JER, 第 12 卷,第 1-2 期Hanyang Economic Research Institute in collaboration with Hanyang University College of Business and Economics, 2007 |
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第 1 到 3 筆結果,共 13 筆
第 174 頁
... signaling is a way for an informed player to communi- cate his type about his ability or his quality to uninformed players . In the context of an electoral competition game , electoral signaling is an effective way for an informed ...
... signaling is a way for an informed player to communi- cate his type about his ability or his quality to uninformed players . In the context of an electoral competition game , electoral signaling is an effective way for an informed ...
第 176 頁
... signaling model because they attempt to signal their high quality . A signaling framework may provide us not only with some explanation of many existing empirical results , but also with an incentive for incumbent to engage in high ...
... signaling model because they attempt to signal their high quality . A signaling framework may provide us not only with some explanation of many existing empirical results , but also with an incentive for incumbent to engage in high ...
第 188 頁
... signaling games can be quite subtle and complex , the basic idea of the role of signaling to send necessary information is simple . Candidates of different types , with possessing dif- ferent information about their own quality ...
... signaling games can be quite subtle and complex , the basic idea of the role of signaling to send necessary information is simple . Candidates of different types , with possessing dif- ferent information about their own quality ...
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advertising activity agent alien species manager allocation analysis AOLS Bertrand game candidate quality candidate's quality Chaebol collusion regime collusion-proof congestion consumer surplus consumers cost cross hedge currency futures dependent variable DOLS Econometrics Editor-in-Chief Editorial Board effects efficient electoral female workers firm's first-best FMOLS foreign firm function futures contract Hanyang University hedge ratio high-quality candidates home firm hostile takeover incentive increase incumbency industries Japanese yen Japanese yen currency Journal of Economic Korea Korea-U.S. FTA lateral collusion low-quality candidates M&A targets marginal Midopa nomics output growth panel cointegration tests panel data panel unit root paper percent perfect Bayesian equilibrium positive quality type quota rents Regressors returns RGDP root tests sample schooling side contract signaling signaling game social welfare stock price strategy supervisor surplus tion trade trade creation unit root unit root tests utility vertical collusion vote voters wage rate Yonsei University