3 Md. Ch. Decis. 278; Ellicott v. Warford, 4 Mad. 80. He is not appointed for the benefit of strangers to the suit: Howell v. Ripley, 10 Paige's C. R. 43.

A receiver is, as between the parties to the suit, to be considered as appointed from the date of the order of reference to the master: Tanfield v. Weston,

supra.

The court itself has the care of the property in dispute; the receiver is but its creature.

Generally speaking, a receiver should be a person wholly disinterested in the subject-matter of the suit: Bennet's Master, 93; and he ought not to interfere in any litigation between the parties: Comyn v. Smith, 1 Hogan, 81.

If a receiver, in the discharge of his duty, be threatened with violence, or actual violence be committed upon him, the court will attach the wrongdoer: Fitzpatrick v. Eyre, 1 Molloy, 171. As he is the officer of the court, and his possession is but its possession, he is not, according to a decision in Georgia, subject to ordinary process of punishment: Field v. Jones, 11 Geo. 413. Still, where a complaint is made against an officer of the court of chancery for misconduct, while acting under color of authority merely, the court may, either itself take cognizance of the complaint, and administer justice between the parties, or may allow the party aggrieved to bring his suit at law for the alleged injury: Parker v. Brown, 8 Paige's C. R. 388.

A receiver of a corporation is not regarded as a purchaser for a valuable consideration, but as its voluntary assignee and personal representative: Receivers v. Patterson Gas Light Co. 3 Zabr. 288.

A receiver represents the interest of all the parties in the property, which interests are often various and conflicting and sometimes involved in doubt. It is his duty to protect the property intrusted to him, to the best of his ability, for all those interests, without being controlled by the representatives of any one of them: Iddings v. Bruin, 4 Sand. Chan. Rep. 417.

His general powers; and what property he can control.

He has no powers, except such as are conferred upon him by the order for his appointment and the course and practice of the court: Verplanck v. Mercantile Ins. Co. 2 Paige's C. R. 452; unless where he is appointed under the statute directing proceedings against corporations (2 R. S. 438); and then, he is a statutory assignee, vested with nearly all the powers and authority of the assignee of an insolvent debtor: Ib.; Attorney General v. Life and Fire Ins. Co. 4 Paige's C. R. 224.

The rules of the English court of chancery were formerly strict in not allowing a receiver to do many things, such, for instance, as making leases or even repairs, without a previous approval of a master. But, says Mr. Hoffman, our court would, undoubtedly, sanction, when performed, what it would have directed to be done; and it is the constant course, for officers of this description, to perform their duties without the previous approval of the court: Hoffman's Master, 156. If this be so, he must get

his power through the practice of the court; and we are inclined to doubt whether a receiver should step far out of his order without its authority. The point is not, whether the court may possibly protect him when he has volunteered an act; but whether he ought to have done it without direction? Chancellor Walworth calls the ordinary receiver of the court a common-law receiver; and says he is appointed to protect the fund during the litigation, and has no powers, except such as are conferred upon him by the order for his appointment and the course and practice of this court: Verplanck v. Mercantile Ins. Co. of N. Y., supra.

Every kind of property of such a nature that, if legal, it might be taken in execution, may, if equitable, be put into the possession of a receiver; and hence, the appointment of such a person has been said to be an equitable execution: Jeremy's Eq. Jur. 249.

And chancery, which has, as it has been somewhere said, "a long arm," can reach property out of the jurisdiction. "The original and primary juris"diction of this court," says Chancellor Walworth, "was in personam merely. The writ of assistance "to deliver possession, and even the sequestration "to compel the performance of a decree, are com"paratively of recent origin. The jurisdiction of "the court was exercised for several centuries by "the simple proceeding of attachment against the "bodies of the parties to compel obedience to its "orders and decrees. Although the property of a "defendant is beyond the reach of the court, so "that it can neither be sequestered nor taken in ex

แ ecution, the court does not lose its jurisdiction in "relation to that property, provided the person of "the defendant is within the jurisdiction. By the "ordinary course of proceeding, the defendant may "be compelled either to bring the property in dis'pute, or to which the complainant claims an equi"table title, within the jurisdiction of the court, or "to execute such a conveyance or transfer thereof "as will be sufficient to vest the legal title, as well "as the possession of the property, according to the "lex loci rei sita" Mitchell v. Bunck, 2 Paige's C. R. 615; and see cases there, and also the arguments of counsel. Still, the difficulty remains: as to a recognition of the powers or officers of the court by persons holding or being upon the property (especially realty) out of the jurisdiction. Thus, in Malcolm v. Montgomery, 1 Hogan, 93, the master of the of the rolls observed, that a receiver could not be effectually appointed over the estates in Ireland by the English court of chancery in any direct proceeding for the purpose; and that attempts have often been made to do so by service of orders made by the English court of chancery, but that they had failed, because the English court of chancery has no direct means of enforcing payment of rent to its receiver, by tenants who reside in Ireland. The attorney-general and another counsel also said, that to their knowledge such attempts had frequently been made, but were uniformly given up as impracticable. A conflict, also, might arise between the receiver out of the jurisdiction, and creditors and others, also out of the jurisdiction. The comity of

nations and different tribunals, would hardly help a receiver. See Abraham v. Plestoro, 3 Wend. 538.

A very able opinion of Justice Wayne's, in Booth v. Clark, 17 Howard, 322 (given since the first edition of this work was published, and doing the book the honor to refer to it in a complimentary manner), clearly shows that a receiver is the mere officer of the court which appoints him, and cannot sue, in a foreign jurisdiction, for the property of the debtor. There, the receiver had been appointed by the court of chancery of the State of New York in a judgment creditor's suit; and the attempt of that officer was to reach a claim upon Mexico, which had been adjudged to the judgment debtor by the United States Commissioners under the Treaty with Mexico. Creditors outside of the State of New York had laid claim to it. The receiver, who was also contesting, got leave from the New York court of chancery to proceed in such contest. We give such parts of Justice Wayne's opinion (and which was the opinion of the court) as is deemed necessary-(after going through adjudications and case): "Our industry has been tasked unsuccessfully, to "find a case in which a receiver has been permitted "to sue in a foreign jurisdiction for the property of "the debtor. So far as we can find, it has not been "allowed in an English tribunal; orders have been "given in the English chancery for receivers to pro"ceed to execute their functions in another jurisdic"tion, but we are not aware of its ever having been "permitted by the tribunals of the last.

"We think that a receiver has never been recog