Interpleader under the Common Law Procedure Acts does not apply to proceedings under the Revenue Jurisdiction Act, to which the Crown is a party. THIS was a proceeding on behalf of the Government claiming a sum of £282 1s. 2d. lying in the Bank of South Australia to the account of John Taylor. The payment was made by virtue of a procuration order in favour of the Messenger of the Bank, and it was alleged that the money was paid by mistake after Taylor had become insolvent. The Government instituted proceedings under the Revenue Jurisdiction Act to recover the money. A notice was served upon the Bank, who claimed no title to the money, by the assignees of Taylor, who had been adjudicated insolvent, whereupon the Bank applied that the assignees might be allowed to interplead, and that the Court would upon that issue decide who was entitled to the money. Thrupp, for the Attorney-General, and J. Downer, for the claimant, objected that interpleader was inapplicable to a proceeding to which the Crown was a party, the Crown not being named ; and the clauses of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act, under which this proceeding was taken, clearly not contemplating interpleader— Baker v. Bank of Australasia, 1 C. B., N.S., 515 Crellin v. Leyland, 6 Jur., 733 Frost v. Heywood, 2 Dowl. P.C., N.S., 801 Best v. Hayes, 32 L.J. Exch., 129 Candy v. Maugham, 6 M. & G., 710 Reid v. Stearn, 6 Jurist, N.S., 267 Acts No. 3 of 1862, No. 7 of 1866, and No. 12 of 1865-6. Belt, for defendants, contra. Per Curiam.-The interpleader provisions of the Act of 1862 do not apply. F2 A direction in a will for the executors to invest money in real estate for benefit of person named stamps the sum named with the cha racter of real estate, and therefore on the death of such person after decease of testator, but before investment, such sum would pass to the heir-at-law of the devisee. THE cause was heard on the 16th December, 1870, and judgment given upon several points which arose in reference to the administration of the estate. In drawing up the decree a question was raised as to the construction of the third codicil to the testator's will, which was as follows:- "By this codicil to my last will I direct my executors to invest the sum of £300 in real estate for each of my three daughters-Mary Vaill Bishop, Amelia Helen Bishop, and Georgiana Helen Bishop, and the sum of £100 to be invested in like manner for the benefit of my son, John Frederick Bishop." Belt, for the widow, contended that, there being no express direction to invest it in purchase of real estate, it would be equitable and reasonable to invest it at interest on mortgage of real estate, and manifestly to the advantage of the legatees, as by that means they would have certain income, which they might not if the money was invested in the purchase of real estate. On that ground he argued that the Court would hold the legacy to be personal estate. Parker, for heir-at-law of deceased legatee, submitted the language of the codicil by which the legacy was bequeathed was very plain that the money should be invested upon land, and that from the time of the testator's death it therefore became land in accordance with the well-known principle that equity considered done what was directed to be done. Cur. ad. vult. 28 August GWYNNE, J., delivered judgment as follows:-The language of the will (codicil) is—"I direct my executors to invest the sum of SUPREME COURT. RANDALL V. ACRAMAN. COMMON LAW. £300 in real estate for each of my three daughters-Mary Vaill Bishop, Amelia Helen Bishop, Georgiana Edith Bishop, and" &c. It appears to us that by this language the testator intended that £300 should be invested in the purchase of land (real estate) for the benefit of each of the daughters in fee-simple. The deceased daughter having survived the testator, the desire or direction took effect, and no part of the testator's purpose failed. Had the daughter died before the testator, there would have been no conversion of the £300 into land, but it would have remained part of the personal estate of the testator. Again, if the testator had given the daughter a life estate or an estate in tail in the land directed to be purchased, then on the decease of the daughter in the one case, or her decease without issue in the other, the money, or the land if the money had been invested, would have gone to the personal representative of the testator. See Reynolds v. Godlee, John., 536. The cases cited on the argument are not applicable. The present is not a question between the real and personal representatives of the testator, nor is it one where there is a partial failure of the purposes of the will. Here the money, stamped with the character of real estate on the decease of the testator, became absolutely invested (as if in fee-simple) in the daughter, and on her decease intestate went to her heir-at-law. HANSON, C.J., GWYNNE, J., WEARING, J.] 1 AND 22 AUGUST, 1871. RANDALL V. ACRAMAN. LOCAL COURT ACT, 1861.