So of the statement that "governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed." The men of '76 did not look forward to a time when that same nation, whose independence they proclaimed "in the name and by the authority of the good people of the Colonies," would for years maintain, by force of arms, its government over several of its own States without "the consent of the governed," and this with every ground of reason and of right: they did not even look forward to the close of the war of independence, when, in the very State of Massachusetts, which led on the war against British taxation, a rebellion should break out against paying debts of the United States contracted for the war, and taxes levied by the State without "the consent of the governed;" and Massachusetts should invoke the aid of Federal troops in putting down her own citizens, and, having suppressed the rebellion with a strong hand, should sentence the ringleaders to death, also without "the consent of" these refractory subjects. In a word, the Congress of 1776 did not think it necessary to fortify the doctrines of the Declaration against such abuses and absurdities as would lead to the disintegration of society, and make government the prey of factions, or the sport of individual wills. It was not individual, personal wills that they were thinking of when they spoke of "the consent of the governed. The right of self-government in communities, the right of representation in some form in the government, the right to be recognized in laying taxes and framing laws, as parties having a substantial voice in the same, this was the right that the British Parliament had attempted to wrest from them by an arbitrary government, a government without consent; and therefore they laid such stress upon governing with "the consent of the governed," without reference to the mode of government, or the manner in which such consent should be ascertained. Interpreted by its own light, this second proposition of the Declaration, like the first, contains a deep, far-reaching truth, a truth by which to hold governments to their place and duty in the interest of mankind.

Man must live in society. In a solitary, single-handed contest with wild beasts, with untamed nature, and even

with his own physical wants, it would fare hard with him as to the enjoyment of life, liberty, or happiness; and, in fact, he is born into and for society, and there he must abide. But, while the existence of society requires some mutual adjustment of the rights of individuals, only by crime against society can one forfeit any of his natural, personal rights. Crime apart, these rights are inalienable; and the independence of civil society, and its development in culture, require that these rights be guaranteed intact; that every man shall have equal security with any other in life, freedom, happiness, and shall be protected and encouraged in making the most of his powers, capacities, and opportunities for good.

The good to be sought in civil society is not, as Beccaria, Priestley, and the Bentham school would have it, an affair of the multiplication-table," the greatest happiness of the greatest number," but the best possible facilities for happiness placed impartially within the reach of all. In artificial rights, the public good may sometimes claim the sacrifice of individual interests; as, for instance, when a right of way is taken through private lands. But no plea of public good can take away from me one natural right, so long as I am guiltless of crime against the public welfare. For the individual voluntarily to sacrifice life, freedom, happiness, to some public end, is noble, is divine; but for the majority to deprive him of these for the sake of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" is an outrage upon that which is noble and divine in man. Society must leave to its every member his equal right to life, liberty, happiness. And what society must leave intact, that must the state secure. The state does not exist as an end in itself: it is the creation of society for its own conservation. Government is instituted by society, or rather it emerges from society as a condition necessary to its own existence. With society grow up institutions, customs, laws; and these, in time, take on the organic form of government. In every political society there is a latent sovereignty, a power not only charged with exhibiting and defending the society against other powers without, but capable of maintaining the society within itself. But this power must be used for the well-being of the society whose

attribute it is. Society does not exist for the state, but the state for society; and hence government is bound to secure to the integral members of society those rights upon which, as we have seen, society itself must rest for independence and culture. For the preservation of these rights, there is need of safety and order, the feeling of security, and hence need of government, to give to society security and permanence in and through the inalienable rights of its personal constituents.

Take

The correlative duties of the citizen to the government belong to another category: we are here concerned with the ends and obligations of civil government. And we might almost say, it is the right of every man to be governed; i.e., to be under law and authority competent and willing to maintain all just rights, and thus to make him secure in the rights that are justly his. In social anarchy, there is no security for personal rights; and it is of the fundamental philosophy of society, that, "to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men." away that conception, and by what pretext under heaven should a government exist? Could men owe allegiance to a government that should avowedly disregard their right to life, liberty, and happiness, and seek to trample out those rights by despotic power? Would society ever purposely establish such a government, or willingly recognize its authority? Do slaves owe allegiance to the force that enslaves them? The second proposition of the Declaration of Independence is fundamental to human society, -that governments exist, not by virtue of force, nor to maintain the power and rule of the governing, but to secure the rights of the governed.

