The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia, 1787

now proposed has not been practically felt, must be attributed, not to any corrective principle in our Constitution, nor to any rigid adherence to the jealous maxims of democracy on the part of the people, but to the motives of action which have governed our chief magistrates. As yet, there has been nothing to excite alarm upon this subject.

The limitation proposed has not yet been wanted, and probably will not be for many years to come; but it is the dictate of prudence to provide for the danger while it is yet remote.

Although this question excites but little feeling at present, it once created more agitation than any other subject that came before them, as will appear by a few extracts from the Journal of that Convention :

On the 1st of June, 1787, in the Federal Convention, Mr. Randolph introduced a resolution, that the national executive should not be eligible a second time, (p. 191 ;) and the next day it was agreed to, eight states being for the resolution, one against it, and one divided. (p. 191.) Seven years was the term then in contemplation.

On the 15th of June, Mr. Patterson submitted a proposition, that the United States in Congress be authorized to elect a federal executive for years, to be ineligible a second time. (p. 208.) The term in contemplation then was also seven years.

On the 18th of June, Colonel Hamilton submitted resolutions, that the President and Senate should be elected to serve during good behavior; that is, for life, with powers nearly as extensive as those of the King and House of Lords of Great Britain. (p. 212.)

Colonel Hamilton was one of the greatest men in this country, and, without doubt, believed that his plan was well calculated to promote the happiness and prosperity of the Union. Many of our distinguished citizens thought with him then, who afterwards changed their opinions, on witnessing the success of our present system.

On the 19th of June, the resolutions of Mr. Randolph, as altered and agreed to in the committee of the whole, were submitted, of which the 9th resolution was, "that a national executive be instituted, to consist of a single person, to be chosen by the national legislature, for the term of seven years, to be ineligible a second time." (pp. 75, 214.) July 17th, it was moved to strike out the words "to be ineligible a second time," which passed in the affirmative, - yeas, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Georgia; nays, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina. (p. 215.) On this occasion, Massachusetts, Maryland, and Georgia, changed their votes, which were first in favor of the limitation. Pennsylvania, which was divided before, now voted against the limitation. Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina, maintained their ground. New Jersey did not vote on the first question.

It was moved to strike out "seven years," and insert "good behavior;" which passed in the negative. yeas, 4; nays, 6. It would seem that four states, at this time, preferred an executive for life.

A motion was made to reconsider, and passed in the affirmative.

On the 19th July, a motion was made to restore the words "to be ineligible a second time." It passed in the negative. (p. 242.)

July 25th, it was moved that no person should be capable of holding the office of President more than six years in any twelve; which passed in the negative - yeas, 5; nays, 6.

The next day, it was moved to amend the resolution, so as to read, " for the term of seven years, to be ineligible a second time." It passed in the affirmative, -yeas, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina; nays, Connecticut and Delaware. (p. 243.)

The same day, it was reported to the Convention as one of the resolutions agreed to This resolution, together with those offered by Mr. Pinckney, and those offered by Mr. Patterson, were referred to a committee, who, on the 6th of August, reported a draft of a constitution, the 1st section of the 10th article of which was, "The President shall be elected by the legislature. He shall hold his office during seven years, but shall not be elected a second time." (p. 255.)

The friends of this limitation now considered the question at rest; but they were deceived it was too important in the eyes of the friends to an executive for life to be given up yet.

On the 24th August, a motion was made to postpone the consideration of the two last clauses of the 1st section of article 10, to wit, the term of years and the limitation. It passed in the negative. It was moved to refer them to a committee of a member from each state. It passed in the negative.

tleman from South Carolina, had been derived from the circumstance that the person coming within its operation had his bench ruptured or broken up. The bench of whom? Not of the farmer not of the mechanic

- but the bench of the money-dealer, and the bench, or counter, of the merchant. Grant that some persons, not strictly traders, may, at times, have been included in the provisions of some laws on the subject of bankruptcies; yet this was where the power of legislation was unlimited — where all legislation, as to all creditors and debtors, was invested in one body. It has but seldom occurred any where, and existed nowhere at the time of this grant of power to Congress.

