It may not be premature to announce that a series of works which shall follow this order is in preparation for our American schools. No textbook exists in Germany; it is an unwritten system, and one which requires some modification, but I have no doubt that it will be found thoroughly adapted to the wants of our American schools.

There are some points which are to be criticized in this country, nevertheless. That same evil which is so largely experienced in America, of crowding the mind with geographical details, is known here. No evil is more prevalent in this department on both sides of the Atlantic. The greatest geographer of this country is singularly unacquainted with these details; his memory is not at all tenacious of them, but his mind grasps the great physical relations with wonderful power; and no one can hear him lecture, without being assured that he is worthy of his theme. It is perhaps the greatest mistake that we commit at home-this swamping the memory of the scholar beneath a flood of geographical names, irrespective of their practical value. He is compelled to learn the appellations of all the tributaries of the Amazon, just as carefully as he would those of the great commercial centres of Europe; he must study the Siberian lakes as closely as he would those of the United States. The same mistake is noticeable in Germany-the want, if I may so term it, of perspective in geographical study.

It is particularly apparent where our country is concerned. Owing partly to the disdain with which the educated Germans regard our “new” country, forgetting that its civilization is coeval with England's, and owing also to the wish of the government to check emigration by keeping the people as much in the dark as possible about us, the geography of the United States is little known here. In the Atlases, we find our place hard by Oceanica and Africa, at the very end of the book; and even our great cities hardly have a recognition. And even if we are supposed to have an immense extent of territory, it is thought to be so unsettled, so wild, so overrun with beasts and savages, as to be of little worth. Not that enlightenment is not coming in with regard to these things: the countless letters sent from the United States to Germany do measureless good; but as yet, the geography of our great country is little understood. W. L. G.

R. EDITOR-Your critic is sorry to learn that he has been the in

correspondent, Observer

He should have relieved himself sooner. He should not, in silence, have suffered mental anguish through all the dreary months from December to May. But authors ought not to be too sensitive. To criticise is not to meddle, as Observer seems to think it is. Books are written for the public, and the public good requires honest criticism. Mr. Kerl has had this at our hands. If he is hurt through "ignorance," it is his own fault, not ours; and if he "can (to)" forgive himself for the injury thus unwittingly done to himself, we shall be among the first to commend his amiable disposition.

Observer complains that the "contemptuous synopsis, which the critic has given of Kerl's First Lessons in English Grammar,' is neither full nor fair." The critic challenges an examination. A comparison of the synopsis with the book will show that it is unusually full and perfectly fair. What the critic said in regard to the number of definitions (one hundred and thirty-nine), and of the space they occupy, is strictly true; and Observer is guilty of "sharp practice" when he charges the critic with unfairness, and at the same time reduces one hundred and thirty-nine definitions to "only about a hundred," and stretches what is on thirty-five pages to cover "fifty-five." But more than this, he deliberately misquotes. He says, "the critic himself admits that the definitions are generally faultless, and the illustrations apt."

What the critic did say, is this: "While many of the definitions are faultless," etc. Perhaps the critic is "rash" in saying "deliberately misquotes," because that can only be said on the assumption that Observer appreciates the difference between the words "many" and "generally;" a matter not so clear, perhaps, as to warrant a charge of intentional dishonesty. "The definitions which Mr. Kerl has given of personal pronouns and relative pronouns are both improvements on the old definitions." That is, Kerl's definitions are improvements on all that precede him. The statement means just that, or it is good for nothing. Let comparison decide.

"A personal pronoun is so called, because it invariably represents the same person." (R. C. Smith, 1832.)

"A personal pronoun is a pronoun that shows by its form of what person it is." (Goold Brown, 1836.)

"A personal pronoun is a simple substitute, which, by its own peculiar form, shows of what person it is." (E. Hazen, 1853.)

"A personal pronoun is one of those pronouns which distinguish the grammatical persons." (S. Kerl, 1865.)

So much for improved definition of personal pronouns.

"A relative pronoun represents a word or phrase, and connects with it the limiting clause in which it stands." (D. B. Tower, 1846.)

"A relative pronoun is a pronoun that stands in close relation to an antecedent, and joins to it a descriptive clause." (S. Kerl, 1865.)

One of these tells, in a certain sense, what a relative is, and the other, where a relative is. Which is the improvement?

"In the classification of verbs, there is an inherent difficulty." Observer should have said, in Kerl's classification of verbs there is an inherent difficulty.

"If predicate and affirm mean precisely the same thing, as the critic affirms," etc. The critic made no such affirmation. He did not use the word "precisely" at all. In speaking of the author's "finite and not finite verbs," he said: "Then what is help, in the entreaty, 'Hercules, help me!' Is it a finite or not finite verb? Does it predicate any thing of its subject? Certainly not, because predicate means to affirm, and nothing is affirmed." Well, here is Mr. Kerl's definition of predicate: "A predicate is a word or phrase denoting what is said of a subject." Now let us try it. "Hercules, help me!" What is said of the subject? Nothing. This rules the imperative out as a finite verb, just as effectually as the other

Whatever, whoever, and whichsoever are compound words," etc. That is all true. But as Mr. K. was not treating of the form of words, but was defining the "classes of pronouns," the critic naturally supposed that he meant double relatives; and, knowing that many grammarians consider all such relations compound, proposed to be generous, and not cavil on that point, and simply raised the question, what is a compound relative? because no proper definition of a relative had been given. With regard to the disposition of the word what, the critic had years ago "learned from Brown,"-"What is a kind of double relative, equivalent to that or those which ;" and also, "No pronoun can properly be called compound, merely because it has a double construction, and is equivalent to two other words." The critic humbly acknowledges his probable mistake in assuming that Mr. Kerl had not read Brown with any profit to himself.

