ate one, he orders * him, as he says in his report, to stand firm, and let the enemy develop toward Warrenton, and that he desired the enemy to cross as large a force as he pleased in the direction of Warrenton. This seems to settle the question, what was the plan in General Pope's mind when he was writing to Sigel. The more troops of the enemy on our side of the river, the fewer there would be for Pope to fight on the other side. Had he intended at that time to overwhelm those who had crossed, he would hardly have thus given them permission to cross as many as they liked. The matter is not of any particular importance, except as showing that the intention of attacking on our side of the river, if it was entertained at first, was soon abandoned for the plan of recrossing the river. But the next morning, the 23d, it was found that the rise in the river had rendered this project of a counter-attack impracticable. It was perhaps quite as well that it was not attempted; no army that had not been thoroughly trained, and that was not under officers accustomed for years to act with each other, would have had much chance of success in such a dangerous operation. Pope's army had just been organized. As for those troops on which he must have relied to guard the railroad during this incursion on the other side of the river, they had not yet even reported for duty. Still, the freshet which put a stop to this plan, rendered it possible to capture that part of Jackson's command which had crossed near the Springs. Accordingly, on the morning of the 23d, Sigel, whose corps had been posted between Beverly and Freeman's Fords, was ordered to move up the river to Sulphur Springs, and thence toward Waterloo Bridge, and to attack whatever force of the enemy he might * Pope to Sigel, August 23; P. R., p. 129. find on our side of the river. Nothing, however, came of this expedition. Early had retired behind Great Run, one of the affluents of the Rappahannock, which was so much swollen by the rain that Sigel was delayed till too late in getting across it. But this was no fault of General Pope's. In this attempt to capture those of the enemy's troops that had crossed the river, Pope did not hesitate to uncover for the time being the lower fords of the Rappahannock. Owing to the freshet, the danger of a crossing by the enemy at these fords had very greatly diminished, if it had not entirely disappeared, for the bridges had been swept away and the fords were gone, and then there were the troops of Heintzelman and Porter, now arriving from Alexandria and Aquia Creek, who would furnish for the moment a sufficient defence. He, therefore, on the morning of the 23d, ordered* General Sigel upon Sulphur Springs, as has just been stated, and thence, if he did not find the enemy, upon Waterloo Bridge, some few miles higher up the river. He ordered t Banks and Reno to support Sigel, and he pushed McDowell's corps to Warrenton, where he fixed his own headquarters. To Warrenton he also directed ‡ Reynolds, who had come up on the 23d from Aquia Creek, with his fine division of Pennsylvania reserves 2-6,000 strong-the first arrival from the Army of the Potomac-and which he attached to McDowell's command, to which it had, as we have seen, originally belonged. He also, on the 23d, abandoned his works beyond the river at Rappahannock Station and withdrew the troops; he destroyed the bridge there; and for the time being, at any rate, he renounced || his plan of recrossing the river. These movements were certainly wise, and they were ordered with commendable promptitude. + Pope to Banks; P. R., p. 131. * P. R., p. 129. While this was going on in our army, General J. E. B. Stuart, the celebrated cavalry officer, whose enterprise and audacity were justly famous, on the night of the 22d, conducted an expedition of 1,500 horse or thereabouts, to our rear, striking the railroad at Catlett's Station. The weather was horrible, and the march exceedingly severe, but the object of the expedition was in part attained, for baggage, despatches, and prisoners were taken. The trestle bridge across Cedar Run, however, could not be destroyed. Still, the moral effect of this raid, so far as it went, was of course favorable to the enemy. On the 24th Early succeeded in rejoining his corps. Sigel, who arrived near Sulphur Springs on the night of the 23d, having marched from Freeman's Ford, was delayed, as we have said, at Great Run, till the morning of the 24th. Whether he could not have accomplished more than he did is still an unsettled question. Between his corps and that of Jackson there was an artillery duel all that day. Buford, with his cavalry, had pushed out to Waterloo in the forenoon of the 24th. Pope directed him to destroy the bridge there, but for some reason this was not done. Sigel was ordered to support him, and Milroy's brigade, constituting the advance of his corps, reached Waterloo late in the afternoon of the same day. In the evening of the 24th Jackson retired to Jefferson, a place about four miles west of Sulphur Springs, and his po sitions on the river were occupied by the corps of Longstreet. That evening, Pope's headquarters were at Warrenton ; Sigel was on the river from Waterloo to the Springs; below him, on the river, was the corps of Banks; the two divisions of Reno were a short distance east of the Springs; Ricketts' division of McDowell's corps was partly between Warrenton and Waterloo, and King's division was between Warrenton and the Springs. Reynolds was near Warrenton. Buford's cavalry observed the extreme right beyond Waterloo. Every. thing was ready to repel another attempt at crossing either at the Springs or at Waterloo Bridge. General Lee had been delayed longer than he expected on the banks of the Rappahannock. He had not succeeded in surprising General Pope. Wherever he had attempted a passage of the river, he had been met with adequate resistance. He now determined on the bold step of sending Jackson round our right by way of Orleans, Salem, White Plains, and Thoroughfare Gap, to cut our railroad communications at Manassas; a move which, if successful, would necessarily bring about a withdrawal of our army from the line of the Rappahannock. It was a dangerous move, and one which could have been entrusted to no one but Stonewall Jackson; and it was so dangerous that even he came within an ace of being totally defeated. Moreover, the object proposed was not worth the risk. It was not supposed by anybody that Pope's army could be materially injured by this expedition. There was nothing in the world to prevent Pope and his whole army from retiring safely behind Bull Run and there meeting fresh supplies and reinforcements, and there was great probability, that, on the way there, he would have an opportunity to crush Jackson before Lee could possibly rejoin him, not to speak of the possibility of Jackson's encountering large bodies of troops of the Army of the Potomac. On this march Jackson started on the morning of the 25th from Jefferson,* passing through Amissville, and crossing Hedgman's River, as the Rappahannock above Waterloo Bridge is called, at Hinson's Mills, and thence marching by way of Orleans and reaching Salem at night. The march of this column could not of course be kept a secret. Everyone saw it-the clouds of dust were plainly visible—the signal officers reported its strength, but where * General Pope is in error when he states, as he does in his report, p. 131, that "during the day of the 24th a large detachment of the enemy, numbering thirtysix regiments of infantry, with the usual number of batteries of artillery and a considerable cavalry force, marched rapidly to the north, in the direction of Rectortown." There was no force that marched in that direction but Jackson's, and that did not leave Jefferson till the morning of the 25th; see Reports of Lee, Jackson, Early, Taliaferro, Hill, Stuart, and Boswell. Rep. A. N. V., vol. i., p 21; vol. ii., pp. 92, 124, 140, 142, 179, 199, and 393. |