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"nized by a foreign tribunal as an actor in a suit. "He is not within that comity which nations have permitted, after the manner of such nations as practice it, in respect to the judgments and decrees "of foreign tribunals, for all of them do not permit "it in the same manner and to the same extent, to "make such comity international, or a part of the "law of nations."

"A receiver is appointed under a creditor's bill "for one or more creditors as the case may be, for "their benefit, to the exclusion of all other creditors "of the debtor, if there be any such, as there are "in this case. Whether appointed, as this receiver "was, under the statute of New York or under the "rules and practice of chancery, as they may be, "his official relations to the court are the same. A "statute appointment neither enlarges nor dimin"ishes the limitation upon his action. His responsi"bilities are unaltered. Under either kind of ap"pointment, he has at most only a passive capacity "in the most important part of what it may be necessary for him to do, until it has been called, by "the direction of the court, into ability to act. He "has no extra territorial power of official action, "none which the court appointing him can confer, "with authority to enable him to go into a foreign "jurisdiction to take possession of the debtor's propแ erty, none which can give him, on the principle of comity, a privilege to sue in a foreign court, or "another jurisdiction, as the judgment creditor him

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"self might have done where his debtor may be ame"nable to the tribunal which the creditor may seek.

"In those countries of Europe, in which foreign "judgments are regarded as a foundation for an "action, whether it be allowed by treaty stipulation "or by comity, it has not, as yet, been extended to "a a receiver in chancery. In the United States, “where the same rule prevails between the States as "to judgments and decrees, aided, as it is by the "first section of the 4th article of the Constitution, "and by the act of Congress of 26th May, 1790, by "which full faith and credit are to be given in all of "the courts of the United States to the judicial senแ tences of the different States, a receiver, under "a creditor's bill, has not as yet been an actor, as แ such, in a suit out of the State in which he was appointed. This court considered the effect of "that section of the Constitution, and of the act “ just mentioned, in M'Elmoyle and Cohen, 13 Pet. "324-327. But, apart from the absence of any "such case, we think that a receiver could not be "admitted to the comity extended to judgment "creditors, without an entire departure from chan

cery proceedings as to the manner of his appointแ ment, the securities which are taken from him for "the performance of his duties, and the direction "which the court has over him in the collection of "the estate of the debtor, and the application and "distribution of them. If he seeks to be recog"nized in another jurisdiction, it is to take the fund "there out of it, without such court having any

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control of his subsequent action in respect to it, "and without his having even official power to give "security to the court the aid of which he seeks, for "his faithful conduct, and official accountability. "All that could be done upon such an application "for a receiver, according to chancery practice, "would be to transfer him from the locality of his appointment to that where he asks to be recogแ nized, for the execution of his trust in the last, "under the coercive ability of that court; and that "it would be difficult to do, where it may be asked แ to be done, without the court exercising its prov"ince to determine whether the suitor, or another person within its jurisdiction, was the proper perแ "son to act as receiver."

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It is sometimes necessary to put a receiver upon property where the interest of the parties to the suit are so connected with those of third persons, that the necessary possession of the officer of the court conflicts with the legal rights of such third persons. But the court never divests a previous possession of such third persons unnecessarily. Even where the receiver is in possession, although the court will not permit him to be interfered with, without its consent, such third persons are permitted to come in and be heard in relation to their interests. And the court will, then, make such order for the protection of the rights of such third persons, either through the agency of the receiver or otherwise, as may be just and equitable: Chancellor Walworth, in Vincent v. Parker, MS., 22 January, 1838; and see Howell v. Ripley, 10 Paige's C. R. 43.

Where the property in litigation consists of a gross sum, there will be no occasion for a receiver, because it can at once, by an order, be paid into court; but where it consists of income, as the rents and profits of land or the profits and produce of any other species of property, a receiver is appointed: Lubé, 96.

A receiver is only to be controlled through the order appointing him, and the rules and practice of the court: Broad v. Wickham, supra..

He can be put into possession in a summary way: Note [c] to Sharp v. Carter, 3 P. Wms., 379.

A receiver will not be appointed over the possession of another receiver; but the proper motion is, that the receiver already appointed shall be extended to the cause in which it is sought to appoint one: Valle v. O'Reilly, 1 Hogan, 199; Irving v. Waller, ib. 258; Osborn v. Heyer, 2 Paige's C. R. 342; and see in this last case, the course a receiver is to pursue where there is a second suit; also Rules, 193, 194, of Chancery.

A receiver has no rights whatever; he is only an officer in the court; his appointment determines no right, and in no way affects the title of the property; his holding is the holding of the court, for him from whom the possession is taken; and he has no right to ask for a revision of the order removing him, any more than a stranger to the cause. But as he is appointed on behalf of all parties, and not of the plaintiff or one defendant only, so when the title to the property has been ascertained, he will be considered as receiver of the party so entitled: In re Colvin, 3 Md. Ch. Decis. 278.

In what stages of a cause a receiver may be appointed; and the nature and form of pleading necessary to sustain an application.

The general power of the court in England to appoint a receiver, appears to require a suit to be pending: Anon. 1 Atk. 578; save in peculiar cases, such as lunacy: Ex parte Whitfield, 2 Atk. 315; Shelford, 147.

An obiter dictum of Lord Thurlow, if correctly reported, shows that his lordship was of opinion that, in extreme cases, a receiver of an infant's estate might be appointed-and that he would have appointed a receiver if there had been no bill filed: Pitcher v. Hilliard, 2 Dick. 580.

This practice, as to appointing a receiver only on a bill filed, is not completely so in the court of chancery of Ireland. The statutes relating to its practice, direct that receivers, in certain cases, may be appointed on petition and without bill; as, for instance, in relation to an infant's real and personal estate: 4 and 5 Wm. IV. c. 78, § 7; or on behalf of creditors by judgment and recognizance: 5 and 6 Wm. IV. c. 55, § 31.

A motion for the appointment of a receiver will be denied as irregular, when the order to show cause against the appointment is served before the commencement of the suit: Kattenstroth v. The Astor Bank, 2 Duer's Superior Ct. Rep. 632.

A preliminary receivership is, in effect, an injunction, and something more stringent still. It is to be granted with great caution, and only in a case of