THE LATE PROFESSOR ROMANES'S THOUGHTS ON RELIGION.

ALL

LL THE publications of the Open Court Publishing Company, purely theoretical though they may appear to be, are brought out with a very practical end in view, which is nothing less than the reconstruction of religion upon the broad basis of modern science. When we undertake to bring out scientific works, such as Ribot's psychological inquiries, Max Müller's expositions of the nature of language and of thought, Ernst Mach's history of mechanics and his popular lectures on the methods of scientific research, we do so because we trust that the spread of sound science is the best and most effective propaganda of true religion. We acquired from Prof. George John Romanes the right of publishing the American edition of his book, Darwin and After Darwin, because we recognise in the doctrine of evolution one of the most important and fundamental religious truths, upon the basis of which the old traditional dogmas. will have to be revised and radically remodelled; and we have just now brought out the American edition of the same scientist's posthumous Thoughts on Religion. It is this latter book to which the present article is devoted, for it seems necessary to explain why we accept for publication a book which in many important points differs from our own solution of the religious problem.

In our opinion, science and religion are not two separate spheres which must be kept apart, lest the one should interfere with the other; but, on the contrary, both form integral parts of man's spiritual being and are closely interwoven as the web and woof of our souls. Science is the search for truth, including the

results of the search; it is the best recognition of the truth according to the most accurate and painstaking methods at our command; and religion is the endeavor to lead a life in agreement with the truth. What is religion but truth in its moral bearings upon practical life!

In opposition to this standpoint the Thoughts on Religion by Professor Romanes are antiscientific and agnostic, indeed, they stand in certain respects so much in contrast to the labor of his life, as to appear a disavowal of his former position.

While our religious convictions are quite definite and outspoken we do not propound them dogmatically. We simply submit them to the world for consideration; we solicit criticism from all quarters, because we trust that they can stand the severest strictures. However, supposing they could be proved to be erroneous, we shall not hesitate to publicly confess our errors; for it is not our aim to propagate our views because they are ours, but because we believe that they are true. If it be right that we must in religious questions sacrifice our intellect and cease thinking, let the truth prevail.

When the doctrine of evolution first dawned upon Romanes, it came to him, not as a religious idea, but as a revolutionary doctrine, which was slowly but radically destroying the very basis of his most sacred belief; and in order to understand the struggles which at that time distracted the mind of the young scientist, we ought to bear in mind that he was in his inmost nature not only deeply religious, but even uncommonly reverent and pious. Judg. ing from his essay on Prayer, which he wrote when still a youth, in 1873, and by which he gained the Burney Prize at Cambridge, he was possessed of a childlike trust in the Lord, his Creator and Heavenly Father, whom he regarded as governing the world by general laws. Would a youth so settled in his convictions give up his faith when confronted with scientific conceptions irreconcilable with the errors of his traditional religion? How could he help it? Science is not of human make; science is the superhuman power of the silent voice of the Holy Spirit, who reveals himself to

mankind in an accumulative revelation, and no one can withdraw himself from its irresistible influence.

Romanes had thoroughly imbibed the rigid definitions of the traditional dogmatism. In order to substantiate the so-called orthodox conception of Christianity our ecclesiastical instructors have gotten into the habit of telling us again and again that there is no religion save such as is theistic, and that there is no theism, save such as is a belief in a personal God, and a personal God means a distinct individual being with an ego-consciousness like that found in man, only on an infinitely higher plane a view which we call anthropotheism. Accepting explanations of religion, such as these, it was natural that Romanes, as soon as he became convinced of the errors of his narrow church-theism, should fall a prey to a desolate scepticism, and already in 1876, if not sooner,1 he wrote a book entitled A Candid Examination of Theism by Physicus, which analyses the crude conception of the traditional God-idea, and finds it wanting.

We quote the following passage from the book, which is sufficient evidence of the author's sincerity:

"And now, in conclusion, I feel it is desirable to state that any antecedent bias with regard to Theism which I individually possess is unquestionably on the side of traditional beliefs. It is therefore with the utmost sorrow that I find myself compelled to accept the conclusions here worked out; and nothing would have induced me to publish them, save the strength of my conviction that it is the duty of every member of society to give his fellows the benefit of his labors for whatever they may be worth. Just as I am confident that truth must in the end be the most profitable for the race, so I am persuaded that every individual endeavor if unbiassed and sincere, ought without hesitation to be made the common property of all men, no matter in what direction the results of its promulgation may appear to tend. And so far as the ruination of individual happiness is concerned, no one can have a more lively perception than myself of the possibly disastrous tendency of my work. So far as I am individually concerned, the result of this analysis has been to show that, whether I regard the problem of Theism on the lower plane of strictly relative probability, or on the higher plane of purely formal considerations, it equally becomes my obvious duty to stifle all belief of the kind which I conceive to be the noblest, and to discipline my intellect with regard to this matter into an attitude of the purest scepticism. And forasmuch as I am far from being able to agree

