ESSAY

ON

External Perception.

BY J. FEARN, ESQ.

AUTHOR OF

A Review of First Principles of Bishop Berkeley, Dr. Reid, and Professor Stewart.

Also, An Essay on Consciousness.

ESSAY,

&c. &c.

PROP. I. All knowledge of the external World is by intellect; not by sense.

PERHAPS few processes of mental operation have gained the assent of opposite metaphysical schools more generally, than that of perceiving external things by the senses. Agreeably with this, we find those who are scrupulous to maintain a scientific division of phenomena,-into those of sense-and those of consciousness, nevertheless fall into the common usage, and treat the things of the external world, as objects of sense. Nor do these leave us any room to suppose this an indirect phraseology. On the contrary, we have a well defined doctrine, that perception of external things is original or instinctive ;-and, especially,-that "it is not the effect of reasoning."

Now if this doctrine (which is no more than a mere statement of what men feel during the fuct) were true, so as that experience could not lead to detection of its fallacy, it must follow, that in such perceptions the mind is as inert a receptacle of external impressions, as the grossest materialist can imagine it to be. But we may safely rest, that the contrary is proved by a host of evidences.

Besides what happens to blind men on receiving their sight; and the known exercise of our judgment in ordinary cases of perception; it is admitted, by the Theorists herein opposed, that no single sensation could ever afford us any notion of its external cause; and therefore it must be admitted, that a million of sensations (without any exercise of reason) would furnish no more knowledge of their causes, than one sensation. But our earliest impulses, as well as subsequent ones, strongly excite the exercise of intellect and the changes we suffer,-the cross evidence of the different senses, and, above all, the observed motions of things, lead us first to judge, and then to judge quickly, that their causes are external. Thus, before infancy is past, we become such adepts at knowing things by intellect, upon sensation, that the sensual perception of figure-and the added intellectual conception of externality-become identified, in feeling, as one simple fact: And it is only by referring to other facts, wherein percep tion of figure stands alone, that we can demonstrate the contrary, and prove beyond dispute, that there is no necessary connexion between perceived figures and conceptions of externalty :—far less is the perceived figure, itself, the external thing.

What a noble view of the Mind does this consideration afford us?Those, in general, who have rated man at the highest, have been content to claim for intellect its own internal world; and have thought it much to maintain, that perception of moral truth is by reason, and not by sense.-But the great and glorious truth is, that not only moral truth, but physical truth also—Or the discovery and intercourse of the external world, is part of the province of intellect.-Seventy years of successive sensations (with out reason) would leave us as ignorant of these, as it found us.

Nothing can be more fatal, than this, to the Hypothesis which resolves all our knowledge into sensation: but, at the same time, nothing can be more fatal to the doctrine of instinctive perception.— Now, being habitually engaged in such inquiries, I feel a responsibility to point at such facts as must be allowed to be plain and demonstrative evidences of the distinct operation, and general province, of intellect, in perceiving the things which surround us.

In the next section we will enter upon the process itself; but previously to this, I must beg to observe, as explanatory of my

ultimate view, that I have in the "Essay on Consciousness" offered arguments, which I humbly trust are conclusive, that the brain cannot for a moment be supposed either to perform the functions of mind, or even any thing like those functions which Dr. Hartley has ingeniously attributed to it, as mental operations. I have indeed, in the same Essay, offered a very different conjecture; and whatever is its complexion, I hope it is at least satisfactory against the supposition of a cerebral percipient.-I confess farther, though it is great presumption, that I am even willing to hope its general principle may be found the natural barrier against the doctrine of materialism: a hope which absorbs my care as to any particular faults it may appear to have, in the eyes of those who may honor it with their criticism.

I consider the evidences of a distinct mind to be so various, and satisfactory, that they must remove every doubt if we but advance to examine them in the only way that sound sense, or philosophy, can allow; instead of shrinking for fear that truth may conduct us to the enemy's post. But one thing is certain, that if we do thus shrink, say what else we can, the doctrine of materialism will advance and any other doctrine, which does but shut our eyes upon the danger, will not prevent its progress.

That men will at once abandon opinions in which they have long been confirmed, is not in ordinary to be expected; but they must yield when they themselves refute them: and let it not here be forgot, that besides the proofs now about to be brought, the foregoing sections have pointed out so very conspicuous a counter evidence in the doctrine of total non-resemblance as admits no relief, but amounts to a complete suicide; and which, without any other evidence, would decide the question. I, of course, think no evidence against Dr. Reid's theory can be thought more strong than his own but such is the magnitude of the subject, that number, and variety, of evidences must still be deeply interesting. Hence we proceed,

PROP. II. We perceive superficial figure strictly with the sensation that betrays it; and to it we habitually add, a wrong belief that it is external.

Perhaps the most important question in philosophy is,-how we get the knowledge of extension and figure, simply considered. It is sufficiently known, that what has been called the common theory of perception, which, under varieties, was generally maintained from the early ages down to that of Bishop Berkeley, supposed that the figures we perceive by sense, are some sort of intermediate beings, existing and operating between the mind and external bodies. This scheme, therefore, left the existence of external bodies at best but conjectural, and open to objection.-It is also known that Berkeley having, in his own conception, confounded perceived figure with the sensation that betrays it to us, therefore deemed all figures mere ideal things; and thus insisted on the non-existence of an extended world.-The philosopher Hume, equally confounding forms with feelings, went on, with a characteristic acuteness, and independence in thinking, to show, that the principles maintained by both Berkeley and himself, lead to the annihilation of minds, as well as of bodies. Thus, through all recorded time, mankind have had no better philosophical ground to rest upon, than what is built upon doubt.

To Dr. Reid the world stands indebted, for having attacked the fabric of Berkeleian errors, in asserting the difference between feelings and the forms they betray to us.-In so doing, he exploded the only ground upon which the dismal conclusions of both Berkeley and Hume are built, and restored to us our wonted state of doubt but it is freely confessed, that he has left the existence of the external world, as it always was, open to the cavils of scepticism. It will, doubtless, appear very presumptuous to say, that more might have been done; but at all risks I am compelled to think, that he turned off at the next step to a mighty truth; which, also, I suppose nothing could have hid from him, except that previous bias which prevented his discerning, that perception of extension is a primary fact.