—Appeal—Special Case. [COMMON LAW. An entry in the Record-book of a Local Court of a judgment “subjeot to a point reserved, case to be stated within a week," is not an entry of a final judgment on which an appeal will lie, and no appeal can be had thereon in the event of a case not being stated within the week limited, unless the Local Court has altered its Record-book by expunging the reference to the point reserved. THE facts being as stated in the head-note, Thrupp, for the defendant, had obtained a rule nisi for a new trial. SUPREME COURT. RANDALL V. ACRAMAN. COMMON LAW. Ingleby, for plaintiff, showed cause.-The appeal is premature, and there has been no final decision of the Local Court. (GWYNNE, J.-That would be a final decision if the defendants had relinquished their case.) They cannot do so. The Local Court has no power to make a term that a case should be drawn up within a week, otherwise judgment for a certain amount. It might be convenient, but he could see nothing in the Act authorizing any such conditional judgment. Thrupp.-The Magistrate would not give the case as asked, but only upon one point. Under those circumstances he had a right either to the reserved case or an appeal. The reserved case was abandoned, the seven days having expired, and therefore there was a final judgment. (GWYNNE, J.-The Local Court is a Court of Record, and can you contradict the record which sets up a conditional judgment?) I understand that there have been several instances before in which the special case has been abandoned. (GWYNNE, J.-I understand a Local Court must give judgment for the plaintiff or defendant, or nonsuit, or state a case.) But if counsel ask for a case, and the Court decline to give the case as asked for, but offer to give another case, that cannot take away the right of appeal. Ingleby. I did not argue that it does. HANSON, C.J.-At present we must argue upon the state of things shown by the Record-book. GWYNNE, J.-Could you not apply to the Magistrates to enter a proper judgment? HANSON, C.J.-That will be the best way. Ingleby.-Do I understand your Honors to express an opinion that the Local Court cannot give that kind of judgment? I wish to know for the benefit of the Local Court practice. Thrupp. If the condition is one which the Local Court cannot impose it would be taken for as much as it is worth, the judgment being considered for the plaintiff. SUPREME COURT. { MOUNT GAMBIER DISTRICT COUNCIL } COMMON LAW. GWYNNE, J.-A judgment is a fixed quantity in law. I never heard of a conditional judgment. The Local Court is a Court of Record, and its judgment, I take it, must have the attributes of a judgment. Appeal dismissed. HANSON, C.J., GWYNNE, J., WEARING, J.] 22 AUGUST, 1871. [COMMON LAW. MOUNT GAMBIER DISTRICT COUNCIL V. HARRALD. DISTRICT COUNCILS ACT, 1858.-Rules-Persons primarily liable. Under the District Councils Act, 10 of 1858, when property is vacant the Council may sue the owner for rates without first proceeding against the person appearing in the assessment-book as occupier. THE defendant was sued in a Local Court as owner of land for £3 15s., rates for several years, and the question of his liability · was reserved for the opinion of the Supreme Court. HANSON, C.J.-The question is a very simple one, namely whether it is necessary to show that you have taken proceedings against previous occupiers before you can recover from the owner of the land. Ingleby, for 'plaintiffs, called attention to the 84th and 184th clauses of the District Councils Act, No. 10 of 1858. It was proved the defendant was the owner of the property, that it was vacant, and that a demand had been made. In conveyancing it was the duty of the purchaser's lawyer to see that all rates were paid, and if they were not paid they were deducted from the purchase-money. The following is the clause of the Act upon which the question turned : "The person primarily liable to payment of the rates shall be the person appearing in the assessment-book as the occupier of any rateable property, |