That laws on the subject of bankruptcies were then deemed commercial only, is further manifest from the fact that when, late in the session of the Convention which framed the Constitution, this clause was introduced, it was coupled with a clause regulating the rate of damages, &c., on bills of exchange. It was well known to our fathers, that, in thirteen distinct sovereignties, the laws as to debtors and creditors were, and must always be, in many respects, very various, to meet their different usages, pursuits, prejudices, and educations; but that the merchants, throughout the confederacy, must carry on their business in other and remote states from those where they resided; and hence, as to their debts, their failures, and their adjustment of their affairs, it might be highly convenient and salutary to have similar rules and laws. In a Constitution, therefore, created, in a great degree, throughout, to benefit commerce, it was natural to confer power to make uniformity, or uniform laws, on a commercial subject.

It was impossible that Congress could, constitutionally, bring farmers and mechanics, by their individual consent, within the provisions of this act, where they would not be compelled to come without consent. It was no question between Congress and those individuals; it was solely a question between the general government and the individual states. He was opposed to this feature of the act; because to pass it would be to bring subjects and citizens within the scope of the general government, never contemplated by our fathers.

The question lay in a very narrow compass. It was, whether Congress had been clothed with power to pass laws regulating the insolvencies of persons not traders, and making their operation upon such persons dependent on their consent. The solution of this question rested mainly on the meaning of the word bankruptcies, as used in the grant of power on this subject, by the states, to the general government, in the 8th section of the 1st article of the Constitution. It thus became a momentous question of state rights, and hence deserved most deliberate consideration.

Amendment to the Constitution.

SENATE, March, 1826.

Mr. DICKERSON. If, by our Constitution, the President of the United States was elected to hold his office during good behavior, our government would be, by whatever name it might be called, an elective monarchy, limited in its powers, but with sufficient inherent energy to break down, in time, any barriers that a written constitution could present against the encroachment of arbitrary power. If, under our Constitution, we adopt the practice of electing our Presidents from period to period. until the infirmities of age admonish them to retire, our system will soon become that of an elective monarchy. That the want of the limitation

The limitation proposed has not yet been wanted, and probably will not be for many years to come; but it is the dictate of prudence to provide for the danger while it is yet remote.

On the 19th of June, the resolutions of Mr. Randolph, as altered and agreed to in the committee of the whole, were submitted, of which the 9th resolution was, "that a national executive be instituted, to consist of a single person, to be chosen by the national legislature, for the term of seven years, to be ineligible a second time." (pp. 75, 214.) July 17th, it was moved to strike out the words "to be ineligible a second time," which passed in the affirmative, — yeas, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Georgia; nays, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina. (p. 215.) On this occasion, Massachusetts, Maryland, and Georgia, changed their votes, which were first in favor of the limitation. Pennsylvania, which was divided before, now voted against the limitation. Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina, maintained their ground. New Jersey did not vote on the first question.

It was moved to strike out "seven years," and insert "good behavior;" which passed in the negative. yeas, 4; nays, 6. It would seem that four states, at this time, preferred an executive for life.

A motion was made to reconsider, and passed in the affirmative.

On the 19th July, a motion was made to restore the words "to be ineligible a second time." It passed in the negative. (p. 242.)

July 25th, it was moved that no person should be capable of holding the office of President more than six years in any twelve; which passed in the negative - yeas, 5; nays, 6.

The friends of this limitation now considered the question at rest; but they were deceived: it was too important in the eyes of the friends to an executive for life to be given up yet.

August 31, it was agreed to refer such parts of the plan of a constitution as had been postponed, and such reports as had been acted on, to a committee of one member from each state. (p. 307.)

On the 4th of September, Mr. Brearly reported certain alterations, &c., the fourth of which was, "The President shall hold his office for four years." In this the limitation was omitted. (p. 312.)

On the 5th of September, it was moved to postpone the report, and take up the following: "The President shall be elected by joint ballot of the legislature. He shall hold his office during seven years, but shall not be elected a second time." This was decided in the negative, and seems to have been the last effort in the Convention in favor of limitation.

On the ratification of the Constitution, several states proposed amendments. Virginia proposed that no person should be capable of being President more than eight years in sixteen; North Carolina, the same.

New York proposed, that no person should be elected President a third time — exactly what is now proposed.

Although the principle of hereditary succession has gained no force in our presidential elections, the principle of a different succession has already become almost irresistible. It is, that the President shall designate his successor, by placing him in the most important office in his gift, and clothing him with such a degree of patronage and power, as to make him an overmatch for any competitor in the walks of private life, whatever may be his merits or his services. The Federal Convention could not have foreseen the operation of this principle as we now see it, or they would have adopted some rule analogous to that most important provision of the Roman law, that no one could be a candidate for the consulship, unless he presented himself in a private station. As no President has yet discovered a disposition to hold the office more than eight years, it may be considered by some as having grown into a law, that no one shall hold the office for a longer period.

