ACT FOR ERADICATION OF SCOTCH THISTLES.-Notice Under the above Act notice to one tenant in common, where both are Per HANSON, C.J.—That if they were jointly rated such notice would be insufficient. A tenant in common is an owner within the meaning of the Act. THIS was an appeal from a decision of the Local Court of Adelaide by which the plaintiffs recovered from the defendant the sum o £80 12s. 6d., the cost of eradicating thistles on four sections in the Hundred of Talunga, subject to the opinion of this Court as to the sufficiency of the notice served on him by the District Council, he being only part owner. It appeared from the evidence that Prankerd and Stuckey were rated as owners of three of the sections, and Prankerd alone of the remainder; that the latter had been in the habit of paying the rates on all of them, and that the notice in question was served on the defendant alone. Stow, Q.C., for defendant.-Where parties are tenants in common notices must be served on each separately, and notice to one is not sufficient. In the event of this verdict being upheld his client would have no means of recovering contribution from other Owners Coryton v. Lithebye, 2 Saun. Rep., 115. Way, for the plaintiffs.-The point reserved by the Special Magistrate raised no question as to description of quality of ownership, but only as to description of property. This was in the nature of an action for work and labour done to the great benefit of defendant's property at the expense of the ratepayers; and the Act is specially framed to meet the point now raised by the words SUPREME COURT. { DISTRICT COUNCIL OF TALUNGA COMMON LAW. As there exists no being inserted, "any owner or occupier." machinery by which District Councils can investigate titles, would the Court say that every person having an interest in a piece of land-whether resident in the colony or otherwise, or whatever the nature of his interest may be-must be personally served with a notice before the Council could recover rates expended for their benefit? 66 Any owner" means any one having an estate in the land Bowditch v. Local Board of Health of Wakefield, 51 L.T., 116. The defendant paid the rates and therefore has held himself out as owner or occupier. The District Council could not investigate the title, and therefore would be entitled to regard the person paying. rates as the owner or occupier. HANSON, C.J.-If they were jointly rated, I should say notice to one would not be sufficient. GWYNNE, J.-If one person only is rated when other persons are interested, it would be his business to appeal, and have the assessment corrected by insertion of the other names. If not, he holds himself out without correction as the owner. It cannot be meant that an owner would be liable as long as there is an occupier, as the owner might be unable to enter on leased lands to eradicate the thistles. Way.-Nothing in the Statute shows that occupier is primarily liable, and it would require express words to show that such was meant. 24 November Cur. ad. vult. HANSON, C.J., delivered judgment as follows:-This is a case reserved by the Local Court of Adelaide. The action was brought to recover expenses incurred by the plaintiffs in eradicating thistles, &c., on certain lands of which the defendant was alleged to be owner, he having neglected to eradicate them after notice served for that purpose; and the questions submitted to us are “1st, SUPREME COURT. HODGKISS V. RYMILL. COMMON LAW. whether the notice contains a sufficient description of the land in respect of which the same was given; and 2nd, whether it was necessary to serve the same or any notice on Robert Stuckey," who was tenant in common with the defendant of the land in question. The latter was the point substantially relied upon by the defendant; but upon a reference to the Act, we are of opinion that his contention cannot be supported. With regard to the greater part of the land, it is found that the name of the defendant alone appeared in the district assessment-book as owner, and that was evidence of ownership, upon which the plaintiffs were justified in relying in any notice they might have to send under the Act; and though in respect of some of the sections the name of Robert Stuckey was joined with that of the defendant as owner, yet looking at the words of the Act, which are "of any owner," &c., we think that the defendant was such an owner as to make him liable for non-compliance with the notice served upon him. The first question, therefore, will be answered in the affirmative, and the second in the negative, and the judgment of the Local Court in favour of the plaintiffs will stand. Verdict upheld. HANSON, C.J., GWYNNE, J., WEARING, J.] [COMMON LAW. 6 SEPTEMBER AND 24 NOVEMBER, 1871. HODGKISS V. RYMILL. BREACH OF CONTRACT.