have met with, begin to make serious impressions, on those who at first rejected the counsels you gave; and they will acquire new weight every day, and be in high esteem when the cavils against them are dead and for gotten. Please to present my affectionate respects to that honest, sensible, and intelligent, society, * who did me so long the honour of adinitting me to share in their instructive conversations. I never think of the hours I so happily spent in that company, without regretting that they are never to be repeated; for I see no prospect of an end to this unhappy war in my time. Dr. Priestley, you tell me, continues his experiments with success. We make daily great improvements in naturalThere is one I wish to see in moral Philosophy; the discovery of a plan that would induce and oblige nations to settle their disputes without first cutting one another's throats. When will human reason be sufficiently improved to see the advantage of this? When will men be convinced that even successful wars at length become misfortunes to those who unjustly commenced them, and who triumphed blindly in their success, not seeing all its consequences. Your great comfort and mine in this war is, that we honestly and faithfully did every thing in our power to prevent it. Adieu, and believe me ever, my dear friend, your's, &c.

TO DR. PRIESTLEY.

B. F.

absolute levity, for the sake of easy transport, Agriculture may diminish its labour and double its produce: all diseases may by sure means be prevented or cured, (not excepting even that of old age) and our lives lengthened at pleasure even beyond the antediluvian standard. O that moral science were in as fair a way of improvement, that men would cease to be wolves to one another, and that human beings would at length learn what they now improperly call huz manity!

I am glad my little paper on the Aurora Borealis pleased. If it should occasion farther inquiry, and so produce a better hypothesis, it will not be wholly useless.

I am ever, with the greatest and most sincere esteem, dear Sir, &c.

B. F..

[Inclosed in the foregoing Letter; being an answer to a separate paper received from Dr. Priestley.]

I have considered the situation of that person very attentively; I think that with a little help from the Moral Algebra, he might form a better judgment than any other person can form for him. But since my opinion seems to be desired, I give it for continuing to the end of the term, under all the present disagreeable circumstances: the connection will then die a natural death. No reason will be expected to be given for the separation, and of course no offence taken at reasons given; the friendship may still subsist, and in some other way be useful. The time diminishes daily, and is usefully employed. All human situations have their inconveniences; we feel those that we find in the present, and we neither feel nor see those that exist in another. Hence we make frequent and troublesome changes without amendment, and often for the worse. In my youth I was passenger in a little sloop, descending the River Delaware. There being no wind, we were obliged when the ebb spent, to cast anchor, and wait for the next. The heat of the sun on the vessel was excessive, the company strangers to me, and not very agreeable. Near the river side I saw what I took to be a a pleasant green meadow, in the middle of which was a large shady tree, where it struck my fancy

was

regard them as you do in whatever sect I meet with them. As to Jesus of Nazareth, my opinion of whom you particularly desire, I think the system of morals and his religion as he left them to us, the best the world ever saw or is like to see; but I apprehend it has received various corrupting changes, and I have with most of the present Dissenters in England, some doubts as to his divinity; though it is a question I do uot dogmatise upon, having never studied it, and think it needless to busy myself with it now, when I expect soon an opportunity of knowing the truth with less trouble. I see no harm however in its being believed, if that belief has the good consequence, as probably it has, of making his doctrines more respected and more observed, especially as I do not perceive that the Supreme takes it amiss, by distinguishing the believers, in his governinent of the world, with any peculiar marks of his displeasure. I shall only add respecting myself, that having experienced the goodness of that Being in conducting me prosperously through a long life, I have no doubt of its continuance in the next, though without the smallest conceit of meriting such goodness. My sentiments on this head you will see in the copy of an old letter inclosed, which I wrote in answer to one from an old religionist whom I had relieved in a paralitic case by electricity, and who being afraid I should grow proud upon it, sent me his serious, though rather impertinent caution. I send you also the copy of another letter, which will shew something of my disposition relating to religion.

With great and sincere esteem and affection, I am, &c.

P. S. Had not your College some present of books from the King of France. Please to let me know if you had an expectation given you of more, and the nature of that expectation? I have a reason for the inquiry.

I confide that you will not expose me to criticisms and censures by publishing any part of this communi

* Supposed to be the Letter to George Whitefield, dated June 6, 1753.

+ Uncertain: perhaps the following

cation to you. I have ever let other enjoy their religious sentiments without reflecting on them for those that appeared to me unsupportable or even absurd. All sects here, and we have a great variety, have experienced my good will in assisting them with subscriptions for the building their new places of worship; and as I have never opposed any of their doctrines, I hope to go out of the world in peace with them all.

Το

DEAR SIR,

(Without date).

