SUPREME COURT. IN THE MATTER OF A CAVEAT COMMON LAW. provisions of this Act," "or any beneficiary or other person claiming estate or interest in such land under any unregistered instrument;" and any person there means any like person," and unregistered instrument means "any instrument incapable of being registered." (GWYNNE J.-I have always read it so. The settlor, or beneficiary, or any one claiming interest in that which is the subject of the settlement, has the caveating capacity.) That is the way I understand it. The words "unregistered instrument" are inapt, meaning "incapable of being registered," in which case Mr. Palmer could not enter a caveat. (GWYNNE, J.-His status did not give him the caveating capacity?) Lewis Thomas did not give him that caveating capacity, because he might have protected himself by registration. Therefore the question is simply who took the landgrant to the office first. My client did, and therefore we are entitled. (GWYNNE, J.-You say the question would be determined upon the maxim of equity-qui prior est tempore potior est jure. Not by the equitable maxim—the Act gave it. Assuming we went to the Registrar-General on the 27th February, with the certificate of title, and he registered us, Mr. Palmer would have had no standing; and supposing we did not do so until after he had registered his judgment, the 93rd clause of the Act says that "the Sheriff, or, person authorized by the Supreme Court," shall after registration do such acts and execute such instruments as may be necessary to deal with the estate. A conveyance by the Sheriff is no more binding until it is registered than any other conveyance. The effect of notice of judgment is shown by the proviso to the same clause. The contract for sale of the property by William Thomas to his brother was signed on the 27th March, long before Mr. Palmer took any steps whatever, and Lewis Thomas was then the only person in the eye of the law entitled to the property. Cur, ad. vult. 28 August Judgment was delivered as follows by HANSON, C.J. :——We are of opinion that the objection taken, that there was no power to enter a caveat, is a valid objection. We were told that what was done was based upon what has been the universal practice of the SUPREME COURT. H.M. CUSTOMS V. LOWMAN. COMMON LAW. Real Property Office since the Act was passed, therefore we don't give costs. GWYNNE, J.-We think that Mr. Palmer, to use the language of the Act, had not the caveating capacity. Ingleby.-There will be an order that the caveat be withdrawn? The caveat HANSON, C.J.-We simply say it was a nullity. ought never to have been there; but if it cannot be removed without an order of the Court, of course an order will be made. Order for removal of caveat. HANSON, C.J., GWYNNE, J., WEARING, J.] [COMMON LAW. 28 JULY AND 28 August, 1871. H. M. CUSTOMS V. LOWMAN. THE CUSTOMS ACT, 1864.-Forfeiture of uncustomed goodsJurisdiction of Local Courts-Defect in information-Discrepancy-Writ of certiorari. Under the Customs Act, 1864, where in packages landed in pursuance of an entry goods are found concealed on which no duty has been paid, and of which no mention is made in the invoice accompanying the entry, such invoice purporting to enumerate the whole of the contents both the goods so concealed and those which serve to conceal them are liable to forfeiture. A conviction under the above circumstances will not be invalidated by Special Magistrates have no jurisdiction to forfeit goods under the THIS was a rule calling upon J. W. Lewis, Collector of Customs, G2 SUPREME COURT. H. M. CUSTOMS V. LOWMAN. COMMON LAW. dated the 21st day of January, 1871, and made by the said E. J. Peake at Port Adelaide, should not be quashed on the following grounds:-1st. That the said Edward John Peake had no jurisdiction to make the said order; 2nd. That the information does not disclose any offence within the Customs Act, 1864; 3rd. That the goods mentioned in the said order were not uncustomed goods; 4th. That the evidence before the Magistrate showed that Customs duties had been paid; 5th. That there was no proof given on the hearing of the said information that the goods mentioned in the said order were being dealt with contrary to section 164 of the Customs Act, 1864; 6th. That the information upon which the said order is made charges that the said John Lowman was concerned in unshipping, harbouring, or having possession of certain prohibited, uncustomed, or restricted goods contrary to section 164 of the Customs Act, 1864, whereby the said goods became forfeited, together with certain other goods found packed with them, and the said order was made by the said Edward John Peake upon such information; 7th. That the said information is uncertain in not specifying whether the said goods were prohibited, or were uncustomed, or were restricted goods; 8th. That the said order is untrue in stating that the said goods mentioned therein had been claimed by the said John Lowman, of Adelaide, upholsterer. The goods were brought from England by John Lowman, upholsterer, in the ship "St. Vincent," and the usual declaration of quantity and value was signed by him, but without specifying the contents of particular cases. He assured the Landing Surveyor, Mr. J. C. Ferguson, that the true value of the goods was stated, and that the invoice was correct, as he had packed the goods himself in London, but he could not tell the exact contents of each of the twenty-two packages. The entries were signed, and the goods removed to the agent's store, where they were examined, and a quantity of horsehair, twine, gimp, and other articles were found (which were not in the invoice, and upon which no duty had been paid), packed in the cases with the furniture which was mentioned in the invoice. On the hearing of the information, the Justices found that the whole of the goods were forfeited, and condemned them accordingly. The further facts of the case will appear sufficiently from the argument and judgment. SUPREME COUrt. H. M. CUSTOMS V. LOWMAN. COMMON LAW. Stow, Q. C., and Way, for the Collector.