Whatever may be the sense of the original, it is perfectly evident that this Paraphrast considered the words of God to David to be the promise of a king to sit on his throne, and explained that promise as applying to the Messiah, who was to rule in the fear of Jehovah, not to be the God of Israel. Dr. S.'s translation is unwarrantable, as the meaning he assigns to the passage is preposterous.

One other example, which we shall take from the xlvth Psalm, will suffice. Dr. S. quotes from the Targum,

"Ver. 2. Thy beauty, O king Messiah, is pre-eminent above the sons of men: the spirit of prophecy is given unto thy lips: therefore God hath blessed thee for ever. (Ver. 7.) The throne of thy glory, O Jehovah, standeth for ever and ever; a righteous sceptre is the sceptre of thy kingdom. (Ver. 8.) Because thou hast loved righteousness, and hated wickedness, therefore thus hath Jehovah thy God anointed thee with the ointment of joy profusely above thy fellows."

There is surely enough in this passage which is inconsistent with Deity in the person addressed, but the question is whether Dr. S. has rightly translated and applied the words of the Targum, ver. 7; and if we were obliged to admit without question the present pointing of the word ', we could not object to his version, however much we might be astonished at the sense it seems to convey; but the Targums originally existed and long remained unpointed. The pointing was first performed by various and unknown individuals in a very inaccurate manner, and as now given, it has been reviewed and corrected by several Christians, especially by Buxtorf, who would, without doubt, point according to their own notion of the sense of the passage. Now, considering the word Dp as a verb, and pointing it with a Trere instead of a Kametz under the, the translation is, "The throne of thy glory Jehovah hath established for ever," which exactly corresponds with the sense ascribed to the Hebrew original by Mr. Belsham and others. And if any one is scrupulous about altering the points, (though their authority is generally allowed to be exceedingly small,) we would refer him to the Targum on Ps. x. ver. 12, where the same word occurring as a verb is, nevertheless, pointed with the Kametz, probably by mistake, as there seems to be no doubt about the sense. "Arise, O Jehovah, establish the covenant of thy hand." All other supposed cases of divine names being attributed to the Messiah in the Targums are susceptible of equally easy explanation.

קוס • קים שבועת ידך The words are

In his chapter on the Apocrypha, Dr. S.'s utmost ingenuity can produce nothing more like evidence for his system than the expression "Eternal Saviour" in the book of Baruch, a book the date of which is unknown, and which is entirely destitute of authority. Yet even here the Common Version, "The Everlasting, our Saviour," is to be preferred to his, because the Everlasting occurs frequently as a name of the Deity in the same book, and is even found in the same sentence.

From Philo our author quotes pretty largely. He identifies the logos of this writer with the Messiah, supposing him to have been led by his philosophical opinions to dwell chiefly on the spiritual part of the mixed nature, whilst he occasionally recognizes personal qualities rather through the influence of the prevailing opinions of the Jews in general, than in strict consistency with his own theories.

"It appears to me," says Dr. S, " that there is a real inconsistency in the assertions and doctrines of Philo concerning the Locos; but such inconsistency as, though not excusable, is yet capable of being accounted for on

the common principles of human infirmity."... "From all the circumstances, it seems to me the most reasonable conclusion, that the leading acceptation of the memra or logos, among the Jews of this middle age, was to designate an intelligent, intermediate agent; that in the sense of a Mediator between God and man, it became a recognized appellative of the Messiah; that the personal doctrine of the WORD was the one generally received; and that the conceptual notion, which Philo interweaves with the other, was purely his own invention, the result of his theological philosophy, and the filling up, as it were, and finishing of a favourite theory."-Script. Test. Vol. I. pp. 599, 600, 2nd ed.

No one will be surprised that a sufficient number of passages may be found in the writings of Philo, in which the logos is so spoken of; that taken from their connexion, considered apart from the other doctrines of their author, and with the assumption of inconsistency and error on his part, whenever it may seem to be required, they may appear favourable to the doctrine which Dr. S. labours to defend; but a more particular examination of the opinions and language of the Jewish philosopher will, we think, prove that he has been greatly misunderstood by those who quote him as favouring the pre-existence or Deity of the Messiah, and that his writings can throw little light on Christian controversy, except as an example of that false philosophy which so early corrupted the church.

After rejecting the notion entertained by some, that Philo was a Christian, Dr. S. says,

"The coincidences of sentiment, and more frequently of phraseology, which occur in the writings of Philo with the language of Paul and of John in the New Testament, must be accounted for on some other principles.. Yet it would be contrary to all the philosophy of human nature, not to ascribe these different but similar streams to one primary source. That source, I venture to propose, is not so much to be sought in the writings of Plato, or in the ethical lectures of the learned Jews of Alexandria, or in the sole speculations and invented diction of Philo himself;-as in the SACRED WRITINGS of THE OLD TESTAMENT, transfused into the Alexandrian idiom, paraphrased and amplified in the terms and phrases which were vernacular to the Grecian Jews, and mixed in a very arbitrary manner with the speculations both of the Persian and the Greek philosophers."-Script. Test. Vol. I. p. 574, 2nd ed.