-Evidence-Agency. A subsequent ratification by a principal of a contract entered into by a broker as his agent without authority gives the principal a right to damages against the contractor in case of breach of such contract. THIS was an appeal from the Local Court of Adelaide. The action was for non-completion of a contract for the sale of shares, and had resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff. It appeared that the defendant had entrusted his agent with the sale of certain shares; that the agent had sold to one Kekwick, SUPREME COURT. HODGKISS V RYMILL. COMMON LAW. who professed to be acting as agent for the plaintiff, though he was not so in fact; and that the plaintiff subsequently bought the shares from Kekwick at the price for which he had agreed with Longson. Stow, Q.C., having obtained a rule to show cause why a new trial should not be granted, Way showed cause.-The fact was admitted by the other side that a written contract was not necessary, and that assuming Mr. Hodgkiss's evidence to be correct, that he did not authorize Mr. Kekwick to act for him, he elected to ratify his act, as he was entitled to do. The Court must not look at the language in which a transaction is described, but at the conduct of the parties and the real nature of the transaction. Stow, Q.C., for defendant, in support of the rule.-Admitting the facts as stated, he demurred to the law laid down by the learned counsel on the other side. Was there a bargain between the prin cipals themselves? Was there any sale by any agent on the part of Rymill to the plaintiff personally? Or was there any sale between an agent on the part of Rymill and an agent on the part of the plaintiff ? There was no sale under either of these conditions, and Kekwick was absolutely unknown in the matter to the plaintiff till after the defendant had authority from Longson to sell the shares. What took place was, in the language of the plaintiff—" Kekwick sold me the shares. He was not my agent." Nor does Kekwick hold himself out as being such agent. If any contract existed, it was between Kekwick in his own name and the plaintiff, consequently the doctrine of ratification put forward by the other side cannot apply, and there was no evidence of any contract between the parties. 24 November HANSON, C.J., delivered judgment as follows:-This is an appeal from a judgment of the Local Court of Adelaide, by which damages were awarded to the plaintiff in respect of a breach of an alleged contract for the sale of some shares in the Provincial Gas Company. The rule was obtained upon two grounds, of which the SUPREME COURT. TURNER V. TIVER. COMMON LAW. first, that there was no evidence of any contract between the parties, is alone mentioned. The plaintiff contended that there was evidence of an authority from the defendant to Longson to sell, and an authority from the plaintiff to Kekwick to purchase the shares in question, and that Longson, on behalf of the defendant, did sell them to Kekwick on behalf of the plaintiff. It was not denied that there was evidence of Longson's authority, and of the sale to Kekwick acting professedly on the part of the plaintiff; but it was contended that there was no evidence of any authority from the plaintiff to Kekwick. In appeals of this nature this Court has nothing to do with the weight of the evidence, but only to decide whether there is any evidence at all in support of the conclusion of the Local Court. Much of the argument, therefore, which was addressed to us, and which would have been material as affecting the question whether the verdict was against the weight of evidence, is irrelevant to the question we have to decide. And it appears to us that there was evidence of an authority from the plaintiff to Kekwick to purchase the shares for him. Kekwick was not the principal, but a broker, and the agreement of the plaintiff to buy the shares from him, which was clearly proved, was evidence to show that he made Kekwick his agent for the purpose of the purchase. The rule, therefore, must be discharged with costs. HANSON, C.J., GWYNNE, J., WEARING, J.] [COMMON LAW. 6 SEPTEMBER AND 24 NOVEMBER, 1871. TURNER V. TIVER. LOCAL COURTS ACT, 1861.-Jurisdiction-Costs. Under the Local Courts Act, 1861, the costs incurred by a defendant in establishing his objections to the jurisdiction of the Local Court to which he is summoned will abide the event. THIS was an application for an order for execution to issue for the costs arising out of proceedings in the Kapunda Local Court. The plaintiff sued the defendant in that Court, and the latter objected to the jurisdiction of the Magistrates, it not being the nearest |