those states who had neglected their militia to revise and amend their laws, and make them more effectual. This is all this house can do all they have a right to do.

Appropriations of Money for fitting out Vessels of War.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, February 25, 1797. Mr. GALLATIN conceived the power of granting money to be vested solely in the legislature, and though, according to the opinion of some gentlemen, (though not in his,) the President and Senate could so bind the nation as to oblige the legislature to appropriate money to carry a treaty into effect, yet, in all other cases, he did not suppose there had been any doubt with respect to the powers of the legislature in this respect.

March 2, 1797.

Mr. NICHOLAS. The power of this house to control appropriations has been settled. It was indeed an absurdity to call a body a legislature, and at the same time deny them a control over the public purse. If it were not so, where would be the use of going through the forms of that house with a money bill? The executive might as well draw upon the treasury at once for whatever sums he might stand in need of. like this would be scouted even in despotic countries.

Patronage.

A doctrine

During the Discussion of the Foreign Intercourse Bill.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, January 18, 1798. Mr. GALLATIN said, he believed, upon the whole, our government was in a great degree pure. Patronage was not very extensive, nor had it any material effect upon the house, or any other part of the government; yet he could suppose our government to be liable to abuse in this way. By the nature of the government, the different powers were divided; the power of giving offices was placed in the executive - an influence which neither of the other branches possessed; and if too large grants of money were made, it might give to that power an improper weight.

Our government, he said, was in its childhood; and if patronage had any existence, it could not, of course, be as yet alarming; but he desired gentlemen to look at all governments where this power was placed in the executive, and see if the greatest evil of the government was not the excessive influence of that department. Did not this corruption exist, in the government which was constituted most similar to ours, to such a degree as to have become a part of the system itself, and without which, it is said, he government could not go on? Was it not, therefore, prudent to keep a watchful eye in this respect?

He did not, however, speak against the power itself: it was necessary to be placed somewhere. The Constitution had fixed it in the executive. If the same power had been placed in the legislature, he believed they would have been more corrupt than the executive. He thought, therefore, the trust was wisely placed in the executive.

January 19, 1798.

On the same occasion, Mr. PINCKNEY said, all commercial regulations might as well be carried on by consuls as by ministers; and if any

differences should arise betwixt this country and any of the European governments, special envoys might be sent to settle them, as heretofore.

January 22, 1798.

Mr. BAYARD. It had been supposed, by gentlemen, that he might appoint an indefinite number of ministers; and were the house, in that case, he asked, blindly to appropriate for them? This question was predicated upon an abuse of power, whilst the Constitution supposed it would be executed with fidelity. Suppose he were to state the question in an opposite light. Let it be imagined that this country has a misunderstanding with a foreign power, and that the executive should appoint a minister, but the house, in the plenitude of its power, should refuse an appropriation. What might be the consequence? Would not the house have contravened the Constitution by taking from the President the power which by it is placed in him? It certainly would. So that this supposition of the abuse of power would go to the destruction of all authority. The legislature was bound to appropriate for the salary of the chief justice of the United States; and though the President might appoint a chimneysweeper to the office, they would still be bound. The Constitution had trusted the President, as well as it had trusted that house. Indeed, it was not conceivable that the house could act upon the subject of foreign ministers. Our interests with foreign countries came wholly under the jurisdiction of the executive. The duties of that house related to the internal affairs of the country; but what related to foreign countries and foreign agents was vested in the executive. The President was responsible for the manner in which this business was conducted. He was bound to communicate, from time to time, our situation with foreign powers; and if plans were carried on abroad for dividing or subjugating us, if he were not to make due communication of the design, he would be answerable for the neglect.

Retaliation for Aggressions.

May 23, 1798.

