JER, 第 11 卷Hanyang Economic Research Institute in collaboration with Hanyang University College of Business and Economics, 2006 |
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第 1 到 3 筆結果,共 12 筆
第 269 頁
... lobbying activity : მყ 2 opt S2 = R22 - · 42 ( L2 ) — w⋅ - dx2 ƏL2 ds2 Əs2 dx2 821106 ( 31 ) The first expression of the right - hand side represents the ' profit shift- ing term ' which is of the same form as the optimal subsidy ...
... lobbying activity : მყ 2 opt S2 = R22 - · 42 ( L2 ) — w⋅ - dx2 ƏL2 ds2 Əs2 dx2 821106 ( 31 ) The first expression of the right - hand side represents the ' profit shift- ing term ' which is of the same form as the optimal subsidy ...
第 270 頁
... lobbying activity is positive even in the second period , but lower than there is no lobbying . Proof . If we assume the welfare - improving subsidy program , this implies that profit shifting effect of subsidy is greater than lobbying ...
... lobbying activity is positive even in the second period , but lower than there is no lobbying . Proof . If we assume the welfare - improving subsidy program , this implies that profit shifting effect of subsidy is greater than lobbying ...
第 275 頁
... lobbying activity which induces lobbying- driven subsidy as well as lobbying cost . Thus , the presence of lobbying behaviour may weaken the argument for a strategic subsidy policy de- signed to capture profits from foreign rivals ...
... lobbying activity which induces lobbying- driven subsidy as well as lobbying cost . Thus , the presence of lobbying behaviour may weaken the argument for a strategic subsidy policy de- signed to capture profits from foreign rivals ...
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analysis asset risks assume assumption capacity utilization capital stock cash flows cointegrated correlation cost currency composition currency hedge debt debt-asset ratio depreciation derivatives econometric effect EIA experts empirical environmental accidents equation equilibrium expected exponential utility firm's foreign financial assets foreign firm futures market futures prices G(st Hanyang University home and foreign home firm home government i'th currency impulse response incentive increase industry interest rate swaps investment Korea Kt+1 lagged learning-by-doing linear lobbying activity LSTAR model marginal measures non-users null hypothesis optimal subsidy output shock parameters period-1 portfolio precommit predictability price-dividend ratio probability of default production profits prospect theory Real Business Cycle regime regression relative Response of STOCK risk aversion risk exposures risk management second period significant spillover spot price standard deviation statistic stock prices stock returns strategic swap users Table Teräsvirta tion trade transition function utility function volatility