$ 567] ANDREW JACKSON 479 uncouth dress and manner, unkempt hair tied in an eel-skin cue, and Jefferson was disgusted by the "passion" that "choked his utterance." Soon, however, Jackson found his place as military leader and Indian fighter; and he came back to political leadership as a more imposing figure, the natural spokesman of Western democracy. "Old Hickory" remained spare in person, with the active and abstemious living of the frontier. His hair was "CLAR DE KITCHEN," a contemporary cartoon caricaturing Jackson's treatment of his cabinet and friends when they differed from him. The faces are all portraits. By the courtesy of the Library of Congress. now a silvered mane. His manner was marked by a stately dignity and, toward all women, by true courtliness. Beneath this exterior, he remained as pugnacious and fearless and selfconfident as ever; apt to jump to conclusions and stubborn in clinging to them; sure of his own good intentions, and, with somewhat less reason, of his good judgment; trusting his 1 A choice bit of contemporary satire makes him say, "It has always bin my way, when I git a notion, to stick to it till it dies a natural death; and the more folks talk agin my notions, the more I stick to 'em." friends (not always wisely chosen) as himself; and moved by an unconscious vanity that made it easy for shrewd men to play upon him; but, withal, with sound democratic instincts, hating monopoly and distrusting commercial greed and all appeals from it for alliance with the government, and believing devotedly in the "sovereignty of the people," a sovereign who "could do no wrong." As President he felt himself to be the embodiment of the Nation's will; and he seized a masterful control of Congress so successfully and imposingly that all Presidents since have felt themselves possessed of rightful power never claimed by Washington or Jefferson. One symbol of the new power of the President was the growth of the veto. The preceding six Presidents together had vetoed nine bills- all on constitutional grounds; Jackson hailed twelve vetoes on the astounded Congress to control general policy, besides using freely the "pocket veto" which was permitted by the Constitution but which no former President had used. 568. The first and main fault of the new democracy, and of its chief, was the degradation of the civil service. Since Jefferson's election, there had been no change of party, and, until 1824, no factional contest within the dominant party. Accordingly, there had been no occasion for sweeping changes among officeholders. In 1820 Senator Crawford of Georgia had secured a "four-year tenure-of-office bill," providing that a great number of offices should thereafter always become vacant four years after appointment. But Adams, with high-minded dignity, refused to take advantage of this legal opportunity to punish adversaries and hire supporters. Instead, he reappointed all fit officials affected by the law, and made altogether only twelve removals during his term. The law remained, however, a keen weapon for less scrupulous men. Jackson, indeed, needed no new weapon: the powers of the President under the Constitution were enough for him. His enemies were, to his mind, the Nation's enemies; and he was controlled by friends who brazenly proclaimed the doctrine, "To the victors belong the spoils of the enemy." $ 569] THE SPOILS SYSTEM 481 Jackson men from distant States hastened to the Capital to attend the inauguration and press claims to appointments. Never had Washington seen such a horde of hungry politicians. In the preceding forty years of the government, there had been less than two hundred removals from office for all causes. In his first year, Jackson made two thousand. But this was far too moderate to content the multitude. The policy of spoils was the Nation's blunder, not merely the President's; and the Nation was to be shackled by it for more than a generation.2 At the moment it resulted in widespread inefficiency and in many scandalous cases of corruption-to all of which Jackson held himself stubbornly indifferent. His successor reaped the whirlwind. In 1837 (Van Buren's first year) the collector of the New York Customs defaulted in the sum of a million dollars and, together, 64 of the 67 land officers stole a million more. 569. The enlarged vote called for new political machinery. Each party created a hierarchy of permanent committees to manage its interests. From a National Committee there radiated downward the many State Committees. From each of these branched the committees for the counties and Congressional districts of the State; and from these, the committees for the precincts in the smallest voting units. This committee system was soon interwoven with a convention system. The division into parties had made it advisable to agree upon candidates for President in advance of the campaign,something never contemplated, as we have seen, by the Consti 1 McMaster (V, 521 ff.) gives a graphic picture. There is a briefer but more caustic one in McLaughlin's Cass (136, 137): “The scrambling, punch-drinking mob which invaded Washington at the inauguration, crowding and pushing into the White House, tipping over tubs of punch and buckets of ices, standing with muddy, hobnailed shoes on the damask furniture, thrusting themselves into the nooks and corners of the executive mansion with the air of copartners, who at last had an opportunity to take account of the assets of the firm. . . ." 