Mr. SITGREAVES said, it is a principle as well settled as any in the law of nations, that, when a nation has received aggressions from another nation, it is competent for the injured nation to pursue its remedy by reprisal before a declaration of war takes place; and these reprisals shall be perfectly warrantable whilst they are commensurate only with the injuries received; and are not, under such circumstances, justifiable cause of war. It is even clear that these reprisals may be made during the pendency of a negotiation, and cannot, according to the law of nations, be justifiable ground for the rupture of any such negotiations.

Alien and Sedition Laws.

June, 1798.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. By this act the President alone is empowered to make the law; to fix in his own mind what acts, what words, what thoughts, or looks, shall constitute the crime contemplated by the bill; that is, the crime of being" suspected to be dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States." This comes completely within the definition of despotism a union of legislative, executive, and judicial powers. My opinions on this subject are explicit: they are, that wherever our laws manifestly infringe the Constitution under which they were made, the people

ought not to hesitate which to obey. If we exceed our powers, we become tyrants, and our acts have no effect.

Mr. TAZEWELL opposed the bill. He knew but of one power, given to Congress by the Constitution, which could exclusively apply to aliens; and that was the power of naturalization. Whether this was a power which excluded the states from its exercise, or gave to Congress only a con current authority over the subjects, he would not now pretend to say. neither authorized Congress to prohibit the migration of foreigners to any state, nor to banish them when admitted. It was a power which could only authorize Congress to give or withhold citizenship. The states, notwithstanding this power of naturalization, could impart to aliens the rights of suffrage, the right to purchase and hold lands. There were, in this respect, no restraints upon the states. The states, Mr. T. said, had not parted from their power of admitting foreigners to their society, nor with that of preserving the benefit which their admission gave them in the general government, otherwise than that by which they would be deprived of a citizen. [The bill passed the Senate by yeas, 16; nays, 7.]

From a Report of Congress. "The right of removing aliens, as incident to the power of war and peace, according to the theory of the Constitution, belongs to the government of the United States. By the 4th section of the 4th article of the Constitution, Congress is required to protect each state from invasion; and is vested by the 8th section of the 5th article with powers to make all laws which shall be proper to carry into effect all powers vested by the Constitution in the government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof; and, to remove from the country, in times of hostility, dangerous aliens, who may be employed in preparing the way for invasion, is a measure necessary for the purpose of preventing invasion, and, of course, a measure it is empowered to adopt."

In relation to the sedition act, the committee report that "a law to punish false, scandalous, and malicious writings against the government, with intent to stir up sedition, is a law necessary for carrying into effect the power vested by the Constitution in the government of the United States, and in the officers and departments thereof, and, consequently, such a law as Congress may pass."

Further" Although the committee believe that each of the measures [alien and sedition laws] adopted by Congress is susceptible of an analytical justification, on the principles of the Constitution and national policy, yet they prefer to rest their vindication on the same ground of considering them as parts of a general system of defence, adapted to a crisis of extraordinary difficulty and danger."

[See Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of '98, at the end of this volume.]

Reduction of the Standing Army.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, January 5, 1800. Mr. RANDOLPH. I suppose the establishment of a standing army in the country not only a useless and enormous expense, but, upon the ground of the Constitution, the spirit of that instrument and the genius of a free people are equally hostile to this dangerous institution, which

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differences should arise betwixt this country and any of the European governments, special envoys might be sent to settle them, as heretofore.

January 22, 1798.

Mr. BAYARD. It had been supposed, by gentlemen, that he might appoint an indefinite number of ministers; and were the house, in that case, he asked, blindly to appropriate for them? This question was predicated upon an abuse of power, whilst the Constitution supposed it would be executed with fidelity. Suppose he were to state the question in an opposite light. Let it be imagined that this country has a misunderstanding with a foreign power, and that the executive should appoint a minister, but the house, in the plenitude of its power, should refuse an appropriation. What might be the consequence? Would not the house have contravened the Constitution by taking from the President the power which by it is placed in him? It certainly would. So that this supposition of the abuse of power would go to the destruction of all authority. The legislature was bound to appropriate for the salary of the chief justice of the United States; and though the President might appoint a chimneysweeper to the office, they would still be bound. The Constitution had trusted the President, as well as it had trusted that house. Indeed, it was not conceivable that the house could act upon the subject of foreign ministers. Our interests with foreign countries came wholly under the jurisdiction of the executive. The duties of that house related to the internal affairs of the country; but what related to foreign countries and foreign agents was vested in the executive. The President was responsible for the manner in which this business was conducted. He was bound to communicate, from time to time, our situation with foreign powers; and if plans were carried on abroad for dividing or subjugating us, if he were not to make due communication of the design, he would be answerable for the neglect.

