The last part is devoted to the doctrine of the soul which constitutes the dualism of the Sâmkhya system.

Professor Barthélmy in his Première mémoire, pp. 449-450, does not understand how Kapila, according to the Sâmkhya system, could retain the conception of the soul as perfectly inert, and here Professor Garbe replies that Kapila's soul-conception was invented to explain consciousness. The buddhi is said to be purely material, not less than bodies and other objects; it is also an object. The soul, however, produces the various attitudes of the inner organs by consciousness, by merely being near and throwing light upon their conditions. How much akin this view is to some modern conceptions of the soul, which insist upon the passivity of consciousness, need not be mentioned. Kapila's dualism of the distinctness of the soul leads him into the doctrine of the plurality of souls, which makes his system involved and naturally led to the criticism exercised by his successor, Buddha. Buddha went so far as to deny the existence of the âtman, considering the soul as the continuity of many mental acts, thus leading again to a monistic conception.

Deliverance could be attained only by a discontinuance of the effect of the objects upon the soul. Deliverance could not be conceived as a reabsorption of an individual soul into a divine soul, because, according to the Sâmkhya system there is no God, and if a God existed, such a deliverance would be furnished solely because of the law that every combination leads to separation. Further, deliverance cannot be the annihilation either of the soul or of the world, because experience teaches that the aspiration of man seeking deliverance is not directed toward annihilation. All this is not deliverance. But what is deliverance? According to the explanation of Aniruddha it is an indescribable condition in which all pain is done away with, excluding the possibility of its return. But since pain is supposed to originate through the connexion of the soul with matter, deliverance consists in the perfect separation of both in a definite isolation of the soul. This separation means that any pain which affects the inner organ has ceased to throw its reflex upon the soul, or, to use another expression, that the organ affected by pain is no longer illuminated by the light of the soul, by consciousness. The soul continues in its state of deliverance as an individual being, but it exists in a state of absolute unconsciousness. Doubts as to the possibility of such a state are refuted by calling attention to such conditions as dreamless sleep, coma, or trance, in brief, all states in which consciousness disappears; the main difference between these states and deliverance being that they still contain the germ of being bound to material existence, which does not obtain in deliverance.

In the Introduction Professor Garbe puts forward a theory of the un-Vedic origin of the Sâmkhya philosophy: not only because Kapila's doctrine was heretical and contradictory to the Vedas, and unknown in the Vedas, but also because none of its fundamental tenets are found in the Vedas. These tenets are the absolute disparity of the spiritual and material principles, the multiplicity of souls, the independence and eternity of matter, the view that matter consists of three constituents, the sat

tvas, or goodness, the rajas, or badness, and the tamas, or indifference; the unfoldment of the world from primitive matter; the conception that first the psychical organs and then the outer objects originate; the trinity of the psychical organs, the twenty-five principles, the doctrine of the sublimate elements, and the inner body of the dispositions or samskaras; the conception of psychical processes as primarily purely mechanical, and only raised into consciousness by the spiritual power of the soul; the denial of the existence of God, and finally the proposition that deliverance is possible only by distinguishing spirit and matter. None of these ideas, Professor Garbe states, can be found in the Brahmaṇas and in the Âranyakas. These, in brief, are his arguments to substantiate his claim of an un-Vedic origin of the Sâmkhya philosophy. His arguments, however, do not appear to us sufficient, for how often do new ideas originate by contrast, by combination, or through the suggestion of the untenability of the prevalent ideas. Thus, Kant's philosophy has, as we most positively know, its roots in Wolf and Hume. Nevertheless, if we enumerate Kant's fundamental doctrines we shall find none of them in the works of those philosophers from the study of which he received the strongest impulse to their formation. Thus, in the face of the facts enumerated by Professor Garbe, we still regard a Vedic origin of the Sâmkhya philosophy as possible, and if it were not so the mystery of its origin would be greater than before. For, not knowing at that time any higher civilisation than that of the Brahmans, how shall we account for the origin of this original and most independent philosophy of ancient India among those foreign invaders? Whatever be the truth regarding the home and origin of the Sâmkhya philosophy, it remains the most thoughtful dualistic system of India, and, apart from shortcomings due to the lack of natural science, perhaps of the whole world. The present volume is unquestionably a very scholarly and reliable exposition, and, as such, an indispensable handbook for students of Indian lore, and especially for those who are interested in the origin and development of Buddhism. кps.

