SUPREME COURT. H. M. CUSTOMS V. LOWMAN. COMMON LAW. possibly bear in favour of the importer, and not the Customs. (GWYNNE, J.-How is it possible there can be perfect entry if some goods are concealed, and not entered at all?) We can only say that is the Act, and this is not the Court to decide upon the evidence whether they were concealed or not. The evidence of Mr. Debney and Mr. Eitzen is that they were not packed to deceive, and they were not uncustomed goods for they were in the hands of the Customs under the 57th clause. Section 180 gives the Governor power to direct the return of any goods, "whether condemnation shall have taken place or not," which shows that the property is not divested until condemned. Clauses 211 and 212 give a Magistrate no jurisdiction to forfeit goods. The 212th clause states that the liability to forfeiture of any goods shall be by action, information, or other proper proceeding in the Supreme Court; but when it is wanted to seize the articles, power is given to summon the persons before Magistrates. The only proof that the goods in question were liable to forfeiture is the decision of the Supreme Court. By the 214th clause jurisdiction is given to Justices by consent to the extent of £100. Is it to be said that Justices have jurisdiction under the 34th clause to say that a ship worth £35,000 and cargo perhaps worth £20,000, is forfeited? (HANSON, C.J.— If they have power above £100 they would seem to have power to any extent.) The power of Justices is defined, and in amounts above £100 it is left solely to this Court to decide the liability to forfeiture. Then, they having decided that they are forfeited, the machinery of the Justices' Court is called into operation in order to hunt up the goods which might be concealed in the bush, instead of employing the expensive proceedings of this Court. Cur. ad. vult. 3 August HANSON, C.J.-The only way in which I can see that clause 211 can be given effect to is by construing it to mean that the liability to forfeiture of any goods is to be tried in the Supreme Court, and that the liability to penalties or forfeitures in the shape of penalties is to be tried before Justices. It is very difficult to express an opinion, because the different clauses are not all consistent. SUPREME COURT. H. M. CUSTOMS V. LOWMAN. COMMON LAW. Stow, Q. C.—The 211th clause gives jurisdiction to the Supreme Court and to Justices as well. The 212th clause, " where any goods shall have been seized, with regard to which the amount of duties or penalties claimed by the Crown shall not exceed the sum of £100, such seizure or penalties shall not be sued for or enforced in the Supreme Court, but by information before any Justice". or Local Court-does not in any way limit the jurisdiction of a Justice, but decides that such cases shall not be brought in the Supreme Court. Having given the Justices jurisdiction in all cases, and the Supreme Court also, the Legislature says the Supreme Court shall not have jurisdiction in cases where the duties or penalties do not exceed £100, unless it is certified by the Treasurer that it is a fit case to be tried in the Supreme Court (HANSON, C.J.-If it came within that limit, he has an option of having it tried in the Supreme Court if he chooses, but if it involves £100,000 he has not. That would be the effect.) No doubt all the difficulty arose from the Legislature not having followed the words of the English Act, which gave the superior Courts full jurisdiction, with a proviso that in cases under £100 proceedings should be taken before the Justices, not before the Supreme Court. The effect of the clause in the local Act is that any suit without limitation may be brought either before the Supreme Court or before Justices-in the one case in the name of the Attorney-General, in the other of the officer of Customs; but that when the duties or penalties do not exceed £100 it must be before Justices. HANSON, C.J.-We should be disposed if possible to put such a construction on the Act as would prevent a single Justice having power in a case which might involve hundreds of thousands of pounds; but of course we have to construe the Act according to what we judge to be the intention of the Legislature from the language they use. - Ingleby, in reply. No offence has been committed by the defendant against the 164th clause, the ouly one under which a conviction can be supported. In the case cited of Graham v. Pocock, the only entry was "carriages," which could not possibly include SUPREME COURT. H. M. CUSTOMS V. LOWMAN. COMMON LAW. corks, whereas there was not a single thing in any of the defendant's cases that would not come under the general description of furniture, although as to value there might have been a discrepancy. Boucaut followed in support of the rule. Cur. ad. vult. 8 August HANSON, C.J., delivered judgment, as follows:-In this case a rule risi has been obtained to quash a Justice's order for the condemnation of certain goods on the ground of their having been dealt with contrary to section 164 of the Customs Act. The