To obtain the scientific comprehension of a unit as highly evolved as a human being, it does not suffice to sum up all that one knows concerning each one of the systems of which it is composed; its total reactions must be explored in themselves; they determine the attitude of the individual with regard to his surroundings, to the medium in which he is situated. And it is certainly in psychological terms that science can best and most intelligibly give an account of it. But according to Meyer—and we must insist upon this point-psychology has not to consider so-called isolated facts of consciousness, these acquiring their significance and their value just in proportion to the part they play in the associative system that constitutes an individual. How can one define the part played by the facts of consciousness? What is their biological importance?

To answer this question Meyer resorts to the notion of symbolisation1. Activities known as mental are made manifest by means of signs or symbols, which represent (in the form of perceptions, memories, ideas, images, projects, etc.) certain facts, thus permitting of conduct better adjusted to circumstances and nearer perfection than that depending upon simple reflex action. Able to utilise by means of symbols the data of the past as well as those of the present, to project his aims and aspirations into the future, to place fancy and reality on the same plane, the creature endowed with 'conscious' life has thus at his disposal a marvellous tool for adaptation and economy, a tool affording him the same facilities that the symbols of algebra and logarithms give the mathematician, at the same time constantly disclosing new possibilities to him.

It is apparent that this point of view with regard to the phenomena of consciousness is above all functional. Mental life cannot be conceived of independently of the organism in the existence of which it exercises. a vital function, useful and necessary. That is why Meyer prefers to substitute for the short and simple term of psychology, that of psychobiology. He also objects to the tendency to accentuate in the name of a misunderstood conception of the principle of parallelism, the idea of an absolute rift between two series of facts, the physical and the mental; which tendency has in turn given rise to another, quite as detrimental to science, and which consists in an effort to place all facts exclusively in one of these two arbitrarily created series, thus falling into a sort of monism, idealistic or materialistic, which no longer corresponds to the complexity of the phenomena observed. When it comes to reactions

1 Ad. Meyer. "Misconceptions at the bottom of 'hopelessness of all psychology,'” Psychological Bulletin, 1907, iv, 178. And: "Inter-relations...." Loc. cit. p. 115.

of a psycho-biological level there is no advantage in reducing them to a one-sided and simplifying formula. In nature these reactions are completely integrated, although the theories concerning the organic basis or the histological conditions of the facts of consciousness are absolutely inadequate1.

Giving up the traditional idea of the contrast between the physical and the mental, Meyer simply recognises modes of reaction. Here too a sort of hierarchy may be established, for these reactions may occur on one of the three levels of complexity denominated vegetative, reflex or psycho-biological, according as they imply the action of visceral organs, of the nervous system or of the complete personality forming a whole. Other American psychiatrists, like Campbell and Kirby, adopt the same point of view, well summed up in this sentence from the Text-book of Neurology and Psychiatry of Jelliffe and White, quoted by Meyer: “The hormone is the type of tool at the physico-chemical level, the reflex at the sensori-motor level, and finally the symbol at the psychic level2." The aim and object of psychiatry being the study of the disorders in the behaviour of the individual-the defective reactions which occur, according to the accepted term, at his level of superior complexity or of total integration-it follows that psychiatry is above all based upon psychology and cannot do without it3.

The medical psychology extolled by Meyer and indispensable to psychiatry differs somewhat from the old classical psychology. It is not based upon philosophical considerations and is not limited to a merely descriptive study of the states of consciousness or of the "faculties of the soul" arbitrarily isolated. Neither is it confined to ingenious laboratory problems to be solved by means of some instrument of precision. Every bit of this is necessary but insufficient; for mental life, inasmuch as it is an object of investigation, must not be deprived of its functional character. Its manifestations always take the form of activities, of behaviours, of more or less complex reactions, which have a biological importance and which cannot be well understood outside of the natural setting in which they occur. These reactions, shaped by previous events and by surroundings, in turn give a particular bent to the ulterior course of the individual's existence. That is why any 1 Ad. Meyer. "Misconceptions...." Loc. cit. p. 179.

2 Ad. Meyer. "Inter-relations...." Loc. cit. p. 115.

3 The position of Meyer is best illustrated by the fact that he devotes his course of introduction to psycho-biology to the practical work of a personality study, the student working out a study of himself and of the three most contrasting fellow-students. In other words, Meyer proposes to study objective facts and the dynamics of the individual make-up.

methodical investigation in this connection must accumulate real facts, find out all about the particular circumstances in the midst of which the subject happened to be, analyse the influences he was subjected to from childhood and which may have fashioned his way of responding, give an exact account of the manner in which he met the obstacles with which he had to cope. This represents a succession of events which must be reconstituted in their concrete reality in order to discover the resources and the weaknesses of the said individual and be prepared to correct, as far as it is possible to do so, his faulty adaptations.