But here observe the admirable wisdom of the Declaration in its specification of rights. On this point, the omissions of the document are almost as important to its true interpretation as are its express declarations. Indeed, in commenting upon certain passages in the paper as he reported it, and which Congress voted to strike out, Jefferson makes the observation, that "the sentiments of men are known not only by what they receive, but what they reject also ;" and we may apply this rule of construction

1 Jefferson's Works, vol. i. p. 19.

to his own omissions in the original draught of the Declaration. This, be it remembered, is a political document, and deals with political grievances and political rights. It is a document designed to justify to the world and to posterity the act of a people in declaring themselves a distinct nation; and it rests that action upon the fact that men are endowed with certain inalienable rights which government is bound to secure, but which the British Government had persistently sought to destroy. Now, when the specification of these rights is given, there is no mention, no hint even, of suffrage or of office-holding as a right with which man is endowed by his Creator. Had they conceived of suffrage as a natural right, and of eligibility to office as essential to human equality, and that a just government must secure these rights, then surely, in laying down the "inalienable rights" upon which all righteous government must be based, they would not have omitted these, nor have given them a secondary place under such generalities as life, liberty, and happiness. But in truth they had no thought of classing these political rights, or rather political trusts and privileges, with those natural rights that are in all men equal and inalienable. The distinction between these two classes of rights-rights that are natural to man as a being, and rights that are acquired by certain acts or conditions, or created by society is of supreme importance for testing certain modern theories of popular government in contrast with the government actually contemplated by the Declaration of Independence. That I may enjoy my natural right to life, liberty, happiness, it is not necessary that I should in any way rule over you, or attempt to control your actions by authority. It may, indeed, be necessary to the just enjoyment of our several rights, both yours and mine, that there be some competent authority above us both to cause us to respect each other's rights, if we will not do this from a sense of justice and honor; but such an authority is not an exercise of the right itself, nor a part of the natural right, but a something brought in from without to secure the enjoy ment of said natural right under the conditions and limitations proper to human society. The natural rights enumerated in the Declaration require nothing but opportunity, and, for the most part, to be let alone.

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Quite the reverse is it with political suffrage and political office. These, in their very nature, imply the act of governing others, and assume a qualification to govern. By what test, then, or evidence, shall we find in man a created equality in and for governing, answering to equality of right in life, liberty, happiness? Surely it is far from a self-evident" truth that every man has by birth the right to govern his fellows. To claim this for all men alike is absurd, since a society of equal governors would make actual government void. For each or any to claim this for himself is to assume the prerogative of kingship. Government is a science; and to govern is a faculty, a capacity, an art, with which some men appear to be specially endowed by nature, to which others may attain by study, discipline, experience, but for which most men show a very small measure either of endowment or of aptitude. Since the very act of governing, even to the extent of participation in government by suffrage, affects society in its every interest, and may put its every interest, and its very existence, in jeopardy, no one can claim it as his right to govern, unless he can show his competence to govern, to such extent, at least, as he demands to participate in government.

We have seen, that, in the political society, each man retains his equal natural rights, and that society is bound to conserve these impartially for all its members; but in the state, which is the governing function of society, no man can have a right, except upon the basis of duty accomplished toward the state in fitting himself intellectually, morally, practically, to the best of his ability, for its service. Since government emerges from society, and is for the behoof of society, it is for society to determine in what form, and by what persons, it shall be governed; and each political society must determine this for itself, in its own way. Hence there is no natural right to rule, nor to vote; but each and every form of participation in the state-function or governing-power of society is a trust, a privilege, conferred or conceded by society itself, subject to such conditions as society may impose. Here the principle of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," which cannot be maintained in the sphere of purely natural rights, may have its legitimate application.