398 U.S. June 1, 1970 FOLLETTE, WARDEN v. COMACHO ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT No. 1394. Decided June 1, 1970 Certiorari granted; 421 F. 2d 822, vacated and remanded. PER CURIAM. The motion of the respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. HIGGINS v. UNITED STATES ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT No. 1183, Misc. Decided June 1, 1970 Certiorari granted; 416 F. 2d 406, vacated and remanded. PER CURIAM. The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U. S. 295. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. LEITCHFIELD MANUFACTURING CO., INC., ET AL. v. UNITED STATES ET AL. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY No. 1426. Decided June 1, 1970 Vacated and remanded. PER CURIAM. The judgment of the District Court is vacated and the case is remanded to that court for redetermination upon the basis of the record of the Interstate Commerce Commission proceedings. MR. JUSTICE BLACK would note probable jurisdiction and set the case for argument. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE HARLAN Would affirm. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or disposition of this case. Syllabus ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD CO. v. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 477. Argued March 2-3, 1970-Decided June 8, 1970 As part of its dispute with the Florida East Coast railroad (FEC) respondent Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE) in 1967 began picketing a switching yard owned and operated by Atlantic Coast Line railroad (ACL). ACL's request for an injunction to halt the picketing was denied by the Federal District Court, which held that the BLE was "free to engage in self-help," and that the Norris-LaGuardia Act and § 20 of the Clayton Act were applicable. ACL then obtained an injunction from a Florida court. After the decision in Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U. S. 369 (1969), holding that unions had a federally protected right to picket the terminal without interference by state court injunctions, respondent union moved in state court to dissolve the injunction, but the state judge held that Jacksonville Terminal was not controlling and denied the motion. The union then returned to the District Court and requested an injunction against the enforcement of the state injunction, which the District Court granted. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The union contends that the federal injunction was proper under 28 U. S. C. § 2283 either "to protect or effectuate" the District Court's 1967 denial of an injunction, or as "necessary in aid of" that court's jurisdiction. Held: The federal injunction was not justified under the exceptions in § 2283 and thus was improperly issued in this case. Pp. 285-297. (a) A federal injunction against state court proceedings otherwise proper under general equitable principles must be based on one of the specific statutory exceptions to § 2283. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U. S. 511, 515–516. Pp. 286-287. (b) The District Court's determination in 1967 that the union had a right to "engage in self-help" under federal law, was not a decision that federal law precluded an injunction based on state law. Pp. 289-291. Opinion of the Court 398 U.S. (c) In 1969 the union in effect was attempting to get the District Court to decide that the state court erred in distinguishing Jacksonville Terminal, but such attempt to seek federal appellate review of a state decision cannot be justified as necessary "to protect or effectuate" the 1967 order. Pp. 291-293. (d) Since the state and federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction in this case neither court could prevent a party from simultaneously pursuing claims in both courts, and an injunction was not "necessary in aid of" the District Court's jurisdiction because the state court may have acted improperly in light of Jacksonville Terminal, as the state court's assumption of jurisdiction over the state law claims did not hinder the federal court's jurisdiction. Pp. 294-296. (e) While the union cannot obtain direct review of the state court decision in the lower federal courts, it can, if adversely affected by the decision or if faced with immediate irreparable injury, seek relief in the Florida appellate courts, and possibly in this Court. P. 296. Reversed and remanded. Dennis G. Lyons and Frank X. Friedmann, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were David M. Foster, John W. Weldon, and John S. Cox. Allan Milledge argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Richard L. Horn. MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. Congress in 1793, shortly after the American Colonies became one united Nation, provided that in federal courts "a writ of injunction [shall not] be granted to stay proceedings in any court of a state." Act of March 2, 1793, § 5, 1 Stat. 335. Although certain exceptions to this general prohibition have been added, that statute, directing that state courts shall remain free from interference by federal courts, has remained in effect until this time. Today that amended statute provides: "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court ex 281 Opinion of the Court cept as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U. S. C. § 2283. Despite the existence of this longstanding prohibition, in this case a federal court did enjoin the petitioner, Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. (ACL),1 from invoking an injunction issued by a Florida state court which prohibited certain picketing by respondent Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE). The case arose in the following way. In 1967 BLE began picketing the Moncrief Yard, a switching yard located near Jacksonville, Florida, and wholly owned and operated by ACL.2 As soon as this picketing began ACL went into federal court seeking an injunction. When the federal judge denied the request, ACL immediately went into state court and there succeeded in obtaining an injunction. No further legal action was taken in this dispute until two years later in 1969, after this Court's decision in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 1 After this suit was instituted ACL merged with the Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co. to form the present Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co. We will continue, as have the parties, to refer to the petitioner as ACL. 2 There is no present labor dispute between the ACL and the BLE or any other ACL employees. ACL became involved in this case as a result of a labor dispute between the Florida East Coast Railway Co. (FEC) and its employees. FEC cars are hauled into and out of Moncrief Yard and switched around to make up trains in that yard. The BLE picketed the yard, encouraging ACL employees not to handle any FEC cars. The initial development of the controversy is chronicled in Railway Clerks v. Florida E. C. R. Co., 384 U. S. 238 (1966). See also, Railroad Trainmen v. Atlantic C. L. R. Co., 362 F. 2d 649 (C. A. 5th Cir.), aff'd by an equally divided court, 385 U. S. 20 (1966); Florida E. C. R. Co. v. Railroad Trainmen, 336 F. 2d 172 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1964). |