supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall make."

Thus then we find that the judicial power shall extend to a great variety of cases, but that the supreme court shall have only appellate jurisdiction in all admiralty and maritime causes, in all controversies between the United States and private citizens, between citizens of different states, between citizens of the same state claiming lands under different states, and between a citizen of the United States and foreign states, citizens or subjects. The honorable gentleman from Kentucky, who made the motion on your table, has told us that the constitution, in its judiciary provisions, contemplated only those cases which could not be tried in the state courts. But he will, I hope, pardon me when I contend that the constitution did not merely contemplate, but did by express words, reserve to the national tribunals a right to decide, and did secure to the citizens of America a right to demand their decision, in many cases evidently cognizable in the state courts. And what are these cases? They are those, in respect to which, it is by the constitution presumed, that the state courts would not always make a cool and calm investigation, a fair and just decision. To form, therefore, a more perfect union, and to insure domestic tranquillity, the constitution has said there shall be courts of the union to try causes, by the wrongful decision of which, the union might be endangered or domestic tranquillity be disturbed. And what courts? Look again at the cases designated. The supreme court has no original jurisdiction. The constitution has said that the judicial powers shall be vested in the supreme and inferior courts. It has declared that the judicial power, so vested, shall extend to the cases mentioned, and that the supreme court shall not have original jurisdiction in those cases. Evidently, therefore, it has declared, that they shall (in the first instance) be tried by inferior courts, with

appeal to the supreme court. This, therefore, amounts to a declaration, that the inferior courts shall exist. Since, without them, the citizen is deprived of those rights for which he stipulated, or rather those rights verbally granted, would be actually withheld; and that great security of our union, that necessary guard of our tranquillity, be completely paralyzed, if not destroyed. In declaring, then, that these tribunals shall exist, it equally declares, that the Congress shall ordain and establish them. I say they shall; this is the evident intention, if not the express words, of the constitution. The convention in framing, the American people in adopting that compact, did not, could not presume, that the Congress would omit to do what they were thus bound to do. They could not presume, that the legislature would hesitate one moment, in establishing the organs necessary to carry into effect those wholesome, those important provisions.

The honorable member from Virginia has given us a history of the judicial system, and, in the course of it, has told us, that the judges of the supreme court knew, when they accepted their offices, the duties they had to perform, and the salaries they were to receive. He thence infers, that if again called on to do the same duties, they have no right to complain. Agreed-but that is not the question between us. Admitting that they have made a hard bargain, and that we may hold them to a strict performance, is it wise to exact their compliance to the injury of our constituents? We are urged to go back to the old system; but let us first examine the effects of that system. The judges of the supreme court rode the circuits, and two of them, with the assistance of a district judge, held circuit courts and tried causes. As a supreme court, they have in most cases only an appellate jurisdiction. In the first instance, therefore, they tried a cause, sitting as an inferior court, and then, on appeal, tried it over again, as a supreme court. Thus then the appeal was from the sentence of the judges to the judges them

selves. But say, that to avoid this impropriety, you will incapacitate the two judges who sat on the circuit from sitting in the supreme court to review their own decrees. Strike them off; and suppose, either the same or a contrary decision to have been made on another circuit, by two of their brethren in a similar case for the same reason you strike them off, and then you have no court left. Is this wise? Is it safe? You place yourselves in the situation where your citizens must be deprived of the advantage given to them of a court of appeals, or else run the greatest risk that the decision of the first court will carry with it that of the other.

The same honorable member has given us a history of the law passed the last session, which he wishes now to repeal. That history is accurate at least in one important part of it. I believe that all amendments were rejected, pertinaciously rejected; and I acknowledge that I joined heartily in that rejection. It was for the clearest reason on earth. We all perfectly understood, that to amend the bill was to destroy it; that if ever it got back to the other House, it would perish. Those, therefore, who approved of the general provisions of that bill, were determined to adopt it. We sought the practicable good, and would not, in pursuit of unattainable perfection, sacrifice that good to the pride of opinion. We took the bill, therefore, with its imperfections, convinced, that when it was once passed into a law, it might be easily amended.

We are now told, that this procedure was improper; nay, that it was indecent; that public opinion had declared itself against us; that a majority, (holding different opinions,) was already chosen to the other House; and that a similar majority was expected for that in which we sit. Mr. President, are we then to understand, that opposition to the majority in the two Houses of Congress is improper, is indecent? If so, what are we to think of those gentlemen, who, not only with proper and decent, but with laudable motives, (for

such is their claim,) so long, so perseveringly, so pertinaciously opposed that voice of the people, which had so repeatedly, and for so many years, declared itself against them, through the organ of their representatives? Was this indecent in them? If not, how could it be improper for us to seize the only moment, which was left for the then majority to do what they deemed a necessary act? Let me again refer to those imperious demands of the constitution, which called on us to establish inferior courts. Let me remind gentlemen of their assertion on this floor, that centuries might elapse before any judicial system could be established with general consent. And then let me ask, being thus impressed with the sense of the duty and the difficulty of performing that arduous task, was it not wise to seize the auspicious moment?

Among the many stigmas affixed to this law, we have been told, that the President, in selecting men to fill the offices which it created, made vacancies and filled them from the floor of this House; and that but for the influence of this circumstance, a majority in favor of it could not have been found. Let us examine this suggestion. It is grounded on a supposition of corrupt influence, derived from a hope, founded on two remote and successive contingencies. First, the vacancy might or might not exist; for it depended as well on the acceptance of another as on the President's grant; and secondly, the President might or might not fill it with a member of this House. Yet on this vague conjecture, on this unstable ground, it is inferred, that men in high confidence violated their duty. It is hard to determine the influence of self-interest on the heart of man. I shall not, therefore, make the attempt. In the present case, it is possible that the imputation may be just, but I hope not, I believe not. At any rate, gentlemen will agree with me, that the calculation is uncertain, and the conjecture vague.

But let it now, for argument's sake, be admitted, saving always the reputation of honorable men, who

are not here to defend themselves-let it, I say, for argument's sake, be admitted, that the gentlemen alluded to acted under the influence of improper motives. What then? Is a law that has received the varied assent required by the constitution, and is clothed with all the needful formalities, thereby invalidated? Can you impair its force by impeaching the motives of any member who voted for it? Does it follow, that a law is bad because all those who concurred in it cannot give good reasons for their votes? Is it not before us? Must we not judge of it by its intrinsic merit? Is it a fair argument, addressed to our understanding, to say, we must repeal a law, even a good one, if the enacting of it may have been effected, in any degree, by improper motives? Or, is the judgment of this House so feeble, that it may not be trusted?

Gentlemen tell us, however, that the law is materially defective, nay, that it is unconstitutional. What follows? Gentlemen bid us repeal it. But is this just reasoning? If the law be only defective, why not amend? And if unconstitutional, why repeal? In this case, no repeal can be necessary; the law is in itself void; it is a mere dead letter.

To show that it is unconstitutional, a particular clause is pointed out, and an inference is made, as in the case of goods, where, because there is one contraband article on board, the whole cargo is forfeited. Admit, for a moment, that the part alluded to were unconstitutional, this would in nowise affect the remainder. That part would be void, or if you think proper, you can repeal that part.

Let us, however, examine the clause objected to on the ground of the constitution. It is said, that by this law the district judges, in Tennessee and Kentucky, are removed from office by making them circuit judges. And again, that you have by law appointed two new offices, those of circuit judges, and filled them by law, instead of pursuing the modes of appointment prescribed by the constitution. To prove all this, the gentle