DOUGLAS, J., dissenting

398 U.S.

matter how the predatory scheme is effectuated, whether one acquires the other or vice versa. On the facts here tendered, a case has been made out for making General Host and Greyhound parties and having a hearing to determine whether they or either of them has interfered with the decree. The question is not whether, as a de novo matter, the combination of either with Armour constitutes a violation of the Act. The issue whether General Host or Greyhound has interfered with the decree is a narrower one. If they and Armour had designed this scheme to avoid the decree, interference would be rather obvious. Why does it matter that General Host or Greyhound, acting without the connivance of Armour, achieves the same result unilaterally? A federal court has inherent power to prevent obstruction of its authority by acts of "force, guile, or otherwise," whether or not the person charged was or was not a party defendant. See Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 1, aff'd sub nom. Osbourne v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 389 U. S. 579. For it is an historic equity principle that even a nonparty is bound "not to interfere with, and not to obstruct, the course of justice," or treat a court order as "unworthy of notice." See Seaward v. Paterson, [1897] 1 Ch. 545, 554. Cf. Rule 65 (d), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

I would not dismiss the case as moot. Rather, I would remand it to the District Court for a full hearing on the issue of interference.

Syllabus

WYMAN, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SERVICES OF NEW YORK, ET AL. v. ROTHSTEIN ET AL.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

No. 896. Argued April 27-28, 1970-
Decided June 1, 1970

Appellees brought this suit challenging on equal protection and statutory grounds the disparity between payments under the state welfare law made to recipients in New York City and those made to recipients in certain suburban counties. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction, having found the disparity violative of equal protection. Held: In the light of the subsequently decided case of Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, the District Court should have the opportunity to pass on the propriety of granting interim relief on the basis of appellees' statutory claims or, if the question is reached, continuing the present injunction in light of the Court's decision in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471.

303 F. Supp. 339, vacated and remanded.

Philip Weinberg argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General, and Amy Juviler, Assistant Attorney General.

Edward V. Sparer argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Carl Rachlin and Norman Lichtenstein.

Peter L. Strauss argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold and Assistant Attor

ney General Ruckelshaus. Morris H. Schneider filed a brief for the Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.

PER CURIAM.

Appellees commenced this action in the federal District Court for the Southern District of New York challenging on equal protection and statutory grounds § 131-a of the New York Social Services Law which provides for payments to welfare recipients in Nassau, Suffolk, and certain other New York State counties in lesser amounts than provided for residents of New York City should the Welfare Administrator determine that adequate cause exists for the differential. A three-judge court was convened and it found that appellees' likelihood of success on their constitutional claim warranted the issuance of a preliminary injunction against what it found to be the payment of welfare in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found it unnecessary to consider appellees' statutory claims. We noted probable jurisdiction. 397 U. S. 903.

Subsequent to the decision of the District Court this Court rendered its decision in Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, wherein we held that a federal court called upon to pass upon the constitutional validity of a State's welfare program should, before reaching the constitutional issues, consider first any pendent statutory claims that are presented, notwithstanding the pendency of negotiations between the State and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

In light of the foregoing, the judgment of the District Court is vacated and the case is remanded to that court for an opportunity to pass on the propriety of granting interim relief in accordance with conventional equitable principles on the basis of appellees' statutory claims, or,

275

BLACK, J., dissenting

if the question is reached, continuing the present injunction in light of this Court's decision in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471.

It is so ordered.

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the decision of this case.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, dissenting.

When this action was commenced by appellees, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare was in the process of determining if the New York welfare provisions under attack in this case are consistent with the federal standard requiring uniform statewide application of state welfare plans. See Social Security Act § 402, as amended, 81 Stat. 877 et seq., 42 U. S. C. § 602 (1964 ed., Supp. IV); 45 CFR § 233.20. Although the federal agency has not yet made a final decision, it appears from the brief submitted by the United States as amicus curiae that HEW has made a preliminary determination that the New York provisions do not conform to the Social Security Act's requirements. Accordingly, the statutory claim which this Court today remands to the District Court for its consideration involves a live controversy between New York and the Federal Government, and, as I said in my dissenting opinion in Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, 430 (1970), it is my belief that such controversies should be resolved in proceedings between the two governments involved, as provided in the Social Security Act. See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. §§ 602, 1316 (1964 ed., Supp. IV). For this reason, I would vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand with directions that the complaint be dismissed.

Per Curiam

398 U.S.

BLOSS ET AL. v. DYKEMA

V.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN

No. 1347. Decided June 1, 1970

Certiorari granted; judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals, 17 Mich. App. 318, 169 N. W. 2d 367, reversed.

PER CURIAM.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals is reversed. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE WHITE are of the opinion that certiorari should be denied.

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting.

I would affirm the judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals upon principles heretofore often expressed by me. See my opinions in Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 496 (1957); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 203 (1964); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413, 455 (1966). From the standpoint of what I regard as the permissible exercise of state power in this field, the materials in this case fall far short of the "borderline" movie involved in Cain v. Kentucky (reversed summarily), 397 U. S. 319 (1970), see my dissent in that case, and I am at a loss to understand how these materials can be deemed to qualify for Redrup treatment when only a short time ago the Court declined to accord that treatment to the materials involved in Spicer v. New York, cert. denied, 397 U. S. 1042.