Retaliation for Aggressions.

May 23, 1798.

Mr. SITGREAVES said, it is a principle as well settled as any in the law of nations, that, when a nation has received aggressions from another nation, it is competent for the injured nation to pursue its remedy by reprisal before a declaration of war takes place; and these reprisals shall be perfectly warrantable whilst they are commensurate only with the injuries received; and are not, under such circumstances, justifiable cause of war. It is even clear that these reprisals may be made during the pendency of a negotiation, and cannot, according to the law of nations, be justifiable ground for the rupture of any such negotiations.

Alien and Sedition Laws.

June, 1798.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. By this act the President alone is empowered to make the law; to fix in his own mind what acts, what words, what thoughts, or looks, shall constitute the crime contemplated by the bill; that is, the crime of being "suspected to be dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States." This comes completely within the definition of despotisma union of legislative, executive, and judicial powers. My opinions on this subject are explicit: they are, that wherever our laws manifestly infringe the Constitution under which they were made, the people

ought not to hesitate which to obey. If we exceed our powers, we become tyrants, and our acts have no effect.

Mr. TAZEWELL opposed the bill. He knew but of one power, given to Congress by the Constitution, which could exclusively apply to aliens : and that was the power of naturalization. Whether this was a power which excluded the states from its exercise, or gave to Congress only a con current authority over the subjects, he would not now pretend to say. It neither authorized Congress to prohibit the migration of foreigners to any state, nor to banish them when admitted. It was a power which could only authorize Congress to give or withhold citizenship. The states, notwithstanding this power of naturalization, could impart to aliens the rights of suffrage, the right to purchase and hold lands. There were, in this respect, no restraints upon the states. The states, Mr. T. said, had not parted from their power of admitting foreigners to their society, nor with that of preserving the benefit which their admission gave them in the general government, otherwise than that by which they would be deprived. of a citizen. [The bill passed the Senate by yeas, 16; nays, 7.]

From a Report of Congress."The right of removing aliens, as incident to the power of war and peace, according to the theory of the Constitution, belongs to the government of the United States. By the 4th section of the 4th article of the Constitution, Congress is required to protect each state from invasion; and is vested by the 8th section of the 5th article with powers to make all laws which shall be proper to carry into effect all powers vested by the Constitution in the government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof; and, to remove from the country, in times of hostility, dangerous aliens, who may be employed in preparing the way for invasion, is a measure necessary for the purpose of preventing invasion, and, of course, a measure it is empowered to adopt."

In relation to the sedition act, the committee report that "a law to punish false, scandalous, and malicious writings against the government, with intent to stir up sedition, is a law necessary for carrying into effect the power vested by the Constitution in the government of the United States, and in the officers and departments thereof, and, consequently, such a law as Congress may pass."

Further" Although the committee believe that each of the measures [alien and sedition laws] adopted by Congress is susceptible of an analytical justification, on the principles of the Constitution and national policy, yet they prefer to rest their vindication on the same ground of considering them as parts of a general system of defence, adapted to a crisis of extraordinary difficulty and danger."

[See Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of '98, at the end of this volume.]

Reduction of the Standing Army.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, January 5, 1800. Mr. RANDOLPH. I suppose the establishment of a standing army in the country not only a useless and enormous expense, but, upon the ground of the Constitution, the spirit of that instrument and the genius of a free people are equally hostile to this dangerous institution, which 56

VOL. IV.