Imagine the terror of the old authorities at the flash of his cimiter in Ferree v. The Commonwealth, 8 Serg. & Rawle: "For myself, I shall never consent to give effect to a claim by the husband, or those in his stead, to what was at any time the wife's real estate, where it is possible to defeat it by any construction, however forced !" Where is the limit to the possibilities of forced construction? Where is the wisdom of a crotchet, that would tie the hands of all womankind, because a few of them are thought not to have wills of their own?

With a certain description of juries, and by similar intuition of all that bore upon his case, Edward Tilghman was nearly irresistible. He talked to the panel as if he was one of them; as if he was opening to his brethren the path in which they had to walk with him in the discharge of a duty, that was a duty of conscience equally to them and to himself. This of course implies that he knew his jury would understand him, and that he thought his case would bear any quantity of sifting. If he thought either the jury or his cause in fault, he threw nothing away upon either, and reserved himself for a better occasion. But, at all times, his sense and shrewdness, occasional pleasantry, and constant air of sincerity, made it delightful to listen to him. He never condescended to propitiate a dishonest prejudice, rarely a prejudice of any kind. He would laugh at it, and sometimes give it a touch of the whip; but he never

coaxed it or wheedled it, or set up a counter prejudice to contend with it. Some of this may at times be proper, but it was not his way. If he thought his cause a good one, and the tribunal an intelligent one, he walked to victory with the most easy and assured step possible. In such a case, before Judge Washington, I heard him once say at the conclusion of his argument, when a colleague was to follow him, "I have now finished what I had to say in the case, and I will let my colleague lose it if he can ;" and this he said without the least vanity or triumph, but as if he was merely giving a voice to what others had thought before he was done.

But we must not infer, from this account of him, that the knowledge of remainders and executory devises, came to him, or comes to any man, by inspiration. He worked hard for 'what he knew, and began early. I have read those note-books, recording his attendance in Westminster Hall, from 1772 to the beginning of 1774; and there, at his age of twentytwo, I have seen, as any one may, the seeds and plants which grew up into that marvellous intuition. The books are in the form of receipt books, with clasps at the end, of a size to be easily carried in the hand, Law being recorded at one end, and Equity at the other; and are full, it would seem, of all the cases of importance which had been argued in his time. They note the points or questions-the name of the counsel

who argued a summary of their arguments and authorities—the dicta of the Judges, and the opinion of the Court, sometimes abbreviated almost into short hand, half a word, and frequently the initial and final letters being made to stand for a word, connectives being omitted where they could be implied; and there is, in some instances, an authority or a remark of his own, interlined, showing that he had taken the notes in Court, perhaps on his knee, and had conned them over in private, especially such as involved great principles, like Goodright v. Patch, where Lord Mansfield explained his opinion in Wigfall v. Bryden, and perhaps damaged that case a little, and in Doe v. Burville, a case of cross-remainders, Campbell v. Power, and other cases, bearing on Mr. Tilghman's favorite subject. His accuracy of language, and perspicuity, are remarkable throughout. In one case, Morgan v. Jones, he says: "Upon what legal grounds Lord Mansfield founded his opinion, in what particular way he effectuated the intention, and according to what rules, I could not understand, being in a crowd and at a distance. However, this I heard him say plainly: 'Tis now settled that marriage and having children is a revocation of a will of land."" His constancy in attending the arguments and judgments in the several Courts-for his note-books report the cases in the King's Bench, Common Pleas, High Court of Chancery, and, in a few instances, the sittings before

Lord Mansfield-is remarkable; and the precision of his abbreviated words, in noticing what fell from counsel or Court, much of which was technical and abstruse, was striking, at his age, and shows him to have been not only a vigilant, but a most intelligent, student; and, as he followed his profession with ardor, it is not difficult to understand the cause of that "intuition" of which Judge Duncan spoke. There was so much in his own mind to behold, and he had looked upon it so frequently and habitually, in at least the great department of estates and tenures, that his quickness and certainty were like those of the eye when it takes in a landscape or a picture.

Besides the labor and attention which his notebooks imply, they also bear frequent traces of the same pleasant sparkle which so often twinkled like a star in the face of our own Bar and Court.

It is probable that Lord Mansfield maintained great dignity on the Bench, and delivered himself with some formality and elegance, more, on occasions, than the juniors thought necessary. One of the note-books has this note: "1773, May 21. Lord Mansfield. ‘I will not give judgment to-day, but on Monday.' N.B. Lord Mansfield said this with usual perspicuity and emphasis."

Again. "King's Bench. Thursday, 7 Feb. 1774. Campbell v. Hall, Esquire. Special verdict. Lord Mansfield. What a farrago Sir John gave us yesterday!'-meaning Sir John Dalrymple, in the matter of

Literary Property. Sir Richard Aston. 'Strange stuff! His criticism upon "no longer" was against him.' Lord Mansfield. 'Sad stuff, Sir Richard! This will prove sad stuff." "

Again. In this instance the words are given with Mr. Tilghman's abbreviations:

"Indt. sp. conts. wds. of J. of P. in Ex. of Off. Objt. not suff'y certain. Rex v. Barr."

“Burland. 'Where only one time in Indt. v. and a. must rel. to that. Adt. and ibid. verbt. in Indt. stds. for both stroke and asst. Hawks. Hale.'

was a Justice

on 6th June, and that a petty sess'n was held before him and an'r, and deft. then and there spoke the words, 'you don't do justice." "

66

was a

Serg. Davy. I wont trouble your Lds. with a wd. from Hale or Sergt. Hawkins, but I believe a word or two from Sergt. Davy will do. Indt. is, Justice before 6th June, and ever since has been. Ergo, if then and there refers to the 6th June, he must have spoke the words "before and ever since."' “Ld. M. ‘'Tis a flat objection.'

A Mr. Morgan, a barrister of that day, is well known to have acquired the sobriquet of Frog Morgan, from his manner of citing Cro. Eliz., Cro. Jac., Cro. Car., as Croak Elizabeth, &c., and not Crook. His voice probably assisted to nick the name. Mr. Tilghman never omits to give him a fling.