State Rights. - Foote's Resolutions.

SENATE, January, 1830.

Mr. WEBSTER. There remains to be performed by far the most grave and important duty, which I feel to be devolved on me by this occasion It is to state, and to defend, what I conceive to be the true principles of the Constitution under which we are here assembled.

I understand the honorable gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Hayne] to maintain that it is a right of the state legislatures to interfere, whenever, in their judgment, this government transcends its constitutional limits, and to arrest the operations of its laws.

I understand him to maintain this right, as a right existing under the Constitution; not as a right to overthrow it, on the ground of extreme necessity, such as would justify violent revolution.

I understand him to maintain an authority, on the part of the states, thus to interfere, for the purpose of correcting the exercise of power by the general government, of checking it, and of compelling it to conform to their opinion of the extent of its powers.

I understand him to maintain that the ultimate power of judging of the constitutional extent of its own authority is not lodged exclusively in the general government, or any branch of it; but that, on the contrary, the states may lawfully decide for themselves, and each state for itself, whether, in a given case, the act of the general government transcends its power.

İ understand him to insist that, if the exigency of the case, in the opinion of any state government, require it, such state government may, by its own sovereign authority, annul an act of the general government, which it deems plainly and palpably unconstitutional.

This is the sum of what I understand from him to be the South Carolina doctrine, and the doctrine which he maintains. I propose to consider

it, and to compare it with the Constitution. Allow me to say, as a pre liminary remark, that I call this the South Carolina doctrine only because the gentleman himself has so denominated it. I do not feel at liberty to say that South Carolina, as a state, has ever advanced these sentiments. I hope she has not, and never may. That a great majority of her people are opposed to the tariff laws is doubtless true. That a majority, somewhat less than that just mentioned, conscientiously believe those laws unconstitutional, may probably also be true. But that any majority holds to the right of direct state interference, at state discretion, the right of nullifying acts of Congress by acts of state legislation, is more than I know, and what I shall be slow to believe.

That there are individuals, besides the honorable gentleman, who do maintain these opinions, is quite certain. I recollect the recent expression of a sentiment which circumstances attending its utterance and publication justify us in supposing was not unpremeditated "The sovereignty of the state - never to be controlled, construed, or decided on, but by her own feelings of honorable justice."

[Mr. HAYNE here rose, and said that, for the purpose of being clearly understood, he would state that his proposition was in the words of the Virginia resolution, as follows: "That this Assembly doth explicitly and peremptorily declare, that it views the powers of the federal government, as resulting from the compact to which the states are parties, as limited by the plain sense and intention of the instrument constituting that compact; as no further valid than they are authorized by the grants enumerated in that compact; and that, in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of other powers, not granted by the said compact, the states who are parties thereto have the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose, for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining, within their respective limits, the authorities, rights, and liberties, appertaining to them."]

Mr. WEBSTER resumed: I am quite aware of the existence of the resolution which the gentleman read, and has now repeated, and that he relies on it as his authority. I know the source, too, from which it is understood to have proceeded. I need not say that I have much respect for the constitutional opinions of Mr. Madison; they would weigh greatly with me, always. But, before the authority of his opinion be vouched for the gentleman's proposition, it will be proper to consider what is the fair interpretation of that resolution, to which Mr. Madison is understood to have given his sanction. As the gentleman construes it, it is an authority for him. Possibly he may not have adopted the right construction. That resolution declares that, in the case of the dangerous exercise of powers not granted by the general government, the states may interpose to arrest the progress of the evil. But how interpose? and what does this declaration purport? Does it mean no more than that there may be extreme cases, in which the people, in any mode of assembling, may resist usurpation, and relieve themselves from a tyrannical government? No one will deny this. Such resistance is not only acknowledged to be just in America, but in England, also. Blackstone admits as much, in the theory, and practice, too, of the English constitution. We, sir, who oppose the Carolina doctrine, do not deny that the people may, if they choose, throw off any government, when it becomes oppressive and intolerable, and erect a better in its stead. We all know that civil institutions are established for the public benefit, and that when they cease to answer the ends of their existence,,they may be changed. But I do not understand the doctrine now contended for to be that which, for the sake of distinctness, we may call the right of revolution. I understand the gentleman to maintain that, without revolution, without civil commotion, without rebellion, a remedy 63

VOL. IV.

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