propriety. But, as I have just said, I incline to the view that they are cases of dementia praecox. There are, of course, offenders who are highly intelligent, and who commit offences, having carefully weighed all the risks. But I suppose that no one would suggest that these are moral imbeciles.

To sum up, I am of opinion that discussions on the diagnosis of moral imbecility are futile, because I refuse to recognize the existence of the condition. All the alleged cases of this condition, which have come under my notice, could either be brought under the definition of feeble-mindedness, or else have been cases of definite psychosis, or of mental conflict and repression. I believe that the retention of the definition of moral imbecility is superfluous and misleading. I consider that the idea of moral imbecility involves untenable conceptions. And I consider that the term should be dropped, as simply tending to darken counsel.

THE DEFINITION AND DIAGNOSIS OF
MORAL IMBECILITY (IV)1

By W. REES THOMAS.

THE subject of Moral Imbecility is admittedly a difficult one, mainly because the legal definition given in Section 1 (d) of the Mental Deficiency Act leaves us in some doubt, not as to the type of case it was generally intended to deal with, but as to the meaning of the criteria laid down in the definition.

The Section reads as follows:

Moral Imbeciles; that is to say, persons who from an early age display some permanent mental defect_coupled with strong vicious or criminal propensities on which punishment has had little or no deterrent effect.

'Early age' has given rise to little difficulty especially as the age of 17 has been held to be an 'early age' within the meaning of the Act.

We thus include the period of puberty and early adolescence and on this point I think there is general agreement.

The latter portion of the definition 'criminal propensities on which punishment has had little or no deterrent effect' is entirely a matter of evidence. I take it that it is necessary to include not only legal punishment but also punishment by parents or others in restraint of vicious or criminal conduct.

But the effectiveness of the whole Section turns on the question of 'permanent mental defect.' It is probable that the mental defect is not here intended to be of the same quality as that of 'mental defectiveness' included in the definition of feeble-minded persons. Had it been so then it would not have been necessary to add the fourth class of defective. The mental defectiveness of a feeble-minded person refers particularly to the degree of intelligence and capacity in relation to an assumed normal for the general population, and the defect of intelligence is so pronounced that he requires care, supervision and control for his own protection and for the protection of others; and further, that in the case of a child, that he by reason of such defectiveness appears to be

1 A Paper contributed to the Symposium presented at the Joint Meeting of the Education and Medical Sections of the British Psychological Society, March 8th, 1926.

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permanently incapable of receiving proper benefit from the instruction in ordinary schools.

It seems clear that the definition of a moral imbecile presupposes an undefined 'mental defect' the quality of which differs in some way from that of a feeble-minded person. It is necessary to make this point clear as I find in practice that a large number of cases are certified as moral imbeciles when they could be covered by the terms of the definition of feeble-minded persons.

Of the meaning of the terms 'permanent mental defect' there has been, and still is, very great difference of opinion. The word 'permanent' as here used seems to suggest that it has been used with a purpose. What that purpose may be I am not sure, but it appears to me that it is intended to differentiate between another condition which may be called a 'temporary mental defect.'

There are a number of conditions which might be brought into this category:

(1) The instability of adolescence.

This refers to the restlessness and instability arising during the years of the development of the secondary sexual characters, both physical and psychic, and it appears to differ from certain other psychic disorders only in the degree of the intensity of its signs and symptoms.

(2) Faulty mental attitude and conduct arising from bad environment and training, and which are capable of correction by education and improved surroundings.

(3) Neuroses arising during an early age, and which undergo natural cure or which disappear as the result of treatment. These include e.g. hysteria, anxiety conditions and the obsessional neuroses-kleptomania, etc.

(4) Psychoses of an obvious nature and from which recovery is probable.

Various authors who have written on this subject have always in their differential diagnosis of moral imbecility mentioned some or all of the above and have warned us against mistaking them for true moral imbecility.