2 The "spoils system" came into force in some States, notably in New York, sooner than in the Nation at large; and it has persisted longer as a serious ob stacle to reform in city and State even than in the National government. tution. For a while this was accomplished by the Congressional caucus (§ 389). But at such a caucus the members were Congressmen who had been chosen two years before, on wholly different issues. Men resented it that such uncommissioned "representatives" should presume to speak for the party on this vital matter, and the repute of "aristocratic King Caucus " had been dissipated finally in the campaign of 1824 (§ 517). The same causes which discredited the Congressional caucus for the Nation had also discredited legislative caucuses for nominating State officers; and New York and Pennsylvania had devised State Conventions, chosen in party gatherings in the various election districts. This step was extended to the Nation at large in the campaign of 1832. 570. For the next three quarters of a century, this machinery worked in the following way. The National Convention of a party (1) nominated candidates for President and Vice President; (2) adopted a statement of principles ("platform," on which the candidate was to stand); and (3) appointed a new National Committee, one member from each State and Territory. Some months in advance of the next presidential election, this committee issued a call for a new National Convention of its party. Below the National Committee were State, County, Town, and Precinct committees, each chosen by party gatherings or conventions. During the campaign the National Committee collected funds, secured and distributed campaign literature, and sent speakers and money to the critical States, to be used as the State Committees should direct. 571. This complex machinery called for an immense body of workers, "more people," said a competent authority twenty years ago, "than all the other political machinery in the world." It was natural, therefore, that its development should have gone along with the appearance of the spoils system (§ 568), to pay the necessary recruits. Quite as naturally the new machinery created "bosses," to direct it. In theory, the political machinery was to repre $572] "SPOILS" AND "BOSSES 483 sent the people's will. In practice, among a busy, optimistic people, it was admirably fitted to fall into the hands of "professionals." For half a century, while the system was at its worst, the average citizen (unless with an "ax to grind ") largely withdrew from all political duties, except that of voting for the names put before him. Officeholders of various grades managed the committees of the party in power; and expectants for office managed those of the other party. Such conditions gave a low tone to politics. A campaign, to the most active participants, was dangerously like a struggle for mere personal preferment. "Ward heelers" and the lowest grade of active workers, taking orders from a city boss, managed ward and precinct primaries. The professionals were often the only voters to appear; and if other citizens came, they found the chairman, judges, and printed tickets all arranged for them by the "machine." The managers were usually unscrupulous players of the game, and, at a pinch, did not hesitate to "pack" a meeting in order to secure the election of their delegates. Arrived at State or county convention, such delegates, with disciplined obedience, put through the "slate" drawn up in advance by the bigger bosses, who commonly had arranged all details with a nicety and precision found until recently in few lines of business. The big boss was not always an officeholder. His profit often came in indirect ways and sometimes in corrupt ways. Corporations wishing favors or needing protection against unfair treatment were willing to pay liberally the man who could secure their will for them. Often the bosses of opposing parties in a State have had a perfect understanding with each other, working together behind the scenes and dividing the plunder. 572. The President's "patronage" gained new importance from this "boss "" system. It soon became the rule for him to nominate postmasters and other Federal officeholders only on the recommendation of the congressman of the district, if he were of the President's party, or of the "boss" who expected to become or to make a congressman. The congressman uses this control over Federal patronage to build up a personal machine, so as to insure support for his reëlection. And the practice gives a powerful weapon to a strong President, who is |