RELIGION INNERHALB DER GRENZEN DER HUMANITÄT. Ein Kapitel zur Grundlegung der Sozialpädagogik. By Paul Natorp. Freiburg and Leipsic: F. E. B、 Mohr. 1894. Pp. 119.

The title of this booklet is apparently modelled after that of Kant's Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der reinen Vernunft. Prof. Natorp, accordingly, has the same enemies to contend with as did the sage of Königsberg; on the one side those to whom religion is higher than all understanding, and on the other hand those to whom humanity is too high an ideal to be identified with religion—an extramundane Utopia. The author states in the Preface that it is his proposition to conciliate both antagonists, trusting that religion should be applied to practical life, especially to the social problem. A radical question demands a radical answer; in a word, it demands a scientific method. The Open Court Publishing Company was founded for the purpose of establishing the Religion of Science, and so of reconciling religion with science by applying the religious enthusiasm to the practical problems of life and

solving its theoretical problems by the method of scientific inquiry. Therefore, we need not say that the enterprise of Professor Natorp finds our full sympathy, and we hope that his work will prove good seed bringing forth in time much fruit.

Like Kant, Professor Natorp contends that the laying of the religious conflict cannot be decided by an appeal to traditional authority or to sentiments and pious instincts. The is and the ought are in conflict, but our sentiment imperatively demands a solution of the conflict. It would be sad if there were an impervious abyss between willing and doing, between duty and action. We must have the faith for achieving that which is required. By faith Professor Natorp understands not the vague idea of belief, but staunch confidence, the firm trust that this demand is for every man, to a certain degree at least, realisable. Accordingly, he proposes to raise all mankind to the height of humanity, to educate the people, that is, the mass of the laboring classes, to the highest attainable stage of a scientific, moral and æsthetic civilisation, in the consciousness of their social relations, or, as our author expresses it in Gemeinschaft, durch Gemeinschaft, als Gemeinschaft. His religion will not be dogmatical, but an aspiration to attain the ideal of humanity. The ideal of humanity to be recognised by a more and more complete investigation of the truth. He says on page 105:

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'Often it has been said that a non-dogmatic religious investigation is impos"sible, but I do not know on what grounds. The child takes the religious tales "simply as history, not in a scientific but in a naïve sense. He is first kept busy in "acquiring its contents and has no time to reflect whether the events really took "place and are to be understood literally. Supposing that everything is clear and "natural—the child-imaginations of mankind are always comprehensible and vivid "to a child's imagination-supposing again, that the moral is not crude and of"fensively intrusive, but steals into the soul on the quiet and sure path of imagi"nation and sentiment without provoking reflexions: the question will not rise at "once, Is the story true indeed, or is it only a beautiful fairy tale? Should, how"ever, the question arise,—and certainly the stage will come where a child will "either propose it himself or in case it be proposed understand its deep importance "-then let the teacher say clearly and definitely: it has been handed down thus by "tradition and received bona fide. Many thousands have been convinced and find "happiness in this conviction; perhaps the teacher himself, but he ought to add there "are many faithful people who are not thus convinced. No doctrine concerning "these things has any right to demand of you the conviction that it is literally true. "You will have to decide independently for yourself as soon as you have learned "many more things whether or not you will accept it. Then, however, as the main "thing the teacher should reveal the great moral truth which is contained in the "story, and should make it as impressive as possible. There are a great number of "educators, and they not the worst, who would be happy to be allowed to teach re"ligion in this way."

Professor Natorp proposes this method not for the higher schools or universi

ties, but for the schools of the people, of the children of laborers. He demands, first, history of religion, expounded in a strictly objective way, as all history ought to be treated, and then an explanation of the foundations of religion which are given in the nature of man, in the laws of his consciousness of his moral and social being. It will produce an unprejudiced appreciation of religion as one of the most potent factors in the education of mankind. This method would resume, as says Professor Natorp (page 107), the good traditions of the German Aufklärung, which should never have been abandoned. Prof. Natorp's work unites with high ideals of reform, the conservatism of the serious philosophical inquirer.

κος.