-Division No. III. of the Customs Act is the first that is important in the present case, dealing with the reporting of ships, and the production by the master of the manifest. By the 32nd clause no goods, except live stock and some other articles, are to be unshipped except on days not being Sundays or holidays and within the legal hours, nor unless in the presence and with the authority of the proper officer; and all goods unladen contrary to the provisions of the Act, the clause says, "shall be forfeited, and all persons concerned, whether directly or indirectly, in the landing of goods before due entry be passed and warrant granted, shall be subject to a penalty not exceeding £50 nor less than £10." In the next division of the Act express provision is made for penalties in the case of goods landed before due entry. The provisions with regard to due entry are-First, that a certain form is to be delivered to the Customs, stating certain particulars with regard to the goods, and then in the case of goods on which duties are levied further information is required. In addition to the bill of entry there is to be an invoice of the goods produced, and a declaration that the invoice is true. That being done, the proper officer of Customs signs that bill of entry, and that is the only warrant for landing the goods. By the 45th clause, where the importer is not aware of the nature of the goods he may obtain what is called a "bill of sight," whereupon he gets a warrant by which the goods may be removed and examined, and then after a certain time he has to make full entry. The officers have a right to examine the goods, in the first place to see whether the entry is true, in the second place to see whether the value is correctly stated. In this case the invoice, which forms an important part of the entry, is proved to be materially false, so that as regards all goods which are not enumerated in the invoice entry has not been made nor duty paid. Inasmuch as the entry was of packages, due entry had not been made of any of the goods which were contained in the packages containing the goods which were not paid for. That has been held by the Privy Council, and also where, although some packages might contain no more than what was enumerated, still they had been so mixed up in the entry with other packages that there would not be due entry even of those. The 42nd clause says :-"The importer of any goods liable SUPREME COURT. H. M. CUSTOMS V. LOWMAN. COMMON LAW. to duties of Customs, and intended to be delivered for home use on the landing thereof from the importing ship, or his agent, shall, within three days in the case of sailing vessels, and twenty-four hours in the case of steamers and colonial vessels, after the report of such ship, and before unshipment thereof, make perfect entry of such goods by delivering to the Collector a bill of entry thereof in the form contained in the 3rd schedule to this Act, or to the same effect." The 43rd clause provides that such bill of entry, when signed by the Collector or his agent, shall "be transmitted to the landing-waiter, and be his warrant for the landing and delivery of such goods." The 44th clause requires a bill of entry of goods not subject to duties, and that also has to be signed by the Collector, the only difference between those and dutiable goods being that there was no declaration of value and no payment of duty. The 51st clause declares-"No entry or warrant for the landing of any goods shall be deemed valid unless the goods shall have been properly described .. by the denominations and with the characters and circumstances according to which such goods are charged with duty." The 60th clause casts the duty upon the importer of fixing the value of the goods, and if the bill of entry is untrue, then the act of the importer in making the entry, and thereby obtaining the landing of the goods, was an illegal act, and the goods were illegally unshipped-that was unshipped before due entry was made, and being so unshipped would be forfeited. If it was even done by mistake that would be the case. Not only the goods illegally transhipped, but the whole of the package containing those goods, whatever they might be, were also forfeited. It did not throw upon the Customs officer the onus of picking out the articles on which duty had not been paid. Nothing which came under the description of passengers' luggage has been forfeited, and the cans of oil, in reference to which a point had been made, were all included in the invoice, and described as so many gallons. The 164th clause is another provision to ensure payment of duties, and enacts that "if any goods liable to the payment of duties shall be unshipped from any boat or ship in the said province, Customs or other duties not being first paid or secured, all such goods shall be forfeited, together with any goods which shall be found packed with or used in concealing them." Applying that to |