The list is not intended to be exhaustive, it is merely set out for its value in suggesting to us the nature of the mental defect we are discussing. It illustrates the point that whatever temporary mental defect may be it certainly is not a defect of intelligence.

None of the conditions given above suggest that the victims have a basis of defective intelligence from which they later recover. We are

usually in the habit of thinking of intelligence as the essential and permanent capacity of an individual for achievement in any direction. It is true of course that a patient suffering from a temporary psychosis may be intellectually clouded, but this is a temporary disorder rather than a defect of intelligence.

If we view the matter from a slightly different angle we may find another help in our attempted interpretation.

It has been said that the essential character of the moral imbecile is the absence of a moral sense and that this constitutes the mental defect. I will discuss the meaning of this latter term at a later stage, but I use it now as I think its application as a popular and non-technical phrase is generally understood.

The presence or absence of a moral sense is extremely difficult to establish especially if it has to be proved apart from the vicious conduct that brings the subject under review.

Instability of an emotional kind and a marked restlessness are often present-but we have to assume these characters from our knowledge of the past rather from the data obtained at the time of examination. Ethical standards vary very greatly and there are as yet no reliable tests within our grasp.

A great deal can be discovered from frequent association with the patients, but except in institutions the physician finds it impossible to give the necessary time. And in testing them we find it impossible to eliminate the purely intellectual element in favour of the affective.

In dealing with the delinquent child our task is easier because in most cases these barriers have not been set up. Under these circumstances correction of the defaulting environment can often be effected with the happiest results. But in the type of case which might come under the heading of possible moral imbeciles it would seem to me impossible to arrive at a diagnosis without delving into the depths of their mental life.

This is particularly true of the unstable type, whose actions appear to be controlled mainly by emotional storms, and these temperament cases illustrate with equal force our inability to correct their conduct merely by reference to the more superficial strata of the psychic life.

We are dealing with some quality of the mind which cannot be demonstrated by mental tests, but which is in some way associated with the working of the mind as a whole, and which is intimately connected with our existence as social beings.

The complete structure of modern society has been built up from simple beginnings by the united effort and forbearance of the individuals

of the group. The habit of gregariousness finds its origin in the history of the development of mankind, and if the theory of the evolution of man from the lower animals is true we are able to produce numerous examples of mutual tolerance associated with gregariousness in the lower levels of our development history.

An immense number of animals live by preying on some species of a lower division of the animal world, but generally the antagonism exists towards a different species and the species within itself lives a social life which entails restraint in exchange for companionship and mass protection. It is this aspect of life which is the more important and extensive in the animal world, that provides us with excellent examples of gregariousness.

A study of the habits of fishes, ants, bees and wild animals will show the widespread nature of social life, and the success of the experiment is obvious from the overwhelming numbers of sociable species.

In this connection Kropotkin writes:

Being thus necessary for the preservation the welfare and the progressive development of every species, the mutual aid instinct has become what Darwin described as "a permanent instinct," which is always at work in all social animals, and especially in man.

Having its origin at the very beginnings of the evolution of the animal world, it is certainly an instinct as deeply seated in animals, low and high, as the instinct of maternal love; perhaps even deeper, because it is present in such animals as the molluscs, some insects and most fishes, which hardly possess any maternal instinct at all. Darwin was quite right in considering that the instinct of mutual sympathy' was more permanently at work in the social animals then even the purely egotistic instinct of self-preservation.

The mutual aid instinct is better known as the social or herd instinct, and the development of this tendency in some of the lower animals has gone so far as to entail actual changes in structure following or accompanying the economic organisation of the group. In man himself we find the full expression of the same tendencies even among the most primitive savages.

The capacity for sacrificing merely selfish desires must have developed side by side with the desire for companionship and mutual protection, the former being the essential counterpart of the latter. And whether or not we agree with Kropotkin that the social instinct is of more ancient lineage than the egotistical we must admit that it arose very little later in point of time.

Man as a social being must therefore possess the capacity for the suppression of those desires that are inimical to the well-being of the herd, or he must sacrifice his association with the herd. Should he