THE APOLOGY AND ACTS OF APOLLONIUS AND OTHER MONUMENTS OF EARLY CHRIS-
TIANITY. Edited with a General Preface, Introductions, Notes, etc., by

F. C. Conybeare, M.A., Late Fellow of University College, Oxford. London:
Swan Sonnenschein & Co. New York: Macmillan & Co. 1894. Pp. 360.
Price $3.50.

The Acts which form the contents of this work are translations of ancient Armenian texts selected from a repertory of martyrdoms published at the Armenian monastery of San Lazaro, in Venice, in the year 1874. It is their object to give the reader, "in a succession of vivid pictures or glimpses, an insight into the practical working of Christianity during the first three centuries of its history." It is known that the documents of early Christianity were continually being altered and recast to suit every fresh development or change in the views of the orthodox and heretical believers. Such changes were made regularly in the Latin, Greek, and Syriac versions, but not so much so in the Armenian versions, which accordingly often give us access to a more primitive form of Christian writing than has survived in Greek, Syriac, or Latin.

Highly interesting is the knowledge these Acts afford us of the character of early Christianity. All relate to martyrdoms. We must not suppose that the highest temper of the new religion was displayed there, but must expect simply a life-picture of the times, sketches of the battle for freedom of individual conscience and private judgment as opposed to the tyranny of a despotic government and the superstitions of the people. We see here clearly, also, the attitude of the government to the new sect. "From the time of Domitian, if not at a still earlier date," says Mr. Conybeare, "the very name of Christian exposed a person to the penalty of death." We also get a glimpse of the pagan elements which still survive in the conceptions of the converts. Nothing could be more untrue than to suppose that conversion to the religion of Christ signified and brought with it a disbelief in the gods of paganism. "A convert continued to believe in the gods as firmly as before; the only difference was that he now came to regard them not as benevolent beings but as malevolent ones They were the fallen angels, ministers of Satan, lying in wait to destroy men, and often for that end taking up their abode in and disguising their natural foulness

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under the most beautiful statues." Even in Justin Martyr, and in Augustine we meet with these views, and we are not astonished, therefore, to find that the Christian saints resorted to exorcism against the gods of the heathen. Further, this view led to iconoclasm, another general characteristic of the early Christians. "The obvi"ous way of scotching a foul demon was to smash his idols; and we find that an enormous number of martyrs earned their crown in this manner, especially in the 'third century, when their rapidly increasing numbers rendered them bolder and "more ready to make a display of their intolerance. . . . The most popular of the "saints were those who had resorted to such violence and earned their death by it; "and as soon as Christianity fairly got the upper hand in the fourth century, the "wrecking of temples and the smashing of the idols of the demons became a most "popular amusement with which to grace a Christian festival. As we turn over "the pages of the martyrologies, we wonder that any ancient statues at all escaped those senseless outbursts of zealotry."

We find also in many of these martyrdoms that the creeds of the saints are simpler than in the third century Acts, showing a distinct growth of doctrine; and also, contrary to the professions of many modern divines, that all the saints believed in the eternal fires of hell,‚—a belief which Christianity took over from paganism. Without the dread of death and the belief in the eternal fire of hell which pervaded the minds of all the ancient peoples, it is probable that Christianity would not have made much advance towards the conquest of men's minds.

Interesting is it also to note how the ancient myths remained gathered around the early saints. Callistratus is borne to the shore by dolphins like Amphion, and saints innumerable began their careers by destroying a dragon like Perseus, or like Hercules a voracious lion, or like Theseus a destructive bull. "A rich harvest awaits any student of folk-lore who approaches the legends of the saints from this point of view." It is also to be stated that the early Christians did not renounce the world as much as is usually supposed from some classical examples of detachment from mundane interests. We find, too, that the asceticism of the earliest followers of Jesus and Paul was due to the conviction that the end of the world was at hand; the millennium belief still survived in some remote regions, as in Syria and in Pontus. We see, thus, that Jesus's repudiation of marriage like the companion precept to possess no riches, was originally meant to prepare men for the kingdom of heaven which was at hand, and we discover why it is that the belief in the superior holiness of virgins survives in the church.

Such are a few of the inferences concerning early Christianity that may be drawn from this work. Of all the Apocrypha here translated, the most beautiful is the Acts of Paul and Thekla, which are full of humane touches. But every one of the Acts of this collection is well worth reading by persons who have the least interest in this subject. It is unnecessary to say that Mr. Conybeare's translation is forcible and idiomatic.

μικρκ.