objections to the order were that the goods were not liable to forfeiture; that the proceedings were irregular, inasmuch as the defendant was summoned to answer an information upon a ground which could form no justification for the condemnation of the goods; and that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction-firstly, because the value of the goods exceeded £100; and secondly, because the defendant had not made any such a claim for the goods as required by the Act. From the evidence taken before the Magistrate it appears that the defendant, a passenger on board the "St. Vincent," had brought with him for importation a large quantity of furniture in several cases, amounting in value to upwards of £800; that he had passed an entry in the usual form, in which the goods were properly described; and that (the goods being liable to duty according to their value) such entry had been accompanied by what was described as an invoice, and declared to as such by the defendant; that duty was paid by the defendant upon such invoice; ' that owing to the form of the invoice it was impossible for the officers of Customs to form any opinion as to its accuracy without examining all the cases; that they were accordingly detained for the purpose; and that upon examination a large quantity of goods not included in the invoice was found packed with the rest. Upon this the goods were seized and proceedings were taken to procure their condemnation, which resulted in the order now sought to be quashed. Upon this evidence it appears clear to us that the goods were liable to forfeiture under the 52nd section of the Customs SUPREME COURT. H. M. CUSTOMS V. LOWMAN. COMMON LAW. 1 Act-the packages having been landed in pursuance of an entry, and goods being afterwards found concealed therein. There remain consequently only the objections to the form of the information and to the jurisdiction of the Magistrates. With regard to the first, it appears to us that we cannot in this case hold the conviction bad on the ground of any defect in the information, or of any discrepancy between the information and the conviction. The 218th section appears to us to make the conviction valid, notwithstanding any such defect or discrepancy. And with regard to the objection that there was no claim to the goods on the part of the defendant, it seems to us that the whole circumstances of the case show such a claim on his part, and that the present is not one of the cases in which a formal claim in writing is requisite. With regard to the question as to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate in cases above £100, we have had great difficulty in arriving at a conclusion. The language of the Act is obscure, and not always consistent. We were pressed in support of the order with the 220th section; but although that section, if it stood alone, might be held to give jurisdiction to the Magistrate, in all cases we are bound if possible so to construe it as to make it consistent with the other provisions; and the 212th, 213th, and 214th sections seem clearly to contemplate the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in all cases where the value of the goods to be forfeited or the amount of the penalty imposed exceeds £100, and we can scarcely attribute to the Legislature the intention of giving to a single Magistrate, appointed by and possibly dependent upon the Government, absolute jurisdiction in questions possibly involving many thousands of pounds. We therefore feel bound to hold that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction in this case, and the order of condemnation will be accordingly quashed. Order quashed. Where a Bill has been dismissed with leave for Plaintiff to apply to amend within a certain time, such right of application will not be lost by reason of the Court not sitting to hear the application within the time limited. THIS was a motion brought before the Court by Mr. Belt on September 8 for leave to amend the bill in this cause, and then ordered to stand over for the production of affidavits as to the circumstances under which leave to move had been obtained. It appeared that the bill had been dismissed with costs by the Full Court, with liberty for the plaintiff to apply to amend within a month, but that the plaintiff had, through the Court not sitting, been unable to apply before the expiration of the time limited. An affidavit was read stating these facts, and that earlier application could not have been made. Stow, Q.C., for the defendant.-When a bill has been dismissed with costs, with leave to apply to amend within a month, and such leave has not been applied for, the Court has no power to reinstate the suit, it having been absolutely determined. Per Curiam.-Though irregularity has undoubtedly been committed in originally granting the leave to amend, yet the plaintiff is not to blame for taking advantage of such leave when given, and he would have been misled and prejudiced by the action of the Court were he now to be refused the right of amendment sought. Amendment allowed. |