Dr. S. can hardly mean to deny that many of the most remarkable characteristics of the religious philosophy of Philo are derived from the school of Plato, and if due weight be given to his first remark in this passage, that the coincidences between the Jewish writer and the New Testament are more frequently of phraseology than of sentiment, and to the concluding one, that whatever was drawn from the Old Testament was mixed in a very arbitrary manner with the speculations both of the Persian and Greek philosophers, we see nothing in the rest to which we are disposed materially to object, or the full admission of which has any bearing on the points of difference between us and Dr. S.

There has been much discussion on the question, to what school of philosophy Philo ought to be considered as belonging; the general voice of antiquity declaring him a Platonist, whilst some learned moderns have maintained that he was an Eclectic; others have supposed him to represent the prevailing opinions of the Alexandrian Jews of his time; others, again, regard him as himself the founder of a sect, and the original author of the doctrines he delivered. It has been very justly remarked, that there is much less real difference between these several statements than would at first view appear, and

than their authors supposed. If in insisting on the Platonism of Philo we must be understood to maintain that he professedly and exclusively addicted himself to the Platonic school, against such an opinion arguments scarcely to be resisted might, without much difficulty, be adduced. Indeed, how could a Jew attached to his religion, disposed probably to regard as indirectly derived from the writings of his own lawgiver all that seemed excellent in the philosophy of other nations, and obliged to modify into at least apparent harmony with those writings all the doctrines which he embraced, profess unresisting submission to the dicta of any Pagan master? It is not to be denied, however, that some of the most striking peculiarities of the Platonic doctrine are adopted by Philo, and that he explains his meaning by phraseology and imagery derived from the works of Plato himself, and much used among his followers. If we call him an Eclectic, as there is no doubt that he occasionally quotes with approbation, and adopts without reserve, the sentiments of philosophers of different schools, still it is not the less manifest that his notions respecting the Divine Nature are Platonic. The later Platonists and Eclectics hardly differed except in name, the latter greatly admiring Plato and following him, especially on subjects relating to the nature of God and the mind.

Those who maintain that Philo only adopted the prevailing sentiments of the learned Jews at Alexandria, should recollect that these Jews studied in the schools of philosophy for which that city was celebrated, and in which a system, which, if not strictly Platonic, was very nearly allied to Platonism, was generally taught. It is probable enough that Philo may not have materially differed in opinion from the more learned of his countrymen in his native city, but it does not follow that his doctrines are Jewish traditions; it is rather evident how much the circumstances of their education led them to accommodate their religion to the wisdom of the age, explaining its simple truths according to the fanciful speculations of philosophy, and saving its historic details from the contempt with which they would otherwise have been inclined to treat them, by allegorizing them into the mystical expression of obscure and useless dogmas. Those who speak of Philo's philosophy as his own invention, and represent him rather as the founder of a sect than as a supporter of the doctrines of any former leader, can surely mean no more than that he made his selection of opinions for himself, that he adopted the principle of the Eclectics, but not satisfied with what was done in their schools, being, indeed, in a peculiar situation as a Jew, his doctrines did not sufficiently agree with theirs for him to be correctly described as belonging to their sect; all which is not, or need not be denied by those who call attention to the manifest signs of Platonism in the works of Philo, and clearly shew that much of his language, respecting the nature of the Deity, is derived, not from the principles of his own religion, or the traditions of his nation, but from the doctrines of the Greek philosopher, which, however, he has mixed with opinions derived from various other sources, and reduced into some sort of agreement with the principles of his own religion.

We cannot hope to understand the language of Philo respecting the logos, except by considering it in connexion with his whole doctrine concerning the Divine Nature. We ought, perhaps, hardly to expect perfect consistency from so obscure and mystical a writer, but it will help much to remove difficulties, if we keep in mind that many parts of his works are written popularly, according to that view of religion which he considered to be suited to the condition of mankind in general, whilst others are designed to express the more just and sublime sentiments to which only the learned and

contemplative could attain, and which differ from the former so widely, that we might despair of harmonizing them, did we not meet with passages in which the precepts and opinions of the popular religion are adapted to and explained by the sublimer theology.

That Philo, believing in one God, nevertheless frequently speaks of three divine principles, is a fact which has attracted much attention, and the proper explanation of which has been a subject of much discussion. By many he is considered as a believer in the Trinity, very nearly as it is received by most Christians. Others, sensible of the deviation of his doctrine from reputed orthodoxy, have, according to their own views, either condemned him as corrupting the traditions of his people with Platonism, or considered him as affording evidence favourable to the Arian doctrine; whilst a third party, much more justly, as it seems to us, have contended, that the three principles of Philo are not beings or persons, though sometimes figuratively spoken of with personal characters, but only attributes, and that he has derived them entirely from his philosophy, not at all from the traditionary religion of his nation.