I HAVE read your manuscript with some attention. By the argument it contains against a particular Providence, though you allow a general Providence, you strike at the foundations of all religion. For without the belief of a Providence that takes cognizance of guards and guides, and may favour particular persons, there is no motive to worship a Deity, to fear its displeasure, or to pray for its protection. I will not enter into any discussion of your principles, though you seem to desire it. At present I shall only give you my opinion, that though your reasonings are subtle, and may prevail with some readers, you will not succeed so as to change the general sentiments of mankind on that subject, and the consequence of printing this piece will be, a great deal of odium drawn upon yourself, mischief to you, and no benefit to others. He that spies against the wind, spits in his own face. But were you to succeed, do you imagine any good would be done by it? You yourself may find it easy to live a virtuous life without the assistance afforded by religion; you having a clear perception of the advantages of virtue, and the disadvantages of vice, and possessing a strength of resolution sufficient to enable you to resist common temptations. But think how great a portion of mankind consists of weak and ignorant men and women, and of inexperienced inconsiderate youth of both sexes, who have need of the motives of religion to restrain them from vice, to support their virtue, and retain them in the practice of it till it becomes habitual, which is the great point for its security. And perhaps you are indebted to her originally, that is to your religious

certainly the eyes, ears and other senses of men are equally capable of judging concerning all things, which they are equally capable of perceiving."

All miracles are facts, of a nature cognizable by the ordinary faculties and suited to the common apprehension of mankind: indeed if they were not so, to no purpose would they have been performed. Those recorded in the Christian Scriptures have a peculiar efficacy in this view, since they do not depend upon à priori arguments and recondite speculations for proof; but uniformly referring to plain facts, and addressed to the common sense of mankind, the most illiterate as well as the most learned could equally judge of their truth. Like other facts, therefore, which are not miraculous, they may be established by testimony, the persons recording them affirming only the experience of their own senses, and that of others, in a plain and simple case, namely, that certain effects were repeatedly produced in the presence of considerable numbers, and of which, too, they themselves had a personal knowledge.

Mr. Hume, in Note K of his Essay, informs us, "That a miracle may be discoverable by man or not; this alters not its nature and essence." A more positive admission of the existence of miracles could not have been made, since whatever has a nature and essence must necessarily exist. And that a miracle is discoverable by man, Mr. Hume has furnished us undeniable evidence in his own example; for if not so, how could he have known, and affirmed of it, that its nature and essence would not have been altered by the circumstances alluded to in the quotation? That a miracle is in itself possible, and capable of being proved by the senses, is certain; and farther, that it may also be satisfactorily proved to others by testimony, Mr. Hume acknowledges when he remarks, that our observation of the veracity of human testimony constrains our assent to the belief of ordinary facts, even although they have never immediately fallen under the cognizance of our own senses. Just so is it with miracles, which, although undoubtedly facts of an extraordinary nature, are not on that account the less discoverable by us, when, as in the case of ordinary facts, they have been submitted to our im

mediate and personal observation, or to that of others, who have recorded them to us. To assert, then, that a fact cannot be proved, when already admitted to have been fully proved, is an absolute contradiction, the very absurdity charged upon the abettors of miracles. A miracle, then, we must admit, in the first instance, is capable of being proved by the senses; and the subsequent establishment of its proof by testimony is no contradiction: indeed, why its being registered and recorded as a testimony of its truth to others should alter its nature, and as it were by enchantment annihilate its previous capacity of proof, a wiser head than even Mr. Hume's is requisite to determine. It must be conceded, however, that the veracity of testimony is not uniform; and here it is that we meet the difficulty in its fullest force, freely admi that miracles require a stronger testimony than common facts, but deny that the nature and capacity of testimony is on that account any ways altered or impaired, which by the objector is strenuously contended to be the case. Had he confined himself to this single point, his objection would have had considerable weight, though it would by no means have been insuperable; but by blending with it the utter incapacity of testimony to prove at all, he has effectually defeated his own purpose. A testimony that proves nothing cannot lie.

and

A more than reiterated experience in proof of miracles is not wanting. If all occurrences, and all must be comprehended under the idea of an uniform experience, were to be brought about by means of particular interpositions (which is the notion of a miracle), every practical benefit to result from them would be lost, and to us they would no longer be miracles: an unceasing series of miraculous interventions would in effect be the same as an established law. The efficacy of a reasonable experience in judging of them is not denied: but the futility and unreasonableness of an uniform experience is manifest. Moreover, our competency to judge of the existence of any fact, whether of an ordinary or of an extraordinary nature, does not depend upon its constant recurrence, nor is it altered by our ignorance of what produced it; since the mode in which the operation of the usual course of the laws of na