fault of such appearance, though without sufficient excuse, and where there were no goods to be attached, or if the debt were contracted fraudulently, or without a probability of payment, it should be considered as a misdemeanor against society, and a criminal offence, subjecting the debtor, in such case, and such only, to a term of imprisonment, or what other punishment the present or other laws may deem adequate. For such a purpose the Court of Reference should have the power of commitment, similar to what the present Insolvent Court now enjoys in the nature of a remand, and for such periods as might be approved, according to the amount of offence imputed to the then criminal debtor. This kind of proceeding, Sir, would establish a just difference between the treatment of the virtuous and vicious part of the community, who now suffer as regards imprisonment almost exactly alike, and by its result must afford and maintain a proper distinction of character and station in society afterwards. There must of course be many points, Sir, with respect to such an institution as I have proposed, that have not been dwelt on, many regulations necessary which have not been alluded to, and some disadvantages might be apparent to others which I do not foresee: but the evils that unavoidably would be, and ought to be removed, by the abolition of arrest for debt, especially'on mesne process, and which the late Lord Stanhope very forcibly and acutely denominated "the White Slave Trade," are so great and so abhorrent to the manly and independent spirit of Englishmen, that even were a little commercial or some occasional pecuniary sacrifices to be made, though I cannot for my own part apprehend their occurrence, the change must be considered as an improvement in our laws. So far indeed from any kind of inconvenience attending such a change, I am strongly impressed that it would be generally and individually advantageous. I think, Sir, and trust I have proved, that as regards the creditor, whose interest alone, or chiefly, will be thought to be at stake, in any abolition of arrest for debt, by the institution of a Court of Reference, his power over the debtor or his property would be much more direct and summary, than is now the case, through the medium of any existing court whatsoever; that the summons there mentioned would have the before conceded effect of arrest, both as to immediate payment of any debt, where it can be done, or the appearance in court that is now intended by the imprisonment of the person; that, as plaintiffs are now often obliged by the incapacity of the defendant or his using the Insolvent Act to pay their own costs, much money might be saved to creditors, in the more simple and unexpensive proceedings of the Court of Reference; that many of their debtors are driven abroad, from fear of arrest, who otherwise would remain at home, and pay at least a part of what they owe; whereas now the whole amount is lost to

them; that others continue in prison as a kind of defence against their creditors' claims, which are oftentimes never satisfied, but the money that should be given up to them spent and wasted in extravagance and dissipation, according to a common and well-founded complaint for many years past; that imprisonment of a debtor, being a proceeding of the highest nature, when a creditor has chosen the person, and the debtor dies in prison, which not very unfrequently happens, he loses his claim entirely; whereas were arrest for debt abolished, the debtor would not have such a kind of sanctuary to fly to, or be able to detain his property from the creditor; -these things, Sir, and some other points of the like nature being well considered, it is with confidence I submit to you, whether the repeal of arrest for debt, both on mesne process and even in execution, would not be greatly to the benefit of the creditor, (who should also reflect that, were it otherwise, he might one day be placed himself in the reverse situation,) whilst, generally speaking, it would be a relief to the unfortunate debtor. To the honest one, who alone is worthy of much consideration, it certainly must be, whilst it would take away the privileges which some of an opposite character, or of a more stubborn and revengeful disposition now enjoy. It would also remove the facility of fraudulent practices and obtainment of goods, which are now so exceedingly prevalent, as the names of such persons who will have been then criminally imprisoned though for debt, and who for the most part are concerned in these deceptions, would or might be regularly published, for the safety and caution of society; whilst at the present time, they are but little known, and cannot oftentimes be avoided. In these views of the case, the abolition of arrest for debt would be more beneficial to the generality of tradesmen and of creditors, than to the debtors themselves. It would also have another good effect, that of checking the angry passions of many of the former, and of almost all of the latter class; it would afford less opportunity for the baser myrmidons of the law to oppress and pillage the unfortunate victim which should fall into their hands, and render that profession more generally useful and respectable, by acting oftener in a mediatorial than compulsory and tyrannical manner. The mode of enforcing payment by the Court of Reference now spoken of would, I think, Sir, be superior to the present, both from its directness and simplicity; it would be very like the method which has for many years subsisted in the principality, and has been found to answer the creditors' purpose extremely well, whilst it harasses the debtor but in a trifling degree; and it would certainly be more consistent in itself as requiring no opposing modification, an evident proof of imperfection in any law, and which is thought necessary against that of arrest for debt; in the form of bail in the first place, to the sheriff; justifying bail in

the second place, to the court; protection against undue influence whilst in imprisonment, in the third place; and, fourthly, the granting a chance of liberation, by the non-payment of an allowance often demanded from the creditor when in execution or after a remand; with, fifthly, the benefit of the Insolvent Act.