Our first remark is, that this writer is not always content with making three principles in the Divine Nature, but sometimes appears to represent God himself as a distinct intelligence presiding over the three principles, and sometimes also increases the number of these principles. There is a very remarkable passage in the book Tepi quyadav (concerning fugitives) in which the author, allegorizing the precepts of the Mosaic law respecting the cities of refuge, absolutely speaks of six different principles in the Divine Nature all inferior to God himself, being really intended as no more than attributes, and yet having, apparently, distinct intelligence ascribed to them. The passage is long, but we think important: it is as follows:

"I must next explain which they are, and why their number is six. Is not, then, the most ancient, the strongest and best, not city only, but Metropolis, the Divine Word to which, above all, it is most profitable to flee? But the other five colonies, as it were, are powers of him who uttered the word, of which the chief is the creative, by means of which the MAKER, by his word, fabricated the world. The second is the royal, by means of which, having created, he rules what he has made: the third is the benignant, through which the Maker pities, and is merciful to, his own work: the fourth is the legislative quality, through which he forbids those things which ought not to be. Fair and well fortified cities all of them, excellent places of refuge for those who are worthy of being saved. Good and humane is the appointment, fitted to excite and encourage hope. Who else could have exhibited such an abundance of beneficial things, according to the variety of cases of persons sinning unintentionally, who have not all the same strength or the same weakness? The intention is, that he who is capable of running swiftly should press on, without stopping to take breath, to that supreme divine word, which is the fountain of wisdom; that, drinking from its stream, instead of death he may find as a reward eternal life; that he who is not equally swift should flee to the creative power, which Moses names God, because all things were disposed and arranged by it. ... but that he who is not sufficiently active for this should take refuge with the royal power. But to him who is

not sufficiently quick to reach the above-mentioned stations, as being far removed, other nearer goals are fixed of useful powers, the merciful, and that which prescribes what should be done; and that which forbids what ought not to be done These are the six cities which are called places of refuge, of which five are figuratively represented, and have their resemblance in the sacred things. The commanding and forbidding powers (have as their types) the copy of the laws laid up in the ark of the covenant; but the merciful

power, the cover of the ark itself, which is called the mercy-seat; and the creative and royal powers, the two winged cherubim placed over it. But the divine word, superior to all these, has not taken any visible form, as bearing a resemblance to no object of sense, being the very image of God, the most ancient of all objects of thought, placed nearest, there being no separating interval, to him who alone truly exists; (possesses an independent existence;) for it is said (he here quotes Exod. xxv. 22), 'I will speak to thee from above the mercy-seat between the two cherubim,' so that the Word should be, as it were, a charioteer to the other powers, but he that uttereth the word, as the person riding in the chariot, who gives his command to the charioteer in all things for the right direction of the whole. He, then, who is not only free from voluntary guilt, but has not even involuntarily committed crime, having God himself as his inheritance, will dwell in him alone; but they who not intentionally but undesignedly have sinned, will have, as places of refuge, the cities which have been spoken of, abounding in good things and wealthy. Of these cities of refuge three are beyond the river, far removed from our race. Which are these? The Word of our Ruler and his creative and royal powers. For to them belong the heaven and the whole world. But neighbouring and contiguous to us, placed near to the mortal race of men, which alone is liable to sin, are the three on this side of the river, the merciful power, that which commands what should be done, and that which forbids things not to be done. For these are close at hand to us."-Philo de Profugis (pp. 464, 465, ed. Turnebi et Hoeschelii, Paris, 1640).

It is plain from this passage that Philo recognizes one Supreme and only true God, whom he placed above all those divine energies or attributes which he endowed with a sort of personality, much in the same manner as Proclus (Comm. in Timæum, Plat. Lib. ii.) contends that Plato himself considered the Supreme God as presiding over his three principles. Again, we see here that Philo is led by no better reason than the desire of allegorizing the six cities of refuge, to distinguish six divine principles instead of three, which he divides into two triads, one superior to the other, but both inferior to the Supreme God himself, whose qualities they all are. As to the nature of the word, we perceive that Philo had no conception whatever of its possible incarnation or sensible appearance among men ; that he considered it as really nothing more than the utterance or expression of the will of the great Supreme; and that in figuratively giving it a personal character, he made it, though in some respects superior to the Divine attributes, yet inferior and subject to God himself. The following passage affords very distinct proof of the sense in which alone Philo attributed personal characters to the Divine perfections. It is an allegorization of the beginning of Gen. xviii. :

"For Abraham also coming with zeal, and haste, and great alacrity, orders Sarah, who represents virtue, to hasten and mix three measures of fine meal, and make hearth-cakes, when God, accompanied by his two principal powers, his royalty and his goodness, He, in the midst of them, being one, produced three images in the visual soul," (i e. caused the visible appearance of three persons, though the whole was but a manifestation of himself alone,)" each of which could by no means be measured, for God is incomprehensible, and his powers are incomprehensible; but he measures all things, for his goodness is the measure of good men, his power is the measure of obedient men, but he himself, the Sovereign, is the measure of all corporeal and incorporeal things. Wherefore, these powers, obtaining the nature of rules and precepts, are a means of estimating things inferior to them. These three measures, then, it is good to have mingled and worked together in the soul, that being persuaded that God is supremely exalted, who rises above his own powers, and is either perceived without them, or manifested in them, it may receive the impressions of his power and beneficence, and, being initiated into the most