Russell argues that it hasn't. Using the tools of contemporary philosophy of language, she outlines a view of analytic sentences which is compatible with semantic externalism and defends that view against the old Quinean arguments. She then goes on to draw out the surprising epistemological consequences of her approach.
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agent analytic justification analytic sentences analytic truths analytic/synthetic distinction applies argument bachelors are male bachelors are unmarried belief Carnap Cassius Clay cats are animals claim concept condition confirmation holism context of evaluation context of introduction context of utterance directly referential Dogmas of Empiricism dthat[the epistemic epistemological example explain extension fact false Frege fully-determined function Harman Hesperus is Hesperus Hesperus is Phosphorus i-term indexicals intuitive Kaplan knowledge Kripke language myth linguistic logical truth modal profile natural kind terms necessary truth notion object pair philosophers possible worlds predicate priori justification problem properties proposition expressed Quine Quine’s reference determiner regress argument rigid designators rules of implication semantic competence sense sensitive to context sentence is true sentences containing shortest spy snow is white statements stimulus meaning stipulate suppose synonymy things thought true in virtue truth-value valid virtue of meaning word bachelor