Now, Sir, I must contend, that any law like that of imprisonment for debt, which is thought to require so many salvos or modifying regulations, and for which such a number of provisions have been made, in order to its avoidance or mitigation, is directly proved to be in se faulty and erroneous, or why afford a debtor the privilege of putting in bail at all if imprisonment be justifiable? why not send him to prison at once? and if the sending and keeping him there afterwards be attended with no ill consequences to his freedom of mental action, or he be thought on an equal footing with his creditor, why provide against an evil that does not exist, and allow him, at a subsequent time, to nullify any act or agreement he there have done or entered into? and, moreover, if a person may ought to be imprisoned for debt, which he cannot pay, why grant a chance of escape from the punishment supposed due to him by the negligence of his creditor? or, lastly, why was the Insolvent Court instituted for his release?

These, Sir, may be considered as amendments on the law of arrest and imprisonment for debt, like amendments on any common legislative act, which denotes the first attempt to be wrong or imperfect; but I may say they even go farther than that, for they prove it of themselves, independent of many other considerations, to be deserving only of entire neglect and abolition. In such a view I trust, Sir, it will be held by yourself, and that arrest of the person for debt will meet from your hands the fate which it merits. I trust it will be estimated as an unnecessary infraction on the liberty of the subject, and altogether an oppressive and unpatriotic proceeding.unfit even for "the dark ages" in which it was instituted, and much more for the present liberal and more refined period, when the feelings of mankind are become less insensible to what is right and just, when liberty both of speech and action is held in so important a light, and whilst every mind is waiting in anxious expectation for a general revision and improvement of our laws.

I have now, Sir, only to add, that in every argument advanced in this letter I have used neither theory nor fiction. They are founded on a knowlege of existing facts and persons, and on that account, I trust, deserve greater weight. Examples could not well be publicly brought forward, and their introduction would also have added too considerably to the length of my communication. They might, however, if thought necessary, be easily procured and described, as there are many living instances of my remarks within the

precincts of the metropolis-observing merely, that I have not, nor am likely to have, any personal interest in the continuance or abrogation of the law of arrest for debt, and that I address you on the subject purely from national and benevolent motives.

I have the honor to subscribe myself, with all due respect, Sir,
your most obedient humble servant,
HY. JEMMETT.

January 28th, 1826.

P.S. I beg, Sir, to add a remark or two on the principle of arrest for debt on mesne process, and on the inroads which have been made on it, (undoubtedly from motives of strict justice and policy,) at different times, which I have not before pointed out amongst the many indirect attacks exhibited with respect to this part of our law in the foregoing letter. It must be allowed, that whatever is right in itself, ought to be left unconfined in effect and operation, since no possible evil can result from a good principle. If arrest for debt then be just and pure in its nature, there never ought to have been any limitation to the exercise of this power, or no kind of debt either greater or smaller in amount should have claimed exemption from its influence. In our criminal law it is considered equally an infraction of the right of property to steal an article of the value of one shilling as of the value of twenty pounds, though the punishment awarded may not be exactly similar. The law itself is broken in either case, and the culprit is amenable to it for the offence committed: but in our civil law, as regards arrest for debt, even the first founders appear to have been somewhat aware of its injustice, and to have brought forward an antidote, or at least a palliative, in restricting the privilege of exerting it against debtors who owed less than ten pounds. Now here the principle itself was violated, or treated at least very inconsistently. If it were right at all, it must have been right in all and every case, let the amount of debt be what it would; and it was equally as just to arrest a man for one shilling as for a larger sum; or in other words, equally as unjust to arrest a man for ten pounds, as for a smaller debt. The principle applies to each respective state of debt, to the one as well as the other. I have as yet, Sir, alluded only to the first promulgators of this law, with respect to the sum mentioned as empowering arrest; but in consonance with the same reasoning and the same regard to a consistent preservation of, or departure from, the principle of arrest, I will now advert to a more recent encroachment on the point now under discussion, in the augmentation of the sum for which, as a minimum, a person may be arrested, from ten to fifteen pounds. Here, Sir, is another direct attack on the justice of

arrest; or I may rather say, acknowlegement of its injustice, by a more extended defence of the debtor's person against the creditor's violence. This step, both from its later adoption and comparatively increased amount, speaks even yet more forcibly against the propriety of arrest than the former clause. Why this innovation? If the principle on which the law is founded be right, why adopt a measure to frustrate its operation even in part? Why nullify a right proceeding even in the smallest degree? It is not, Sir, that I am condemning the change I have spoken of as matters now stand, for I much applaud the protection (though it be small) which is thus granted to the debtor, and hail the measure as a partial acknowlegement of the wrongness in principle I am now endeavoring to illustrate, as it could be only a doubt or partial conviction of its injustice which could lead our present legislators to alter the original sum of a debtor's liability. I hope indeed that ajstill greater change will take place, and even venture to expect it from the parliamentary discussions which have ensued on this point, when the protecting sum was wished to be rated even higher than it now is, by many sensible and considerate members of the House of Commons; and I trust that the amount of protection to the liberty of the subject will be enlarged, until that valuable liberty shall be truly and amply secured by the total abolition of arrest for debt.