Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics: JITE, 第 159 卷

2003 Mohr Siebeck addictive agents agreement analysis assets assume assumption banks bargaining behavior capital Coase theorem competition conflict constraint consumers consumption contract cooperation corporate governance court decision demand E-mail Economics JITE 159 effect efficient equilibrium evolutionary ex ante expected final-good producers firm function fundamentalist groups hold-up problem implies incentive increase individual inequity aversion input Institutional and Theoretical Institutional Economics interest investment joint venture Journal of Economic Journal of Institutional labor marginal marginal cost Mohr Siebeck Nash equilibrium negotiations NGOs optimal outcome paper parties payoff players polder model political preferences problem production profit Proposition reciprocity reciprocity-induced regulation result role rules secondary labor market Section seller shareholders signal social strategy subpopulation surplus symmetric T₁ Theoretical Economics JITE theory trade transaction costs trustworthy ultimatum game unintegrated union utility wage workers x-sector