Appropriations permanent, continuing, and annual Audit The Comptroller of the Treasury that, although he was depriving various committees of their much-prized power to report appropriations, he was still leaving them valuable and useful functions. His scheme has the merit that it contains less novelty than the other plans for reform and is but a modification of a system which was in operation for twenty years. It lacks, however, the advantages of the Taft budget plan and the Sherley committee plan in that it fails to coördinate the revenue-producing and revenue-spending committees. Furthermore, it requires a greater sacrifice of political influence from the other committees than either of the other plans. It would undoubtedly make for economy, and at the same time raise the Committee on Appropriations to a commanding position politically, making its chairman the most important man in the House. PAYMENTS AND AUDIT Payments are made only as the result of appropriations of Congress. These statutes may be classified as (1) permanent, such as appropriations for the interest and principal of the public debt; (2) continuing, such as those of the construction of public works, like the Panama Canal and some river and harbor improvements; and (3) annual, — such as appropriation bills for all branches of the government service. The payments are made by the Treasurer of the United States and subtreasurers or their agents upon warrants of the proper disbursing officers approved by the proper auditors and comptrollers. The system of auditing is involved and technical. In general the departments having the greatest expenditures 1 are assigned auditors, while a single auditor serves for the expenses of the other departments where the expenditures are not so heavy. It is the duty of these auditors to pass upon the warrants of the disbursing officers and see that the account or claim against the government is submitted in proper form. Appeals from their decisions lie to the Comptroller of the Treasury. The Comptroller of the Treasury, although attached to the treasury department, is appointed by the president and holds a semi-independent 1 Treasury, War, Interior, Navy, and Post Office, although this department is less dependent upon the Secretary of the Treasury than the others. position of a quasi-judicial character. It is his duty to pass upon all appeals from the decision of the auditors, and to advise the disbursing officers in determining the validity of payments. His decisions are not reviewable by the Secretary of the Treasury, but appeal may be entertained by the appropriate court of law. Within his province the Comptroller is independent even of the Attorney-General upon questions of law. Nevertheless, like all officers except the judges, he is liable to removal by the president, and is thus, like them, subject to the directions of the president. His position, although involving judicial duties, is not so carefully protected from political influence as is that of the Comptroller in England, who in the performance of similar duties receives the same protection as is given to the judges. The government slow to appreciate and use this power Power to regulate com only by the Constitution CHAPTER XIX THE REGULATION OF COMMERCE THE POWER TO REGULATE FOREIGN AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE The right to regulate commerce stands second in the list of powers granted to Congress. Indeed, while the right to raise money might possibly be implied, the right to control commerce must depend upon some specific grant. The disastrous experience of the Confederation when both foreign and interstate commerce were at the mercy of state jealousy and avarice convinced the convention of 1787 that national regulation was absolutely essential. Although adopted as the result of a compromise and subject to several restrictions, the power contained in the grant has proved sufficient for the unexpected development and expansion of commerce and industry. The government was slow to appreciate the extent and the significance of this power. It was not until 1824 that the extent of the power was pointed out by the Supreme Court in Gibbons v. Ogden, and during the next sixty years the grant was more generally invoked to prevent state encroachments than to substantiate federal activity. Not until 1887 did Congress attempt in any comprehensive way to utilize affirmatively the authority given it over interstate commerce, and this attempt was hardly made efficacious until 1906. In 1824 Marshall, in his opinion in the case of Gibbons v. merce limited Ogden,1 pointed out the extent of the power in these words: "The power to regulate commerce, like all other powers vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution." Therefore, no assumed or additional restriction drawn from conditions existent in 1787 or the intent of the convention can 19 Wheat. 1, 196. limit or control the extent of this power. This was clearly asserted in 1889 when the court used these words: "The reasons which may have caused the framers of the Constitution to repose the power to regulate interstate commerce in Congress do not, however, affect or limit the extent of the power itself." 1 Thus, subject to the restrictions contained in the Constitution itself, Congress has full and absolute power to adopt any means to regulate commerce for any purpose that it shall deem advisable. To illustrate by anticipation, it will be seen that under this clause Congress has not merely checked state interference and provided for equality in transportation, but has utilized this power to accomplish, by federal legislation, economic, industrial, social, and moral reforms. In other words, by means of the authority to regulate commerce Congress has been able to enter the vast field of the police power from which it was otherwise debarred. Power not the intent of the framers stitution limited by of the Con Development of the com mercial power commerce? The present conception of the term "commerce " is the result what is of judicial interpretation and definition. From the very early years of the government the court has been liberal in its interpretation of this word. Thus, in 1827, Marshall said, "Com- Marshall's merce is intercourse"; while in 1875 Chief Justice Field gave the following more ample definition : definition sive definition of commerce Commerce is a term of the largest import. It comprehends inter- A comprehencourse for the purpose of trade in any and all its forms, including the transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities between the citizens of our country and the citizens or subjects of other countries, and between the citizens of different states. The power to regulate it embraces all the instruments by which such commerce may be conducted.2 In 1877 the court thus summarized the constantly increasing application of the term: definition with chang The powers thus granted are not confined to the instrumentalities of Expansion of commerce, or the postal service known or in use when the Constitution was adopted, but they keep pace with the progress of the country, and ing conditions adapt themselves to the new developments of time and circumstances. They extend from the horse with its rider, to the stage coach, from the 1 Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 228. 2 Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 280. Commercial power covers agents and means of commerce as transported sailing vessel to the steamboat, from the coach and steamboat to the railroad, and from the railroad to the telegraph, as these new agencie are successively brought into use to meet the demands of increasing population and wealth.1 Messages by telephone and wireless telegraph are also included within this definition, in short, anything that involves transportation of persons or things, tangible or intangible. "Transportation is essential to commerce, or rather it is commerce itself," said the court in Railroad Co. v. Husen.2 The regulation of commerce extends not merely to the thing transported and the means by which it is transported but also to the persons engaged in the act of transportation. Thus, not well as thing only has the power of Congress to compel the use of safety appliances on railroads been upheld, but legislation concerning the hours of labor and the relations of the employees to the employers have been sustained on the ground that the employers were agencies of commerce. In sustaining the second Employers' Liability Act the court used these words: What is not commerce: (1) Bills of exchange Among the instrumentalities and agents to which the power extends are the railroads over which transportation from one state to another is conducted, the engines and cars by which such transportation is effected, and all who are in any wise engaged in such transportation, whether as common carriers or as their employees.3 On the other hand, certain well-recognized commercial transactions do not fall within the definition. For example, the court has held that bills of exchange were not commerce, saying: A bill of exchange is neither an export nor an import. . . . Now the individual who uses his money and credit in buying and selling bills of exchange, and who thereby realizes a profit, may be taxed by a state in proportion to his income, as other persons are taxed, or in the form of a license. He is not engaged in commerce, but in supplying an instrument of commerce. He is less connected with it than the shipbuilder, without whose labor foreign commerce could not be carried on.* 1 Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U. S. 1, 9. 8 Mondous v. N. Y., N. H. & Hart. R. R. Co., 223 U. S. 1, 47. |