1The book appeared in 1878 (at Trübner's), and we read in the preface that it was written several years before, but had been left unpublished.

with those who affirm that the twilight doctrine of the 'new faith' is a desirable substitute for the waning splendor of 'the old,' I am not ashamed to confess that with this virtual negation of God the universe to me has lost its soul of loveliness; and although from henceforth the precept to 'work while it is day' will doubtless but gain an intensified force from the terribly intensified meaning of the words that 'the night cometh when no man can work,' yet when at times I think, as think at times I must, of the appalling contrast between the hallowed glory of that creed which once was mine, and the lonely mystery of existence as now I find it,—at such times I shall ever feel it impossible to avoid the sharpest pang of which my nature is susceptible. For whether it be due to my intelligence not being sufficiently advanced to meet the requirements of the age, or whether it be due to the memory of those sacred associations which to me at least were the sweetest that life has given, I cannot but feel that for me, and for others who think as I do, there is a dreadful truth in those words of Hamilton,-Philosophy having become a meditation, not merely of death, but of annihilation, the precept know thyself has become transformed into the terrific oracle to Edipus: Mayest thou ne'er know the truth of what thou art.'"

While Romanes pursued his scientific work unswervingly, completing works on The Mental Evolution in Man, The Mental Evolution in Animals and Animal Intelligence, and beginning his Darwin and After Darwin; he wrote several essays bearing on religion. They are:

I. "Mind and Motion." A lecture, published in The Contemporary Review, July, 1885, p. 74.

2. "The World as an Eject," published in The Contemporary Review in 1886, p. 44.

3. "The Evidence of Design in Nature," a paper read before the Aristotelian Society in 1889, and published in its proceedings as a contribution to a Symposium.

4. Three articles on the "Influence of Science Upon Religion,' written in 1889, but remaining unpublished for unknown reasons.

In these essays Professor Romanes takes an unequivocal stand on the ground of monism, yet when he comes to the question of theism he assumes an attitude of agnosticism which does not venture to decide the problem but "leaves a clear field of choice between theism and atheism." The secret reason of his position which probably was hidden from his own mind was in our opinion this: he felt instinctively that there was some truth in theism, yet he could not discover by his reasoning powers what it was. He saw the errors

of the narrow church-theism, but he did not venture to broaden his idea of God so as to conform it to his better scientific insight.

Professor Romanes in 1892 sent us a copy of his article "The World as an Eject," suggesting its republication by The Open Court Publishing Company, which for reasons too long to enumerate we had to refuse. Professor Romanes's world-conception coincided with the monism of The Monist in all important points except in one -his agnostic reservation of leaving the question of theism undecided. I could not republish his essay, but I took the occasion to discuss our differences in an editorial article (which appeared in Vol. III, No. 2, pp. 249–257 of The Monist) hoping that he would either refute my strictures and fortify his arguments or alter his position which appeared to me half-hearted and untenable, and adopt a more scientific God-conception. At that time Professor Romanes's health broke down and I did not consider it proper to urge a reply from him before he would have thoroughly recovered. He went in the winter of 1892-1893 to Madeira, and it is probable that he never read what I had to say about his agnostic view of theism.

The agnostic reserve of Professor Romanes's position might have easily appeared to his readers as an unwillingness to decide a dilemma, which, whatever horn he chose, could only implicate him in troubles of various kinds; but the fact is that he was sorely perplexed in his own mind. On the religious problem all his sympathies were enlisted against his rational faculties, and he saw no other hope for the defence of the faith which he so dearly but vainly longed for, than by denying his rational faculties the right to have anything to say in the matter, and this, his attitude, he called, in distinction to the Spencerian agnosticism, "pure agnosticism."

Between the lines of Romanes's Thoughts on Religion we can see the distress of his soul. What a poor evidence is agnosticism!

It is like a straw to which a drowning man desperately but vainly clings. For it goes without saying that agnosticism of every color is equally favorable to dogmatic Christianity to Mohammedanism, Brahmanism, theosophy, and mysticism of any description, as to Freethought and Nihilism.

With such sentiments Professor Romanes pondered in the last