This conception leaves very little room for a belief in 'constitutional fatality.' By recognising the importance of psychological causes as defined above, this conception approaches that accepted by current opinion. It implies moreover possibilities of modification which would often be excluded a priori in the name of the dogma of innate constitution. "It must be borne in mind," says Meyer, "that psycho-pathology is beginning to assign a definite rôle, not only to the growth, nutrition and possibly extraneous diseases of the brain, but also to those brain conditions which we know and use only as mental states and mental activities in the sense of a dynamic psychology. We are beginning to consider as legitimate material of science what common sense has taught us and the teacher has long used in practice. We want to know the effect of certain activities and reactions on subsequent life, and also whether by modifying mental attitudes and habits we may not be able to avert trouble in the future1."

This thoroughly practical psychology deals therefore with concrete data drawn from the life and the conduct of the individual. Thus defined it is an objective science better qualified to penetrate into the medical world, so often sceptical and still sometimes affected, according to the delightful expression of the eminent psychiatrist of Baltimore, with real 'psycho-phobia.' But it is only fair to admit that this psycho-phobia is in part due to certain faults of the old traditional psychology. In spite of its progress in experimental research, this science has been somewhat wronged by those who have seemed to consider that its only field of investigation should be the purely abstract or subjective states of the soul, instead of insisting upon the functional importance of these states and maintaining the bridge connecting them with the rest of biology. As a result, psychology sometimes acquired in the medical world a reputation of uselessness, whereas it should long since have been

1 Ad. Meyer. "What do histories of cases of insanity teach us concerning preventive mental hygiene during the years of school life?" Psychological Clinic, 1908, II, 90–91.

considered an important part of the programme of study of every future practitioner.

As soon as physicians come upon some abnormal mental reaction they are inclined to give up the attitude of plain common-sense, observes Meyer. They think it would not be scientific to see in these reactions nothing more than ineffective attempts on the part of the patient to adapt himself to surrounding conditions; and instead of discarding their prejudices and analysing the facts relating to the incident in question, "they pass at once to a one-sided consideration of the extra-psychological components of the situation, abandon the ground of controllable observation, translate what they see into a jargon of wholly uncontrollable brain-mythology, and all that with the conviction that this is the only admissible and scientific way1." Now then, in the majority of cases of mental disorders functional facts are the very first to be directly ascertained, and instead of indulging in anatomical hypotheses and juggling with words qualified by Meyer as 'neurologizing tautology,' it would be preferable to remain upon the ground of facts as they occur in reality.

A superficial knowledge of Meyer's doctrine might lead one to believe that he under-estimates the importance of somatic factors, but that is far from being the case. In his hierarchy of the different levels of complexity of an organism, the highest level, characterised by psychological symbols, is placed above the inferior, vegetative and reflex ones, but he does not eliminate these nor can he dispense with them. That is why the study of the non-mental conditions of a psycho-biological reaction is all-important. Practically Meyer makes the very most of the methods of investigation adopted by general medicine and of anatomical data, to the study of which he devotes the most minute attention. But we must never lose sight of the fact that this is not sufficient to explain any mental disorder; the highest level of complexity and the only one at which these mental phenomena occur, is precisely the one which permits of the best adjustment of the individual to the conditions in which he happens to be placed. There lies the main point, the essential part of the problem, which can be handled and expressed in psychological terms only. For this function of adaptation does not depend upon one particular organ of the body, but on the complete integration of the personality and on the influences of the surroundings in which it reached its full development. This is equivalent to saying that no state whether normal or morbid can be qualified as 'inorganic,' if that is 1 Ad. Meyer. "Misconceptions...." Loc. cit. p. 172.

supposed to signify some condition sine materia quite inconceivable in biology. On the other hand, mental states are all functional by definition, in the particular sense that they are made manifest by some disorder or other in the higher functions of the individual-those concerning his social adjustments-whatever may be the part played by the non-mental factors generally, the vegetative and reflex, which must also be taken into account.

If Meyer's medical psychology gives the greatest importance to anatomy and physiology, it also makes the most of all the contributions which introspection yields. What is required is a close scrutiny of deep inner tendencies, to eke out, so to speak, the marks of the moral shocks through the subjective data furnished by the patient. By utilising this last means of exploration Meyer turns away from the over-strict doctrine of the orthodox behaviourists, according to whom in fact one should be concerned with the statements supplied by visible outward things alone, taking no account of the content of the states of consciousness. In Meyer's opinion, it is true, this content is of no importance in itself, but it represents concrete facts with considerable economy thanks to its symbolic capacity mentioned above; thus it helps the individual to adjust himself to real situations and the biological part it plays is of the utmost importance. The knowledge of this content and of all its deviations is therefore indispensable but subordinate, just as all the purely anatomical and physiological notions are for that matter, to a problem of general biology.

To our mind this broadly comprehensive point of view escapes the well-founded objections formulated against the narrow psychology of behaviourism, particularly by MacDougall, Roback, Claparède. Meyer's attitude, on the other hand, does not exclude the purposive character of the mental processes, a character upon which psychologists seem ever more inclined to insist1.

1 See on this subject the reports and discussions, at the last International Congress of Psychology (Oxford, 1923), by Myers, Piéron, Janet, Bovet, Claparède, Reymond, Adler, Head, Mitchell, Meyer, Adrian, Campbell, Jones, Abraham, Hart, et al.