"If he does not know that participles are used after the auxiliaries be and have, and infinitives after all other auxiliaries," etc. About the use of be and have, there has been no dispute. As to "infinitives after all other auxiliaries," he is happy not to know. He does, however, know that two or three grammarians of the last century did teach, "The preposition to is never expressed after the helping verbs, except after ought." (Alexander Murray, 3d ed., London, 1793, p. 112.) As ought is not an auxiliary verb, but is found in the old lists of auxiliaries, it is easy to conjecture the origin of the idea that to is suppressed after all the others. A few grammarians since Murray's day have adopted the doctrine, but only a few; and even these have had no faith in its correctness. Otherwise they would have exhibited the infinitive as one of the principal parts of the verb. Even Kerl himself, who so strenuously insists on this doctrine, teaches that the four principal parts of the verb-that is, the parts from which all the other parts are formed—are :

And yet he writes, "infinitives after all other auxiliaries," without any seeming consciousness of its absurdity and inconsistency.

"The remaining criticism on this sentence shows how grossly and ridiculously ignorant of grammar the critic himself is; for the sentence is grammatically correct, and his officious mending of it would make false syntax of it." If Observer will look again, he will perceive that the critic did not mean to mend by making correct syntax, but only to state what he supposed to be the intention of the author. "The Old and the New Testaments make the Bible," the critic considers, though not strictly correct, grammatically less absurd than, "The Old and the New Testament make the Bible." Had the critic intended to "correct" it, he would not have committed the blunder of leaving a noun, to which no allusion had been made, to be understood after the first of two (such) adjectives separated by other words. He would write, "The Old Testament and the New make." "The nominative case," etc.

"No man also, having drunk old wine, straightway desireth new; for he saith, The old is better." (Luke, v. 39.)

"The critic's remark about was captured is unfair; for he garbled the passage," etc. The passage garbled is on page 35 of the book (definition 139), and reads: "An auxiliary verb helps other verbs to express their grammatical properties. Hence, there are auxiliary verbs that express voice; as, was captured." On this "garbled" passage, the critic remarked that hence, was writing must be a verb in the passive voice, and he still holds that opinion.

"The critic's remark that nothing plainer is given on punctuation is not true."

The critic offers a full example as his vindication.

66

"; The semicolon; which denotes the next shorter pause.

"The semicolon is used

"1. To separate parts that have the comma, or that require a point greater than a comma, and less than a colon.

"2. To separate the parts of a loose series."

If this blind statement of the manner of using the semicolon makes the definition any plainer, the critic is ready to make "a manly apology." Near the close of his communication, Observer says something, in a pleasant, good-natured way, about how to "conduct warfare." If he proposes to go into that business, for which, on account of his extreme good-nature, he is not well adapted, let him get a good Damascus blade, 2nd not go into the fight with a short bowie-knife made by some common blacksmith. The former will always exhibit a better temper, and serve im a better turn than the latter. CRITIC.

"UP THE HUDSON," MAY 2, 1866.

CURRENT PUBLICATIONS.

PROFESSOR AGASSIZ'S “Geological

Sketches" originally appeared in the Atlantic Monthly, and are therefore popular rather than technical. The rambling and discursive style in which they are written, affords opportunity for explanation of some of the author's peculiar views. He thinks zoologists err in regarding the pterodactyl as a flying reptile; for, as he maintains, its wings resemble the paddles of a sea-turtle more than the wings of a bird; it has not the powerful breast-bone, with large projecting keel along the median line, peculiar to flying animals; and its teeth are too powerful for merely catching dragon-flies, the largest aerial prey of the period. Prof. Clark, discussing this question in his late work, "Mind in Nature," shows that the bat has a low median keel: it certainly is a flying animal. Dana states

a) GEOLOGICAL SKETCHES. By L. AGASSIZ.
ton.
Ticknor & Fields. 12mo, pp. 311. $2.25.

Bos

that the bones of the pterodactyl are hollow, like those of birds; so that it is possible that our author himself is in error, and that this was a flying reptile feeding upon aquatic animals. Prof. Agassiz denies the existence of birds in the Mesozoic age. He refers all the footprints to reptiles, or possibly marsupials, and looks upon the archæopteryx of Solenhofen as a synthetic type in which bird-like features are combined with reptilian structure. He also maintains that America is the oldest continent, in opposition to Murchison, who, judging from recent researches, claims priority for Africa. In the closing chapters, upon glaciers, the author defends his theory against the recently published views of Tyndall & Forbes. Prof. Agassiz takes advantage of every opportunity to assail the develop ment theory, and, in a quiet way, presents some strong arguments against it.

The work is exceedingly interesting.